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ABSTRACT 
 
It is the purpose of the present thesis to emphasize, through a series of examples, the need and 
value of appropriate pre-analysis of the impact of health care regulation. Specifically, the thesis 
presents three papers on the theme of regulation in different aspects of health care provision 
and financing. The first two consist of economic analyses of the impact of health care regulation 
and the third comprises the creation of an instrument for supporting economic analysis of 
health care regulation, namely in the field of evaluation of health care programs. 
The first paper develops a model of health plan competition and pricing in order to understand 
the dynamics of health plan entry and exit in the presence of switching costs and alternative 
health premium payment systems. We build an explicit model of death spirals, in which profit-
maximizing competing health plans find it optimal to adopt a pattern of increasing relative 
prices culminating in health plan exit. We find the steady-state numerical solution for the price 
sequence and the plan’s optimal length of life through simulation and do some comparative 
statics. This allows us to show that using risk adjusted premiums and imposing price floors are 
effective at reducing death spirals and switching costs, while having employees pay a fixed 
share of the premium enhances death spirals and increases switching costs. 
Price regulation of pharmaceuticals is one of the cost control measures adopted by the 
Portuguese government, as in many European countries. When such regulation decreases the 
products’ real price over time, it may create an incentive for product turnover. 
Using panel data for the period of 1997 through 2003 on drug packages sold in Portuguese 
pharmacies, the second paper addresses the question of whether price control policies create 
an incentive for product withdrawal. Our work builds the product survival literature by 
accounting for unobservable product characteristics and heterogeneity among consumers when 
constructing quality, price control and competition indexes. These indexes are then used as 
covariates in a Cox proportional hazard model. We find that, indeed, price control measures 
increase the probability of exit, and that such effect is not verified in OTC market where no such 
price regulation measures exist. We also find quality to have a significant positive impact on 
product survival. 
In the third paper, we develop a microsimulation discrete events model (MSDEM) for cost-
effectiveness analysis of Human Immunodeficiency Virus treatment, simulating individual paths 
from antiretroviral therapy (ART) initiation to death. Four driving forces determine the course 
of events: CD4+ cell count, viral load resistance and adherence.  A novel feature of the model 
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with respect to the previous MSDEMs is that distributions of time to event depend on 
individuals’ characteristics and past history. Time to event was modeled using parametric 
survival analysis. Events modeled include: viral suppression, regimen switch due virological 
failure, regimen switch due to other reasons, resistance development, hospitalization, AIDS 
events, and death. Disease progression is structured according to therapy lines and the model is 
parameterized with cohort Portuguese observational data.  
An application of the model is presented comparing the cost-effectiveness ART initiation with 
two nucleoside analogue reverse transcriptase inhibitors (NRTI) plus one non-nucleoside 
reverse transcriptase inhibitor(NNRTI) to two NRTI plus boosted protease inhibitor (PI/r) in HIV-
1 infected individuals. We find 2NRTI+NNRTI to be a dominant strategy. Results predicted by 
the model reproduce those of the data used for parameterization and are in line with those 
published in the literature. 
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1. Introduction 
The field of Health Economics developed as a branch of Economic Analysis due to the 
specificities of the health sector. These specificities include not only the right to health 
protection (established in Article 64 of the Portuguese Constitution) but also the presence of 
multiple market failures deriving from uncertainty, externalities and incomplete information.  
The unique and aggravated combination of such specificities has justified public intervention in 
health. Public Intervention in healthcare systems assumes many roles, namely those of 
insurance provider, healthcare provider and regulator. 
The exact degree of governmental intervention in health care differs between countries. 
Portugal, like many other European countries, has opted for a National Health Service type 
system while the United States has traditionally favored a private sector approach.   
Regardless of the level of intervention desired by each society, few argue with the regulatory 
role played by the State in the health sector. As a regulator, the State issues norms and 
establishes the rules of the game which condition the activities of those in this sector. As a 
regulator, it is up to the State to create, through adequate public policies, an environment that 
promotes equity and efficiency. 
In order to reach this objective, it is essential that health care policies be analyzed in the light of 
economic theory, which is where Health Economics plays a predominant role. Therefore, it is 
the purpose of the present thesis to attest the need and value of appropriate analysis of the 
impact of health care regulation. It is also important to emphasize that such analysis should be 
performed in the specific context of its application, since, in terms of social welfare, the 
outcome of the actions of the regulator will depend on the context in which such regulation is 
performed. 
With this goal in mind, the value of context specific economic analysis of health regulation is, in 
the present thesis, highlighted through a series of examples of different health issues in distinct 
health care sub-sectors. Specifically, the thesis presents three papers on the theme of 
regulation in different aspects of health care provision and financing. The first two consist of 
economic analyses of the impact of health care regulation, and the third comprises the creation 
of an instrument for supporting economic analysis of health care regulation, namely in the field 
of evaluation of health care programs.  
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The three articles deal with different health sub-sectors: the health insurance market, the 
pharmaceutical market and the provision of treatment for HIV infection. The choice of distinct 
subject matter serves to emphasize the broadness of the theme in question and, thus, highlight 
the need for a correct pre-analysis of the impact of health care regulation that is not limited to 
one specific area but must, in fact, be applicable to all problems that regulation tries to 
minimize. 
The themes selected reflect premises of major relevance for health policies. Obviously, many 
other topics of equal or greater importance exist, but the chosen examples are especially 
appropriate for the purpose of the thesis. The first two examples evaluate the impact of the 
same regulatory issue (price regulation) with evidence suggesting opposite effects in terms of 
the impact on welfare. The first article focuses on an example where price control reduces 
switching costs while the second provides evidence of increased switching costs due to price 
control regulation. As such, these two papers demonstrate the need and value of context 
specific economic evaluation of health regulation. The third article emerges naturally as a 
response to such need by providing an instrument that will precisely contribute to such context 
specific economic evaluation of health regulation. 
The aim of the first paper is to understand the dynamics of health plan entry, exit and pricing in 
the presence of switching costs and biased selection. Moreover, we aim at understanding how 
these dynamics are affected by alternative price regulation strategies.  
The existing insurance market literature has, generally, modeled equilibrium patterns of 
adverse selection without trying to model the dynamics of health plan entry and exit, while in 
the non-health literature, a variety of models examine dynamic pricing strategies with switching 
costs. Consequently, we build on the existing insurance market literature by developing a new 
model of health plan competition and pricing, specifically accounting for the dynamics of health 
plan entry and exit in the presence of switching costs. In order to understand the impact of 
regulation we simulate the equilibrium under alternative health premium payment systems. 
We obviously make a number of simplifying assumptions in order to focus attention on pricing 
dynamics, plan switching and entry/exit decisions: we assume that plans are ex-ante identical; 
we choose to model entry and exit of health plans into a given employer, not in the overall 
market; we allow for only two types of enrollees; and we assume the switching costs 
distribution to be independent of health status. We use a discrete time model to capture the 
fact that health plan pricing decisions and commercial plan enrollment decisions are each made 
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only once a year. We find it to be important enough to justify the additional computational 
requirement resulting from the absence of an explicit terminal condition. 
The theoretical model explains the economic rationale behind the insurance provider’s strategy 
of offering heath plans with extremely aggressive prices in the first years, followed by sharp 
increases in subsequent years. This strategy leads to eventual market exit, once the prices, 
despite the switching costs, are no longer competitive. 
This phenomenon named “churning” 1
Among our most interesting findings is the possibility that, a first period price floor strategy, can 
potentially be welfare improving. By reducing competition, the imposition of a price floor, 
depriving health plans of aggressive entrance, substantially reduces average switching costs 
plus average premium, and softens death spirals at the same time, as it yields health plans 
positive intertemporal profits.  We also find that in the presence of switching costs, cost sharing 
is welfare reducing while, on the other hand, risk adjustment yields lower total costs (switching 
costs plus premium costs) to consumers.  
 has been widely referred to in the health policy literature 
[1, 2]. In an attempt to minimize its impact some States, in the United States of America have 
opted to administratively establish an upper limit to price increases. More often than not, such 
policy leads the insurance companies to anticipate product removal from the market, thereby 
generating elevated switching costs to consumers. 
While true that, in Portugal, the health sector is mainly financed by public health insurance, 
given the growing share of employer-provided private health insurance, the analysis to be 
performed and the conclusions to be drawn in the first article are also of relevance in the 
national context, as they may guide future regulatory action in that sector.  
The topic for the second article arises from the assertion that the phenomenon observed in the 
Unites States (U.S) health insurance market, where decreasing profits lead to the eventual 
product exit, could be the origin of the observed significant turnover rate of products in the 
pharmaceutical market in Portugal.  
In the U.S. health care insurance plan market analyzed in the first article, there are no 
restrictions to the increase of prices upon entry into the market; nonetheless, the rise of costs 
                                                          
1 In general terms, “churning” refers to the following phenomenon: The insurance companies competing in prices enter the market 
with very aggressive prices that only cover the costs while the initial exclusion clauses are valid, but that are too low to cover the 
costs two years later, once these clauses are no longer applicable. The result is an abrupt rise in prices, one or two years after the 
product enters the market. 
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leads to a decrease in profit throughout the life of the product. In the Portuguese 
pharmaceutical market, once the initial price is set, subsequent price increases are rarely 
allowed and reductions may be mandated. Posterior price variations are determined by the 
annual pharmaceutical price revision, announced by the Government. These annual 
pharmaceutical price revisions set the maximum allowed price increase as a function of the 
previous year’s inflation rate, and are usually set below the inflation rate, which means that the 
real price decreases over time as the product ages. Although the decrease in the actual price 
does not go hand in hand with the decrease in profit throughout the life of a product, reality 
dictates that the decrease of the actual price can imply that the maximization of profits be 
obtained through the re-introduction of the product in the market.  
Thus, one way to regain control over the price is to replace the existing product by a “renewed 
version” of the same. Although, the price of the new product will still be set under the general 
rules, which, in essence, take the average price of that of a similar product from four reference 
countries, a price negotiation takes place once again. The renewed version may be reflected in 
something as simple as new packaging.  
The aim of the second paper is, therefore, to understand whether price regulation of the 
Portuguese pharmaceutical market creates an incentive for product turnover. The research 
question is addressed by empirically evaluating, in a reduced-form model, the determinants of 
product life-cycle in the pharmaceutical market. 
In line with analysis performed in other markets, we construct indices of competition, 
differentiation, price control and quality which are used as explanatory variables in survival 
analysis. If, indeed, price regulation does create an incentive for product turnover, a significant 
coefficient on the price control index is expected.  
Methodologically, we build on the existing product survival literature by introducing in this 
literature methods developed in the Industrial Organization literature. While proxies for 
unobserved product quality have previously been considered as a determinant of exit, we apply 
a more flexible non-parametric method to the estimation of the unobservable component then 
obtain consumer preferences for both observable and unobservable characteristics and use 
those to build an index of product quality.  To our knowledge, the methodology followed had 
not previously been applied in the product survival literature.  
While only a dynamic structural model of entry and exit would allow for a full understanding of 
the impact of any given health policy and the consequences of any changes in the regulatory 
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environment, we find the proposed methodology, which is considerably more straightforward, 
to be most adequate as a first approach to examine whether the issue deserves future research. 
We find that price control measures do, in fact, influence the decision of product withdrawal 
and, consequently, have an impact on turnover rates in the pharmaceutical market. While novel 
product introductions are expected to have a positive welfare impact due to therapeutic 
improvements, replacement of existing products carries costs to society (switching costs, 
marketing costs and licensing costs) with little or no benefit to consumers. 
The development of the first two articles highlights the importance of context specific economic 
analysis of regulation in health care. In fact, in the matter of health insurance, examined in the 
first article, we find price regulation (namely, regulation of entry price in the market) to be 
potentially welfare improving while, in the pharmaceutical market, considered in the second 
article, the analysis suggests that price regulation, in its current form, may be welfare reducing.  
Considering the need to perform economic analysis on a case-by-case basis, the third article 
aims to contribute to the process of economic analysis, by creating a support instrument for 
health care regulation. The instrument consists of a framework of economic evaluation for a 
broad range of measures aimed at combating a specific disease. Economic evaluation allows for 
the resources to be given opportunity cost value, thereby contributing to the efficient allocation 
of resources.  
The instrument focuses on the area of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) infection – one of 
the priority intervention areas, according to the strategic orientation defined by the 
government’s National Health Plan for 2004-2010. In line with such strategic orientation, the 
Health Ministry delegated the National Coordination for HIV/AIDS Infection, of the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Health, the responsibility to create a National Plan of HIV/AIDS 
Prevention and Infection Control – 2007-2010. The instrument aims to be a support tool for 
resource allocation decisions in the context of health strategies defined in that Program or 
others defined by the government in the HIV/AIDS field. 
The third paper thus aims at providing a framework for cost-effectiveness analysis of HIV 
treatment in Portugal. It does not aim to compare specific named treatments or programs but, 
instead, to provide a model, general enough to allow, amongst others, for the comparison of 
antiretroviral treatment options, of different cut-offs for treatment initiation, or of different 
adherence improvement strategies. This type of instrument, properly parameterized to the 
national context, positively contributes, therefore, to an adequate regulation of health care. 
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The framework contributes to the existing Portuguese literature, given that no other model, 
parameterized with Portuguese cohort data, is available for economic evaluation of a broad 
range of HIV treatment related decisions. It should be noted that, due to the requirement of 
economic evaluation studies in applications for drug reimbursement, several economic 
evaluation models of HIV treatment have, obviously, been developed or at least adapted in 
Portugal. These models were nevertheless built to compare specific antiretroviral drugs, 
parameterized with international data taken from the international literature. Since economic 
evaluation models provided to National Authority of Medicines and Health Products, IP 
(INFARMED), in the context of reimbursement applications, are not publicly available direct 
comparison is not possible. 
A discrete event microsimulation model is designed to fit the disease progression from start of 
antiretroviral treatment (ART) to death. The model is parameterized to reflect characteristics of 
HIV infected individuals at ART initiation in Portugal, as well as the country’s clinical practice. 
Given the unavailability of a national database complete enough for estimation of all 
parameters of interest, several databases are used. 
The work also contributes to the existing literature, in that the methodology applied, namely, 
microsimulation discrete events model has not, to our knowledge, been previously applied to 
cost-effectiveness of HIV treatment. Discrete events simulation (DES) has been applied in a 
variety of settings. Of particular similarity to our model is the one developed by Barton et al. 
[3]- The Birmingham Rheumatoid Arthritis Model (BRAM). We expand on their work by 
modeling the parameters of the Weibull distributions from which time to event is sampled as a 
function of patient characteristics and history. Such modeling allows for a better fit to the 
observed data. 
DES is selected for three reasons. First, microsimulation (individual simulation) models have 
been reported to perform better than a Markov model in isolating long-term implications of 
small, but important, differences in crucial input data  [4, 5]. Second, in DES event occurrences 
determine time advances so random draws are never performed for patients to remain in the 
same state. Moreover, they do not limit event occurrences to cycle length2
                                                          
2 The shorter the cycle, the more computationally demanding the model will become. 
, as occurs in fixed 
cycle length models. Third, DES model are particularly useful when interaction between 
individuals is of relevance, as is the case with infectious diseases. Although such interactions are 
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not modeled in the present framework, the framework was designed to allow for its future 
integration in an epidemiological model. 
Given the fact that the model developed is a framework for analysis, we have a priori no 
empirical findings to report. Nonetheless, while a model is, by definition, a simplification of 
reality, its usefulness depends on its ability to reproduce the main aspects under consideration. 
Overall, the model predicts values close to those observed in the Centro Hospitalar de Cascais 
(CHC) sample, from which the model was (for the most part) parameterized. Individual 
parameter values predicted by the model (such as, CD4+ cell count growth, % reaching viral 
suppression, first line duration, etc.) are also close to those published in the literature, when it 
is possible to perform such comparisons. It should, however, be noted that validation also 
requires the ability to reproduce results from different samples and such a step has not yet 
been performed due to lack of available data. 
Even though the model developed is a framework for analysis, we do include an application of 
the model consisting of a cost-effectiveness analysis of two Nucleoside Reverse Transcriptase 
Inhibitor (NRTI) plus one Non-nucleoside Reverse Transcriptase Inhibitor (NNRTI) versus two 
NRTI plus one boosted protease inhibitor (PI/r) as a first line antiretroviral therapy regimen [6] 
and the results obtained are in line with those obtained by equivalent analysis in other 
countries [7, 8]. All three analysis reinforce the British HIV Association 2008 [9] 
recommendations to select NNRTIs as the third agent of choice in treating naïve patients, unless 
impeditive clinical factors  exist. 
In conclusion, the thesis as a whole contributes to highlight the importance of economic 
analysis as a support instrument to health care policies. Although economic analysis, namely, 
economic evaluation, has been adopted and even become mandatory prior to political 
decisions in some health sub-sectors, such as in pharmaceutical reimbursements applications, 
the need and value of such analysis in other health sub-sectors has not yet been fully embraced 
by decision makers. In the last decade we have witnessed several examples of policy changes 
based on economic rationale (the separation of the financing and provider roles in the health 
sector is such an example), but by highlighting the value of information provided by economic 
analysis, and by reinforcing the need for context specific analysis, the present thesis holds as an 
argument in favor of its broader utilization and a consequently more efficient allocation of 
scarce resources. 
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 Knowledge driven by research is built by adding small pieces of a puzzle, one after the other. 
Looking at what has been done and adding something to it. Throughout the dissertation, we 
carefully reference the work, developed by others, on which our work is based. The remaining, 
(unreferenced) developments are the authors’ contribution. This dissertation adds three little 
pieces to the puzzle of health sector regulation through economic analysis. Each chapter adds 
one tiny piece to the complete picture and, in so doing, we believe that it will be of use to those 
who in the future will look at what has been done and build from there.     
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2. Death Spirals, Switching Costs, and Health Premium Payment 
Systems 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper develops a model of health plan competition and pricing in order to understand the 
dynamics of health plan entry and exit, in the presence of switching costs and alternative health 
premium payment systems. We build an explicit model of death spirals, in which profit-
maximizing competing health plans find it optimal to adopt a pattern of increasing relative 
prices culminating in health plan exit. 
 
We find the steady-state numerical solution for the price sequence and the plan’s optimal 
length of life through simulation and do some comparative statics. This allows us to show that 
using risk adjusted premiums and imposing price floors are effective at reducing death spirals 
and switching costs, while having employees pay a fixed share of the premium enhances death 
spirals and increases switching costs. 
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Abbreviations and notation  
 
  
Abbreviations and notation Description
hat notation Competitor defined value
star notation Optimal values
AP Average premium
ASWC Average switching cost
AVCt Average cost in period t
BU Boston University
CM Annual costs of enrolling a sick person
CN Annual costs of enrolling a healthy person
d Rate at which employees leave the firm per year
FC Annual fixed costs
ft Probability of not switching from a plan aged t
Ft Cumulative probability of not switching from a plan aged t
HPPC Health plan participation constra int 
IHS Involuntary healthy switchers
IS Involuntary switchers
ISS Involuntary sick switchers
k (1-s)
l (1-d)
Mt Number of sick individuals
NE New employees
Nt Number of healthy individuals
Pmin Lowest premium charged by any competitor
Pt premium charged by a plan aged t
s Rate at which healthy employees become sick per year
SWt Expected number of people switching out of a t year old plan
T Health plan´s life span
THC Total health costs of the firm's employees 
VHS Voluntary healthy switchers 
VS Voluntary switchers 
VSS Voluntary sick switchers 
Vt Cumulative discounted profi ts  from period t onwards
w Switching cost
W Maximum switching cost
α Risk adjustment factor
Δ Variation
λ Proportion of premium payed by the employee under cost sharing
ρ Discount factor 
Ψ Total number of plans offered by the employer 
∏t Health plan profits in period t
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2.1. Introduction 
This paper is inspired in part by the history of health plan entry, exit and pricing in the Boston 
area. Both Boston University (BU) and Harvard University experienced rapid rates of premium 
escalation during the 1990's, culminating in numerous health plans being canceled by 
employers or plan providers. The Harvard University Experience is analyzed in Cutler and Reber 
[10], while the BU Experience is discussed further below. 
We develop a model of health plan competition and pricing in order to understand the 
dynamics of health plan entry and exit, in the presence of switching costs and alternative health 
premium payment systems. Switching costs are defined as costs incurred by the enrollee of a 
health plan if and when he decides to change his health plan. These costs may result, among 
others, from required paper work, change in health care provider or information gathering.    
We build an explicit model of death spirals, defined as a pattern of increasing relative prices 
culminating in health plan exit, in which profit-maximizing competing health plans find it 
optimal to adopt such a pattern. Plans may be forced to enter such death spirals, because of the 
introduction of new plans that charge low premiums, thereby attracting the employees with 
lower switching costs. 
In order to focus attention on pricing dynamics and plan switching, we construct a model in 
which all of the plans are ex ante identical. We fully appreciate that product differentiation is 
one factor in recent plan entry and exit, among various types of managed care plans. However, 
we believe that emphasis on these differences clouds the understanding of some of the basic 
forces driving pricing, entry and exit. Regardless of whether plans are identical or differentiated, 
entry of new plans creates an important asymmetry, changing the mixture of healthy and sick 
enrollees in each health plan. Plan entry and exit permits a recurring cycle of pricing, in which 
the costs of enrollees in existing plans are always increasing. Rather than product 
differentiation, our focus on identical plans emphasizes this process as a rationale for plan 
entry. 
The existing insurance market literature has generally modeled equilibrium patterns of adverse 
selection without trying to model the dynamics of health plan entry and exit [11-16]. Rothschild 
and Stiglitz [11] analyze adverse selection equilibrium in multiple plan types, but without 
modeling the process of entry, exit, or changes in pricing over time. Neipp and Zeckhauser [17] 
introduce the notion of death spirals and examine the empirical patterns, but do not attempt to 
build an analytical model, and treat cost increases of existing plans as exogenous to pricing 
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decisions. Keeler, Carter and Newhouse [18] develop a model of consumer choice among 
differentiated health plans, and use a dynamic process to understand equilibrium enrollments, 
premiums and social costs, however they do not attempt to model health plan entry and exit. 
Vistnes, Cooper and Vistnes [19] use a two period game in which health plans first compete to 
be selected by employers and, if selected, compete to be chosen by consumers, but it does not 
explore the dynamics of pricing or exit per se. Ellis and Ma [20] consider a related issue by 
analyzing the impact of employer provided health insurance on job turnover. The authors focus 
on the firms’ insurance offer decision, while we focus on the health plans’ offer decision.  
In the non-health literature, a variety of models examine dynamic pricing strategies with 
switching costs. Our model shares some features with that of Beggs and Klemperer [21]3, but 
their framework focuses on two infinitely lived firms, and does not support death spirals in 
which plan prices increase as market share shrinks, to the point where a firm decides to exit. 
Gale and Rosenthal [22] develop a model of firms whose quality is only imperfectly 
observed4.The model in this paper differs from theirs in that it focus on biased selection5
Switching costs introduce the potential for biased enrollment, if they differ across enrollees and 
are correlated with health costs [10, 16]. Strombom et al. [23],  examine switching among 
employees of the University of California system during the mid 1990's. They find that, under a 
fixed contribution scenario, consumers price elasticity ranges from −1.8 to −10 indicating 
considerable price sensitivity but also a significant heterogeneity among consumers
 rather 
than adverse selection. 
6. This 
finding, together with the fact that new employees are, on average, much healthier than 
existing enrollees, lays the basis for potentially severe biased selection7
Grönqvist [24] empirically analyses the biased selection problem, arguing that this can explain 
the limited empirical evidence for adverse selection in insurance markets in the literature, and 
presents a model of insurance choice focusing on the decision of whether to purchase 
. 
                                                          
3 Beggs and Klemplerer examine the implications of switching costs in an infinite period market in which new consumers arrive each 
period that are not yet attached to a seller. 
4 In that model firms enter at a high quality and high price. Once they have established themselves to have this high quality and 
before exiting, firms switch to low quality, in order to take advantage of the greater profitability of charging high prices with low 
quality. 
5 Biased selection includes both favorable selection (which plans want) and adverse selection (which enrollees want individually). 
6 The analysis suggests that the healthiest enrollees may be four times as responsive to price differences as the sickest group of 
employees. This difference increases nine fold when they also allow for variation in age and employment tenure. Age and tenure 
are shown to significantly (and negatively) affect price sensitivity. 
7 Mean annual premiums in the Strombom et al. sample are approximately $3900, while employee annual spending on premiums 
averages just under $700 (18%). His demand model predicts that a $60 per year increase in the employee premium will result in a 
50% reduction in the proportion of healthy individuals choosing a plan, versus only an 8.8% reduction for sick enrollees. 
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insurance, which is a complement to our analysis. Most recently, Cutler et al. [25] estimate the 
determinants of health plan switching (adverse selection, adverse retention, aging, 
demographics and the level of cost-sharing) and incorporate these in a simulation model to 
predict the long-term dynamics. Their analysis focuses on the determinants of switching 
between two different types of plans while we abstract from plan differences and focus instead 
on entry, exit and dynamic pricing behavior.   
Several published empirical papers support the idea of death spiral and biased selection in the 
health insurance market [26-29]. Pauly et al. [30], on the other hand, argue that the 
phenomenon interpreted as death spiral may instead be an adjustment towards more 
preferred products which would have occurred even in the absence of adverse selection8
 
. Our 
model provides a rational for death spirals even in the presence of identical plans. 
Of direct relevance to our theoretical framework is the recently published article by Handle [31] 
who builds a structural model to empirically investigate consumer switching costs in the context 
of health insurance markets, accounting for potential adverse selection. The author estimates 
an average switching cost of $1,570 (75% of the average employee premium). 
 
Fixed costs for health plans prevent plans from continuing to exist with minimal enrollments at 
very high prices, and are plausible given that certain transaction and administrative costs are 
independent of the number of plan enrollees. Biased selection and fixed costs are, thus, the 
driving forces of the health plan death spirals modeled here. 
Death spirals are a consequence of how contracts are written between health plan providers 
and employers, not a characteristic of the plans themselves. Therefore, we model entry and exit 
of health plans to a given employer, not entry and exit of health plans overall. So, the same 
health plan can be a new entrant with one employer, while being a long time incumbent with 
other employers. Glazer and McGuire [32] have documented that health plans in the Boston 
area routinely charge different premiums for identical plans. Once plans are allowed to price 
discriminate between different employers, death spirals can occur, even when health plans are 
profitable. 
Our model generates many insights. Plan deaths impose much higher switching costs than 
voluntary switches, since higher prices induce the lowest switching cost enrollees to switch 
                                                          
8 Their conclusions are drawn from the fact that “implementing a significant risk adjustment had no discernable effect on adverse 
selection against the most generous indemnity insurance policy” 
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plans, while plan deaths force those with the highest switching costs to involuntarily change 
plans. We use the model to simulate how premium cost sharing schemes, risk-adjustment 
policies and the imposition of price floors, affect entry and exit, as well as health plan pricing 
and enrollee choice patterns. 
Among our most interesting findings is the possibility that a first period price floor strategy can 
potentially be welfare improving. By reducing competition, the imposition of a price floor 
deprives health plans of aggressive loss leading entry. A price floor can potentially reduce the 
sum of switching costs plus premiums and soften death spirals at the same time, as it yields 
health plans positive intertemporal profits. 
 We also find that, in the presence of switching costs, cost sharing is welfare reducing, while, in 
contrast, risk adjustment yields lower total costs (switching costs plus premium costs) to 
consumers. 
While the analysis has been inspired by the dynamics of entry and exit of health plans in the 
United States, lessons to be learned from this analysis are relevant to other countries, such as 
Portugal, where the employer-provided private insurance market is growing [33]. A proper 
health policy environment will minimize phenomena’s such as “churning”9
The remainder of the paper is organized into four sections. In Section 
and death spirals 
observed in countries where health care is extensively financed through private health 
insurance. 
2.2, a motivating example 
drawing upon empirical results from three markets in the United States is presented. Sections 
2.3 and 2.4 describe the analytical model and discuss the attainable analytical results in a model 
with no closed-form solution. In Section 2.5 the four premium payment systems under 
consideration are presented in the context of the analytical model. In Section 2.6 we summarize 
the steady-state equilibrium solutions to our model under different premium payment systems 
and perform some sensitivity analysis. We conclude the paper with a discussion of the 
implications and limitations of our model. 
                                                          
9 In general terms, “churning” refers to the following phenomenon: The insurance companies competing in prices enter the market 
with very aggressive prices that only cover the costs while the initial exclusion clauses are valid, but that are too low to cover the 
costs two years later, once these clauses are no longer applicable. The result is an abrupt rise in prices, one or two years after the 
product enters the market. 
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2.2. Motivating Evidence 
Death spirals are not occurring in all employers or in all parts of the United States, but they do 
appear to be occurring under some contracts, and Boston University seems to be an example of 
this. Results in Cutler and Reber [10] and Yu, Ellis and Ash [34] suggest that the problems facing 
Boston University are similar to those experienced by other large employers in Massachusetts. 
We present the evolution of total premiums for non-retired single employees at Boston 
University and compare it to two other markets: Minnesota and California premiums for state 
employees. A health plan is here defined as any separately, independently named and 
marketed insurance product for which a separate premium is charged. In many cases, the same 
insurance company offers multiple health plans. 
2.2.1. Premium Patterns 
Table 1 presents data on health plan entries (births) and exits (deaths) from the available 
portfolio of three employer markets (Boston University, Minnesota and California). The table 
reveals that the three employer markets have very different rates of entry and exit over time. 
Boston University has had the highest rates of entry and exit. California, despite having the 
largest number of health plans offered to its state employees, has the lowest rate of exit, and 
Minnesota lies in between the two. 
Table 1: Key Descriptive Statistics 
 
Changes in premium cost sharing occurring in each region during the sample periods are shown 
on the top of Figure 1 to Figure 4. The figures suggest that those changes may have a significant 
impact on premiums dispersion and exit rates. 
2.2.1.1. Boston University 
Boston University has offered fifteen different health plans over the 14 year period from 1987-
2001. There were eleven new plans offered, and nine plan deaths. The overall number of plans 
Sample Period Years
Plan 
Births
Plan 
Deaths
Average 
Number 
of Plans
Average 
Plan Births 
per Year
Average Plan 
Deaths per 
Year
Average 
Percentage of 
Plans Dying each 
Year
Boston University 1987-2001 14 11 9 6.10 0.79 0.64 10.5%
Minnesota 1984-1995 12 3 6 8.00 0.25 0.50 6.3%
California 1984-1995 12 6 2 22.70 0.50 0.17 0.7%
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has remained relatively constant at five or six per year, implying a plan death rate of about 10.5 
percent per year. 
Figure 1 illustrates the three primary features that we model: 
1. New plan entrants are generally priced lower than existing plans10
2. Existing plans tend to increase their premiums relative to the average 
. 
3. Higher premium plans have a greater probability of exiting than low premium plans.  
Indeed, except in 199211
 
, average premiums among exiting plans were always above average 
premium of those not exiting. 
Figure 1: Boston University Average Single Premiums 1987-2001 
 
From 1987 to 1992, BU made level premium contributions towards the six health plans that 
were offered at that time. As a result, employees faced the full cost burden of premium 
differences across plans. In 1993, BU changed its premium cost sharing so that, instead of level 
contributions, BU paid a fixed percentage of all premiums12
Figure 2
. Greater dispersion in premiums 
across plans in their real costs in 2001 is evident in . 
                                                          
10 The only entrance above average occurred in 1999 with a plan which was offered for a single year. 
11 This was the average of two plan deaths, only one of which was priced below the average premium of exiting plans. 
12 BU also adopted a strategy of freezing enrollment in two health plans, the highest cost FFS plan (BCBS Comprehensive) and the 
highest cost HMO (Tufts).  Except for those already enrolled in these plans, employees are not allowed to join them. BU also 
decided to enter the market in 2000 with its own plan, the BU Medical Center Preferred HMO.  We do not try to model these 
alternative employer strategies. 
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Figure 2: Boston University Average (95% CI) Single Premiums 
2.2.1.2. Minnesota 
Minnesota offered twelve different health plans to its state employees over the sample period 
ranging from 1984 to 1995. There were only three plan births versus six plan deaths13
Figure 3
 implying 
a plan death rate of 6.3 percent per year, and suggesting some evidence of death spirals. 
However, the most evident plan deaths occurring above the average premium happened in 
1989. This was a year after Minnesota changed its health premium payment system, moving 
from a price floor system to a level premium contribution. Under the new system, employer 
contributions are calculated as equal to the premium of the lowest cost plan.  shows 
premiums tracking together very closely from 1984-1988, at which point an enormous change 
in the dispersion of premiums occurred, quickly resulting in three plan deaths (marked with 
stars). This increased dispersion is plausible due to Minnesota switching from a price floor 
regimen to a fixed employer contribution. 
                                                          
13 Several of which reflect mergers rather than true plan exits. 
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Figure 3: Minnesota Relative Single Premiums 1984-95 
2.2.1.3. California 
 California offered 26 plans over the twelve years for which we have premium data. There were 
six plan births and two plan deaths, implying an annual plan death rate of only 0.7 percent. 
There is no evidence of death spirals in the California sample: the (only) two plan deaths in our 
sample period were at average rather than high premiums. 
 California had consistently maintained a system where the state's contribution is not tied to 
the lowest cost premium. California premiums contributions are such that employees pay no 
premium for all but the top four of its twenty three plans in 1996. This fact may be linked to the 
striking pattern shown in Figure 4: the high number of premiums clustered at the price floor 
imposed by the state. Moreover, even plans charging premiums higher than the price floor 
seem to survive for many years rather than dying, as was the case in Massachusetts and 
Minnesota. 
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Figure 4: California Relative Single Premiums 1984-95 
With no intention of generalizing based on only three markets, the premium patterns above 
suggest four patterns. First, death spirals do occur under some circumstances. Second, 
proportional premium cost sharing is associated with increases in the dispersion of premiums 
across plans. Third, maintaining a price floor is associated with lower rates of plan exit and 
slower rates of premium growth. Fourth, years in which the premium payment system is 
changed causes enormous turmoil in health plan pricing, entry and exit. 
2.3. Model 
 
Figure 5: Timing 
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We model the process as a repeated game, as represented by Figure 5. At time 0, the employer 
chooses a premium payment system, which is to say a mechanism for making payments to 
health plans and charging premiums to employees. This decision is made only once, at the 
beginning of the process, and we model how plans and consumers respond to this premium 
payment system in equilibrium, without trying to model how agents would react to changes in 
the premium payment system. 
In each period thereafter, there are five stages. During the first stage both potential new 
entrants and incumbent health plans simultaneously announce their premiums. Existing plans, 
which are unable to find a price yielding a nonnegative expected sum of future profits, exit. 
In the next stage, the employer chooses which plans to offer. Since all plans are, a priori, alike, 
the main reason for the employer to offer a new plan is to enable price competition among 
plans and keep premiums down. Among several potential new plans, the employer chooses one 
new entrant each period - the entrant announcing the lowest first period premium. If several 
plans offer the same lowest price, the employer randomly picks one. 
In the third stage of the process, each employee selects one of the offered health plans. Since 
all plans offer identical benefits, the only information employees use when choosing plans is the 
premium they will have to pay for each plan and the switching costs they will have to incur, 
should they switch plans. 
Once employees have made their choice, the next step is for plans to bear the costs of treating 
health care needs according to health status of their enrollees. The fifth, and final stage, occurs 
after costs are borne by the plans but before the prices are chosen for the next period. Chance 
determines whether a healthy consumer becomes sick and/or departs the firm, and whether a 
sick enrollee leaves the employer. The five stages are repeated in each subsequent period. 
2.3.1. Employers 
The employers are assumed to care about the sum of total premium payments plus total 
switching costs. Even though employers do not directly bear the burden of switching costs, they 
should care about the value of the health plan benefits for their employees. The employer is 
assumed not to care about switching costs borne by employees leaving the firm. 
The employer benefits from competition among potential entrants, but cannot force any plan 
to commit to a price beyond the current period. If plans are ex ante identical, the employer's 
best strategy is to select only one new entrant each period - the health plan announcing the 
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lowest first period premium. This will avoid duplication of fixed costs and induce Bertrand 
competition among potential new entrants14
2.3.2. Employees 
.  
There are only two types of employees: low cost (healthy) and high cost (sick). By sick 
employees, we mean chronically ill patients. All other employees are considered healthy. All 
new employees are assumed to be healthy and we normalize the number of new employees to 
be one. Each employee has single coverage: family contracts are not modeled. Healthy 
employees become sick at the rate 𝑠𝑠 per year, while sick employees never recover to become 
healthy again. All employees leave the firm at the rate 𝑑𝑑 per year, for reasons that are 
independent of their health status15
From the consumer's point of view, all plans offer the same coverage and give the consumer 
the same utility, except that consumers bear a switching cost when changing from their current 
plan to another. Consequently, when switching, consumers always choose the health plan 
charging the lowest premium. If, the optimal price sequence is increasing in time, the health 
plan charging the lowest premium will always be the youngest plan. 
. Employees leave the firm for reasons that are exogenous 
and independent of plan prices and enrollee switching costs. 
A more general model would consider heterogeneity in switching costs. For the time being, we 
assume that each time an employee, either healthy or sick, abandons a health plan and joins a 
new one, she is assigned a switching cost 𝑤𝑤, where 𝑤𝑤 is uniformly distributed over the interval 
[0,𝑊𝑊]. 
The structure we have just described implies that we can take expectations across all individuals 
in a health plan and represent the expected number of individuals in the plan at time 𝑡𝑡 as the 
vector {𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 ,𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡}, where 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡  is the number of healthy individuals, and  𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡   is the number of sick 
individuals. 
In the absence of any plan switching, the stochastic process can be represented by the 
following stationary transition matrix A: 
                                                          
14 Not offering a new plan each year is never optimal since existing firms will raise premiums even more. We do not model the 
optimal length of a period. 
15 We have also experimented with departure rates that are correlated with health states. This added complexity with few new 
insights. Ellis and Ma (2011) show that the higher job turnover of young employees more than offsets the predictable turnover of 
the older retirees. 
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�𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
� = 𝐴𝐴 �𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1
� 
 
where,  𝐴𝐴 = �
(1 − 𝑠𝑠)(1 − 𝑑𝑑) 0
𝑠𝑠(1 − 𝑑𝑑) (1 − 𝑑𝑑)�. With plan switching, the transition matrix is no longer 
stationary. In this case, the transition matrix, 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 , will be: 
𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡  𝐴𝐴 
where 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡  is the probability of a current enrollee not switching from a plan of age 𝑡𝑡. The 
complete specification of this probability depends on the premium payment system as 
described in Section 2.5. The expected number of people switching out of a 𝑡𝑡 year old health 
plan, 𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 , can be written as: 
𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 = [𝐴𝐴 − 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1] �
𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1
� 
Equation 1: Expected number of people switching out of a 𝒕𝒕 year old plan 
2.3.3. Health Plans 
Every year, many potential new entrant health plans compete à lá Bertrand to gain access to 
the market. Since only one new health plan is selected each year, as long as there are at least 
two potential new entrants, first period premiums are bid down to the point where the sum of 
discounted profits over the life span of the plan is exactly zero; unless a first period price floor is 
set by the employer. 
Insurance companies are assumed not to be allowed by employers to charge different 
premiums to different individuals in the same plan. However, because of switching costs, plans 
are not perfect substitutes and, consequently, each plan faces a downward sloping demand 
curve. Insurance companies are thus price setters, and each year they choose the premium to 
charge all enrollees from a given employer. 
Health plan profits in period 𝑡𝑡 (∏𝑡𝑡) can be written as: 
∏𝑡𝑡 = (𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁)𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 + (𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀)𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 − 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 
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where 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡  is the premium charged by a plan aged 𝑡𝑡, 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 are the fixed costs, and 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 and 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 are 
the one year costs of enrolling a healthy person and a sick person, respectively. Cumulative 
discounted profits from period 𝑡𝑡 onwards, 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 , is given by: 
𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 = �𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡∏𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇
𝑖𝑖=𝑡𝑡
 
 where 𝜌𝜌 is the discount factor and 𝑇𝑇 is the health plan´s optimally chosen life span. 
At any age 𝑡𝑡, if 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡  is negative, it is optimal for the plan to exit. Consequently, in order for the 
plan to remain active at age 𝑡𝑡, the following health plan participation constraint (HPPC) has to 
be satisfied: 
𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶: 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0 
2.4. Results 
Given the structure of our model, with one unit of healthy new employees arriving each period, 
the proportion 𝑠𝑠 of existing healthy employees becoming sick each period, and the proportion 
𝑑𝑑 of existing healthy employees departing each period, then the steady-state total number of 
healthy enrollees, (𝑁𝑁), that will be choosing among all of the health plans is: 
𝑁𝑁 =
1
(1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘) 
Equation 2: Steady-state total number of healthy enrollees 
where, 𝑘𝑘 = (1 − 𝑠𝑠) and 𝑘𝑘 = (1 − 𝑑𝑑). Similarly, since a proportion 𝑠𝑠 of healthy workers are 
becoming sick each period, and a proportion 𝑑𝑑 of both newly sick and previously sick are 
departing the firm, then the steady-state total number of sick employees in the firm at any 
moment, (𝑀𝑀), must be: 
𝑀𝑀 =
𝑘𝑘
(1 − 𝑘𝑘) −
𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
(1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘) 
Equation 3: Steady-state total number of sick employees 
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Regardless of how workers distribute themselves among the total number of plans offered by 
the employer (Ψ), total health costs (𝑇𝑇𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶) of the firm's employees will be: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 =
1
(1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘)
∗ 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 + �
𝑘𝑘
(1 − 𝑘𝑘)
−
𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
(1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘)
� ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 + Ψ ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 
 
2.4.1. The Social Optimum 
It is straightforward to see that the social optimum would have only one plan (and hence plan 
lifetime, 𝑇𝑇 , will be infinite), and it would charge a constant premium over time. Having a 
constant premium guarantees that consumers have no incentive to switch plans, thereby 
minimizing switching costs. From Equation 1 it can be seen that switching costs would be zero. 
Having a single health plan also minimizes the fixed costs. Hence we have: 
𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 =
1
(1− 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘) ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 + �
𝑘𝑘
(1 − 𝑘𝑘) −
𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
(1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘)� ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 + 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶
1
1 − 𝑘𝑘
 
𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = ∞ 
2.4.2. Competitive Solution 
As described in Section 2.3.3, in the absence of a price floor, competition among potential 
entrants reduces overall discounted profits to zero. The first period price (𝑃𝑃₁) is thus implicitly 
defined by: 
(𝑃𝑃₁− 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁)𝑁𝑁1 + (𝑃𝑃₁− 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀)𝑀𝑀1 − 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 + �𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖−𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡=2
∏𝑡𝑡 = 0 
Equation 4: Lifetime profit 
In order to solve Equation 4, three preliminary steps are required: The first is the specification 
of the optimal sequence of prices and profits, given T; the second is the definition of the vector 
{𝑁𝑁1,𝑀𝑀1}, also for a given life span, 𝑇𝑇; The third, and final step, is the determination of the 
optimal life span. We turn to these issues next.  
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2.4.3. The Optimal Price Sequence 
The optimal price sequence is the solution to the following optimization problem: 
 
We assume Bertrand pricing behavior. Let the hat notation define variables set by competitors 
and let  P=>?@ be the lowest premium charged by any competitor. As shown in Appendix I, the 
number of healthy and sick enrollee at any moment in time is a function of the parameters P=>?@, PA, and P, and of N, M .  NA and MA, are independent of any other past premiums 
charged by the plan. 
 
Claim: 
D ≡  =  &21₁&2₁ + [1 − 1]₁ 
Equation 5: Number of healthy and sick employees in a given plan at time t 
where the cumulative probability of not switching up to period   G  & ≡ ∏ **, = HIJKILMN@H . 
Proof: See Appendix I. 
This result implies that the premium charged by the health plan at any moment  will have no 
impact on future profits. Consequently, the optimization problem can be solved one period at a 
time through -- 1 problems of the form: 
 5P IJ     (! − "#) +  (! − "%) − &". . Q ΠA ≥ 0! ,  ,  ≥ 0S  
Problem 1: Maximization problem for period t 
 
This problem is solved by assuming that all restrictions are met, and then verifying if they are 
indeed met. By solving Problem 1, we obtain the equation defining ! , ∀  = 2, . . , -. 
 
P1,...,PT
Max V t
s. t.
HPPC
P t,N t,Mt ≥ 0
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Claim:  
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 =
�𝑊𝑊 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀��
2
+
𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
2
 
where 𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 ≡
�𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝑁𝑁₁+𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 �𝑀𝑀₁+�1−𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1�𝑁𝑁₁��
𝑁𝑁1+𝑀𝑀1
  and 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀� is the lowest premium charged by any 
competitor. 
Equation 6: Optimal price at 𝒕𝒕 > 1 
Proof: See Appendix I. 
Moreover, the expression for the optimal price depends on time, exclusively through average 
costs. Consequently, as long as AVCt   is increasing in time, so is Pt . As shown in Appendix I, it is 
easily verified that: AVCt > 𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶t−1,,∀t  , as long as CM > CN . 
Claim: The optimal price sequence {𝑃𝑃2, … ,𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇} is strictly increasing in 𝑡𝑡. 
Proof: From Equation 6, it is clear that 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡  is increasing in 𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡  , the average cost at time t: 
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
=
1
2
> 0 
The intuition behind the above claim is the following: in our model, two forces cause health 
plan average costs, and hence health plan premium, to increase as a plan ages. First, new 
enrollees are healthier than average and perfectly price elastic: they always join the lowest 
premium plan, lowering the new plan costs relative to existing plans. Secondly, even in the 
absence of plan switching, the healthy get sicker, raising plan costs over time16
The fact that the optimal sequence of prices is increasing in 𝑡𝑡 has an important consequence to 
our model. In Section 
. 
2.3.2 we argued that switchers would always select the health plan with 
the lowest premium. If prices are increasing with time, this implies that all employees deciding 
to switch will select the youngest plan (𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀� = 𝑃𝑃1). Equation 6 may, then, be rewritten as: 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 =
𝑊𝑊 + 𝑃𝑃1�
2 +
𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
2  
Equation 7: Equilibrium optimal price at time 𝒕𝒕 > 1 
                                                          
16 Cutler and Reber (1998) highlight the importance of the third factor, which they term "adverse retention." The classic Rothschild 
and Stiglitz (1976) frameworks focus on the adverse selection resulting from the fact that healthier employees are more likely to 
switch plans. This fact would occur in our framework if heterogeneity in switching costs was included. 
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Consequently, changes in pricing by incumbents older than 𝑡𝑡 do not affect the pricing decision 
of a firm of age 𝑡𝑡. After establishing its market share in the first period, and given the premium 
charged by the youngest plan, 𝑃𝑃₁, the health plan tries to extract the highest possible rent from 
consumers over which it has market power due to switching costs, i.e. its enrollees. Equation 7 
is analogous to the well-known monopolist optimal price with (𝑊𝑊 + 𝑃𝑃₁) as the consumer's 
reservation price. Indeed, once we have solved Equation 5 for 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 , it becomes obvious that 
(𝑊𝑊 + 𝑃𝑃₁) may be interpreted as the consumer's reservation price. 
This notation for the reservation price also creates a useful criterion of the firms exit decision. 
Note that the average cost is a deterministic function of the parameters 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 ,𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 , 𝑘𝑘 and the initial 
enrollments 𝑁𝑁1 and 𝑀𝑀1. The firms exit decision will be when 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀 ≡ 𝑊𝑊 + 𝑃𝑃1� < 𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 . 
This can be simplified to yield the following exit condition: 
𝐸𝐸𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀 𝑊𝑊 + 𝑃𝑃�1 <
𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝑁𝑁₁ + 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀[𝑀𝑀₁ + (1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1)𝑁𝑁₁]
𝑁𝑁₁ + 𝑀𝑀₁
+
𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶
𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1(𝑁𝑁₁ + 𝑀𝑀₁)
 
Equation 8: Exit condition 
This equation shows that there are two reasons why firms exit: One is because of the increase 
in the average variable cost of their enrollees as the proportion of healthy enrollees declines 
relative to the sick (aging); The other is due to the increase in average fixed costs as total plan 
enrollment declines. This equation makes it clear that in this model, firm exit is exogenous to 
the pricing strategy of any firm other than the new entrant, which sets 𝑃𝑃₁�. 
From Equation 8, it can be seen that firm lifetime will decrease as 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 increases, plan departure 
rate increases (𝑘𝑘 ≡ 1 − 𝑑𝑑 decreases), rate of becoming sick increases, and the maximum 
support for switching costs increases.  
As shown in the Appendix I, substituting Equation 7 back in the objective function of Problem 1, 
we obtain an expression for the optimal period 𝑡𝑡 profit. 
∏𝑡𝑡  =
𝑘𝑘
4𝑊𝑊  (𝑁𝑁₁+ 𝑀𝑀₁)[𝑊𝑊 + 𝑃𝑃₁ − 𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡]²− 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 
Equation 9: Profit in period t 
 
Claim: Profits, after the first period, are decreasing in 𝑡𝑡.  
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Proof: In the optimal profit expression (Equation 9), we see that profit at time 𝑡𝑡 depends on 𝑡𝑡 
exclusively through 𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡  and, as it can easily be verified, 𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 > 𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1,∀𝑡𝑡  . 
Substituting Equation 9 back in Equation 4 yields: 
𝑃𝑃₁ =  𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶₁ +
∑ 𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡−1𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶
𝑁𝑁₁ + 𝑀𝑀₁
−
1
4𝑊𝑊
�𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡−1
𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡=2
𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1[(𝑊𝑊 + 𝑃𝑃₁�) − 𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡]² 
Equation 10: Optimal first period price 
Proof: See Appendix I. 
Equation 10 reveals that 𝑃𝑃₁, as a function of 𝑁𝑁₁ and 𝑀𝑀₁, is actually quite simple. 𝑃𝑃₁ is the 
average marginal cost in period one, plus the sum of discounted fixed costs per initial enrollee, 
less the sum of future profits each person will, on average, generate. Thus, for a given {𝑁𝑁1,𝑀𝑀1} 
vector, the more profitable each person is in the future (because new plans enter less 
aggressively), the more willing the plan is to incur losses in its first period. As a result, high first 
period prices are not sustainable in equilibrium unless a price floor is set. 
2.4.4. The Optimal Vector of First Period Enrollees 
Our next step is to find expressions defining the vector of first period enrollees, {𝑁𝑁1,𝑀𝑀1} . Since, 
all switchers and all new employees select the youngest plan, 𝑁𝑁₁ will be the sum of new 
employees (𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸), plus involuntary healthy switchers (𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆), plus voluntary health switchers 
(𝑉𝑉𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆). 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆 are employees who, due to their high switching costs, chose never to switch out of 
the plan that just died, but instead were forced to switch when the plan exited. 𝑉𝑉𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆 are 
enrollees who choose to switch while their health plan was still available. They have, of course, 
lower switching costs than IHS. 
𝑁𝑁₁ = 𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸 + 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆 + 𝑉𝑉𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆 = 1 + 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 + �𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑇−1
𝑡𝑡=1
𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡� �1 − 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1� �𝑁𝑁₁ 
Equation 11: Number of healthy enrollees in year 1 
where, 
𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1� =
𝑊𝑊−𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡�+𝑃𝑃₁
𝑊𝑊−𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1�+𝑃𝑃₁�
  and   𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡� =
𝑊𝑊−𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡�+𝑃𝑃₁�
𝑊𝑊
. 
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When a plan exits, all its former enrollees are forced to switch, thus the probability of not 
switching, 𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇+1�, is zero. Including this, Equation 11 simplifies to: 
𝑁𝑁₁ = 1 + �𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡=1
𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡� �1− 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1� �𝑁𝑁₁�  
Equation 12: 𝑵𝑵𝟏𝟏 
The derivation of 𝑀𝑀₁ follows approximately the same reasoning as that of 𝑁𝑁₁, except that, 
because all new entrants are assumed healthy, the new plan's market share of sick enrollees is 
simply the sum of involuntary sick switchers (ISS) and voluntary sick switchers(VSS) it is able to 
"steal" from existing plans: 
𝑀𝑀1 = 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘 + 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 + ��𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖�𝑘𝑘 + 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖� �(1 − 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖+1)
𝑇𝑇−1
𝑖𝑖=1
 
Equation 13: Number of sick enrollees in year 1 
⇔𝑀𝑀₁ = �(𝑀𝑀�𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 + 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑁𝑁�𝑖𝑖)(1 − 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖+1� )
𝑇𝑇
𝑖𝑖=1
 
Equation 14: 𝑴𝑴𝟏𝟏 
2.4.5. The Determination of the Optimal Life Span 
Results derived until now have all been conditional on 𝑇𝑇, the optimal lifespan of a plan. The 
procedure for the determination of the optimal life span is explained in more detail in Appendix 
I, but we turn next to a brief description of it. 
At the beginning of each period, the plan will determine the price that maximizes its profits, 
according to the HPPC, 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0, if no price yields non-negative profits, the plan will exit. The 
determination of the steady-state optimal life span, 𝑇𝑇, requires, nevertheless, one additional 
condition: that it would not have been feasible for the health plan to select the optimal price 
sequence of any other life span. Any 𝑇𝑇� > 𝑇𝑇 would not be feasible because the HPPC would not 
have been satisfied for all 𝑡𝑡, and 𝑇𝑇� < 𝑇𝑇 would not be feasible because 𝑃𝑃₁ is decreasing in 𝑇𝑇. 
Bertrand competition among potential entrants implies that the lowest possible P₁, yielding 
zero intertemporal profits will be selected. 
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2.4.6. The Steady-State Competitive Equilibrium 
Because one plan is added to the menu of choices each year and one plan dies, the optimal life 
span, 𝑇𝑇, is also the number of plans offered by the employer at any moment in time. Moreover, 
by symmetry, the steady-state equilibrium 𝑁𝑁1 = 𝑁𝑁1� = 𝑁𝑁1∗, 𝑀𝑀1 = 𝑀𝑀1� = 𝑀𝑀1∗ and 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡� =
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡∗,∀t  , where the star indicates equilibrium values. 
Imposing the equilibrium conditions on Equation 12, Equation 14, Equation 10 and Equation 7 
and then substituting this last one on the first three, we obtain the system of equations defining 
the first period variables of interest, from which all others may be obtained. This system does 
not have a closed-form solution. Instead, we use it to simulate the model as described in the 
next section. 
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎧P1∗ = 𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶1∗ +
∑ 𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡−1𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1
𝑁𝑁1∗ + 𝑀𝑀1∗
−
1
4𝑤𝑤
�𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡−1𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1[(𝑊𝑊 + P1∗) − 𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡∗]2
𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡=2
𝑁𝑁1∗ =
2𝑊𝑊
(1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘)∑ 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1(𝑊𝑊 + 𝑃𝑃1∗ − 𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡∗)𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖=1
𝑀𝑀1∗ =
𝑁𝑁1∗ ∑ [𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡(1− 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡)−𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1(1− 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1)]𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖=1 (𝑊𝑊 + 𝑃𝑃1∗ − 𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡∗)
(1 − 𝑘𝑘)∑ 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡(𝑊𝑊 + 𝑃𝑃1∗ − 𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡∗)𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖=1
(𝑃𝑃1∗ − 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁)𝑁𝑁1∗ + (𝑃𝑃1∗ − 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀)𝑀𝑀1∗ − 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 +
+�𝜌𝜌𝑡𝑡−1 �
𝑘𝑘
4𝑊𝑊
(𝑁𝑁1∗ + 𝑀𝑀1∗)[(𝑊𝑊 + 𝑃𝑃1∗) − 𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡∗]2 − 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶� = 0
𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡=2
  
Equation 15: Equilibrium conditions 
 
In the price floor scenario, the system is precisely the same, except for the third equation: the 
equation defining 𝑃𝑃₁. We assume the price floor is such that first period profits are zero. 
Consequently,  
𝑃𝑃1∗ = 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶₁ +
𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶
𝑁𝑁1∗ + 𝑀𝑀1∗
 
2.5. Premium Payment Systems 
We consider four possible premium payment systems: Base Case, Cost Sharing, Risk Adjustment 
and Price Floor. 
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2.5.1. Base Case 
Our base case assumption is that employers make level contributions toward all the health 
plans offerings, so that employees bear the full cost differential of any premium charges made 
by health plans. For simplicity, we assume that employees pay the entire premium in this case, 
and ignore the well-known problem of tax exempt health care spending. In the absence of any 
discounting, this assumption also implies that total lifetime premiums exactly equals total 
treatment costs, hence comparisons of pricing paths under this assumption focus on differences 
in total switching costs. 
Since under this system employees pay the full premium, a given employee will choose to 
switch out of a plan in period 𝑡𝑡 if 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 > 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀� + 𝑤𝑤, where 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡  is the premium charged by a plan of 
vintage 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀� is the lowest premium charged by any competitor. The switching cost, 𝑤𝑤, is 
uniformly distributed over the interval [0,𝑊𝑊], hence the probability that a current enrollee will 
not switch from a plan aged 𝑡𝑡, denoted by 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 , is: 
𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ 𝑊𝑊 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�
𝑊𝑊−𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�
 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓  𝑊𝑊 ≥ 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�  ∧ 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1
0                          𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑊𝑊 < 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�  ∧ 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1
1                                                             𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 < 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1
  
Equation 16: Probability of not switching at time t 
Under our model assumptions, it turns out that in equilibrium conditions 𝑊𝑊 ≥ 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀� and 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 are both satisfied. As described in the Section 2.3.3, existing plans are unable to 
charge a price that yields strictly positive profits in the forthcoming periods exit in stage 2. This 
implies that the first condition defined, 𝑊𝑊 ≥ 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀� , will always be met for an active plan 
because if it were not, all enrollees would switch and fixed costs would imply negative profits. 
The second condition, 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1, means that prices are non-decreasing over time. As we show 
in Section 2.4.2 this condition is also met in equilibrium. 
Intuitively one would expect the probability of switching to be decreasing in 𝑊𝑊. For a given 
price sequence, this is easily confirmed by taking the partial derivative of  (1 − 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡) with respect 
to 𝑊𝑊. However,  𝑊𝑊 will have an impact on the optimal price sequence and possibly on the 
optimal life span. Without an analytical solution to our model, the total effect has to be 
simulated, and this is done in Section 2.6. 
Switching costs depend on the prices, the number of healthy and sick people in each vintage 
plan, and especially on how many people are in a plan when it dies. The expected switching cost 
of enrollees leaving a plan at age 𝑡𝑡 is: 
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𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀� + 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�
2
[𝐴𝐴 − 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡] �
𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1
� 
Equation 17: Expected switching cost at t 
2.5.2. Cost Sharing 
The second premium payment system we consider is proportional premium cost sharing. In this 
system, employees pay only the proportion 𝜆𝜆, with 0 < 𝜆𝜆 < 1, of the full premium 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 , while the 
employer pays the remaining (1 − 𝜆𝜆)𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 . Since employees pay only a proportion of the total 
plan premium, their willingness to switch health plans will depend on 𝜆𝜆�𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀��  rather than 
�𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀��, as occurs in the base case. With cost sharing, the probability of a current enrollee 
not switching from a plan aged 𝑡𝑡, denoted by 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆, is defined as: 
𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 =
𝑊𝑊 − 𝜆𝜆�𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀��
𝑊𝑊 − 𝜆𝜆�𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀��
=
𝑊𝑊
𝜆𝜆 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀
�
𝑊𝑊
𝜆𝜆 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀
�
 
Equation 18: Probability of not switching under CS 
The probability described in Equation 18 is identical to 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 , the probability of not switching in our 
base case, after replacing 𝑊𝑊 with 𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 = 𝑊𝑊
𝜆𝜆
. Hence, with regard to the probability of switching, 
premium cost sharing is equivalent to increasing switching costs. 
2.5.3. Risk Adjustment 
The third premium payment system considered involves risk adjustment. Risk adjustment is a 
supply side payment system that uses signals predictive of enrollee health costs to, partially or 
fully, compensate health plans for predictable differences in the expected cost of their 
enrollees. Risk adjustment does not directly affect demand responsiveness or switching, 
however, it does change the relative profitability of healthy and sick consumers. We implement 
imperfect risk adjustment in our model by assuming that the employer is able to observe a 
signal that is imperfectly correlated with enrollee costs. They use this signal to increase 
payments to the sick and reduce them to the healthy. Hence, under imperfect risk adjustment, 
health plan profits at time t can be written as: 
∏𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 = (𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 + 𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁)𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 + (𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 + 𝛾𝛾𝑀𝑀)𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡  
Taking expectations, the effect of risk adjustment is to reduce the profitability of healthy 
enrollees and reduce losses on sick enrollees. We simulate this effect by assuming that 
𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁 = 𝛼𝛼(𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 − 𝐶𝐶̅) and 𝛾𝛾𝑀𝑀 = 𝛼𝛼(𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 − 𝐶𝐶̅). Since 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 < 𝐶𝐶̅ < 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀, then 𝛾𝛾𝑁𝑁 < 0 < 𝛾𝛾𝑀𝑀 . That is, risk 
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adjustment raises the cost of enrolling healthy people and lowers the cost of enrolling sick 
people. We model the effect of risk adjustment by replacing 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 with  𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼) 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 + 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶̅, 
and replacing 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 with   𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼) 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 + 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶̅. 
Reflecting the fact that existing risk adjustment formulas are imperfect, in our simulations we 
assume 𝛼𝛼 = 0 .1; that is, risk adjustment moves costs only ten percent of the way towards fully 
compensating health plans for enrolling sicker than average enrollees17
Risk adjustment affects only the supply side of the market, and does not affect demand 
responsiveness or plan switching, other than through its effect on pricing behavior. 
Consequently, the probability of a current enrollee not switching from a plan of vintage 𝑡𝑡 is 
precisely the same as in the base case scenario. 
. 
2.5.4. Price Floor 
The fourth and final premium payment system we consider is a price floor on first period 
premiums. By price floor we mean a minimum premium such that, if a health plan charges a 
lower premium, employees do not reap any of the reduction. Price floors arise naturally when 
employers choose a base plan for calculating their employee contribution which is not the 
lowest premium health plan. While price floors are generally considered bad by economists, in 
our context they serve the useful purpose of thwarting the ability of the entrant plan to attract 
the healthiest employees. 
In our simulations, the first period price floor value is the price yielding zero profits in the first 
period. This would be feasible if employers have some, but not full, power to negotiate first 
period prices. If employers know the true costs of first period plan entrants, for instance, then 
they might be able to enforce zero profits in the first period, even if they cannot enforce zero 
profits in subsequent periods. 
2.6. Simulation Results 
In order to simulate the model, we selected values for the parameters and used Mathematica 
4.0® to find the steady-state equilibrium in each of the four premium payment systems 
considered. Comparative statics is performed by linearizing the system and then, applying the 
                                                          
17 We are using conventional, not optimal risk adjustment here, as Glazer and McGuire (2000) define it. That is, we assume that the 
employer does not use its knowledge of the demand model of how consumers are selecting health plans to risk adjust payments. 
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implicit function theorem, again use Mathematica 4.0®, to understand the impact of each 
parameter on the equilibrium. This analysis is, obviously, performed locally around the 
equilibrium found, which itself depends on the values selected for the parameters. We 
conclude this section with some sensitivity analysis meant to verify the degree of dependence 
of our results on the parameter values chosen. 
2.6.1. Starting Values 
Table 2: Simulation Parameters 
 
Table 2 displays the assumed values of our base case simulation model. Healthy enrollees are 
assumed to cost 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 = $1,000 per year, with sick enrollees costing twice as much 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 = $2,000. 
The maximum price differential that will result in all enrollees switching is 𝑊𝑊 = $2,000. 
Employees, both healthy and sick, are assumed to leave the firm at the rate 𝑑𝑑 = 0.1. The rate at 
which healthy people become sick was selected to insure that there were a total of eight units 
of healthy employees and two units of sick employees. From Equation 2 and Equation 3, we 
obtained 𝑘𝑘 = 7
8𝑘𝑘
, which is to say that healthy people become sick at a rate, 𝑠𝑠, of approximately 
three percent. Health plans are assumed to have fixed costs of 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 = $100 per plan/year. We 
assume no discounting for our baseline. These six parameters (𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 ,𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 ,𝑊𝑊, 𝑠𝑠,𝑑𝑑,𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶,𝜌𝜌) fully 
characterize our model for a given premium payment system. 
With eight units of healthy employees and two units of sick employees, the average treatment 
costs will be: 
8 ∗ 1000 + 2 ∗ 2000
10
= $1200 
Once fixed costs are added, we obtain the social optimum premium that one (single) plan could 
charge and achieve zero profits: 
Sample 
Period Years
Number of New Entrants Each Period NE 1
Proportion of Healthy Who Become Sick s 0.03
Proportion of Employees Departing the Firm d 0.1
Annual Medical Cost per Healthy  Enrollee CN 1,000
Annual Medical Cost per Sick  Enrollee CM 2,000
Maximum Switching Cost W 1,000
Plan Fixed Cost per Year FC 100
Discount Factor ρ 1
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𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 1200 +
100
10
= 1210 
2.6.2. Competitive Equilibrium Simulation Results 
In this section we provide an overview of the simulation results obtained from dozens of 
reasonable combinations of the six parameters {𝑠𝑠, 𝑘𝑘,𝑊𝑊,𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 ,𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 ,𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹}. In almost all the sets of 
parameters chosen, the model has one (unique) solution yielding real, positive values for all 
variables. The exception occurs for low values of 𝑊𝑊 (the highest possible switching cost) in 
which case no solution exists. We believe that this is due to the fact that for low values of 𝑊𝑊, 
the model reaches close to the Bertrand paradox, where the first order conditions no longer 
hold.     
We discuss the simulation results by first commenting on the determination of the optimal life 
span (Section 2.6.3) and then on the equilibrium values of our base case (Section 2.6.4). Once 
the main features of our model are presented, the comparison of equilibria under the four 
systems (Section 2.6.5) should run smoothly.  
2.6.3. Determination of the optimal life span 
In all but the price floor scenario, the determination of the optimal life span of the plan follows 
the following steps (exemplified in Table 3): 
1. Assume the life span is 𝑇𝑇� = 2 
2. Find the steady-state optimal stream of prices and profits given that 𝑇𝑇� = 2 
3. If at time 𝑇𝑇� , profits are positive, assume the life span is 𝑇𝑇� = 3 
4. Find the steady-state optimal stream of prices and profits given that 𝑇𝑇� = 3 
5. If at time 𝑇𝑇� , profits are positive, assume the life span is 𝑇𝑇� = 4 
This loop goes on until the optimal price strategy yields negative profits at time 𝑇𝑇� . When it 
occurs, it means the optimal life span, 𝑇𝑇, is 𝑇𝑇 = 𝑇𝑇� − 1 
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Table 3: Determination of 𝑻𝑻 
 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
$1,397 $1,422 $1,439 $1,451 $1,462 $1,472 $1,481 $1,490 $1,499
$240 $202 $176 $157 $142 $130 $120 $111 $104
$1,637 $1,624 $1,614 $1,608 $1,604 $1,602 $1,601 $1,602 $1,603
1.24 0.89 0.67 0.52 0.41 0.33 0.27 0.22 0.18
0.42 0.32 0.26 0.22 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.11
2.67 2.48 2.34 2.23 2.14 2.06 1.98 1.92 1.86
0.71 0.64 0.58 0.53 0.49 0.46 0.43 0.40 0.38
16.6% 12.1% 9.3% 7.4% 6.0% 4.9% 4.1% 3.4% 2.9%
33.8% 31.2% 29.2% 27.6% 26.3% 25.1% 24.1% 23.2% 22.4%
$1,007 $735 $560 $439 $350 $283 $231 $191 $158
$341 $268 $220 $185 $158 $136 $118 $104 $91
$830 $806 $782 $758 $736 $714 $693 $672 $652
$221 $207 $195 $183 $173 $163 $154 $146 $139
1 $986 $941 $912 $893 $880 $873 $868 $867 $867
2 $1,598 $1,572 $1,554 $1,541 $1,532 $1,525 $1,520 $1,516 $1,514
3 $1,609 $1,583 $1,565 $1,552 $1,543 $1,536 $1,531 $1,528 $1,526
4 $1,594 $1,576 $1,563 $1,554 $1,547 $1,542 $1,539 $1,537
5 $1,587 $1,574 $1,565 $1,558 $1,553 $1,550 $1,548
6 $1,584 $1,575 $1,569 $1,564 $1,561 $1,559
7 $1,585 $1,579 $1,574 $1,571 $1,569
8 $1,589 $1,584 $1,581 $1,579
9 $1,594 $1,591 $1,589
10 $1,600 $1,599
11 $1,608
1 4.91 4.37 4.01 3.75 3.55 3.39 3.25 3.14 3.04
2 1.67 1.41 1.26 1.15 1.08 1.03 0.99 0.96 0.94
3 1.42 1.20 1.06 0.98 0.92 0.87 0.84 0.81 0.80
4 1.02 0.90 0.83 0.78 0.74 0.71 0.69 0.67
5 0.76 0.70 0.66 0.62 0.60 0.58 0.57
6 0.59 0.55 0.53 0.51 0.49 0.48
7 0.47 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.41
8 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.34
9 0.31 0.30 0.29
10 0.25 0.25
11 0.21
1 1.13 0.96 0.84 0.75 0.68 0.61 0.56 0.52 0.48
2 0.44 0.36 0.31 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.18
3 0.43 0.35 0.30 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.18
4 0.33 0.29 0.25 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.18
5 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.17
6 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16
7 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15
8 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.14
9 0.14 0.14 0.13
10 0.13 0.12
11 0.11
1 -$1,316 -$1,376 -$1,367 -$1,331 -$1,281 -$1,225 -$1,166 -$1,107 -$1,049
2 $719 $554 $459 $400 $362 $335 $317 $304 $296
3 $596 $453 $372 $322 $289 $266 $251 $240 $233
4 $369 $299 $256 $227 $208 $195 $186 $180
5 $237 $200 $176 $159 $148 $141 $136
6 $153 $132 $118 $109 $102 $98
7 $95 $83 $75 $70 $67
8 $54 $47 $43 $40
9 $24 $20 $17
10 $1 -$1
11 -$17
Premium
N
M
Profit
Average Premium
Average Switching Cost
Average Premium plus 
Average Switching Cost
Inv. Healthy Switchers
Inv. Sick Switchers
Vol. Healthy Switchers
Cost Vol. Sick Switchers
Life Span
Vol. Sick Switchers
% Inv. Switchers
% Vol. Switchers
Cost Inv. Healthy Switchers
Cost Inv. Sick Switchers
Cost Vol. Healthy Switchers
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In the absence of a first period price floor, as shown in Table 3 and Figure 6, the longer health 
plans intend to live, the more aggressive they will enter the market, i.e. 𝑃𝑃₁ is decreasing in 𝑇𝑇. 
This occurs because health plans are willing to "pay" more (in the form of a first period price 
even lower than marginal cost) for potential consumers, if they expect to extract future rents 
over a longer life span. 
 
Figure 6: First Period Premium, Number of Healthy and Number of Sick Enrollees for Different Life 
Spans 
 
As 𝑃𝑃₁ decreases in 𝑇𝑇, one might expect to find higher market shares and bigger losses in the 
first period as 𝑇𝑇 increases. However, that is not the case (Figure 6). As Table 3 shows, the 
number of (healthy and sick) enrollees in the first year of the plan's life is decreasing in 𝑇𝑇, and 
so is the loss incurred in that period. In our model, the life span equals the number of plans in 
any given period, meaning that longer life spans correspond to a higher degree of competition 
among existing plans. Although the loss per enrollee in the first period is higher, with more 
plans in the menu of choices and a constant number of employees, each plan will have less 
enrollees and lower losses in the first period. 
Table 3 and Figure 7 also show that the average premium is increasing in 𝑇𝑇. For all 𝑇𝑇, prices 
increase sharply from period one to period two and only slightly after that, so the increase in 
average price, as 𝑇𝑇 increases, simply reflects the fact that 𝑃𝑃₁ weighs less as plans live longer. In 
fact, the average premium, excluding the first period price is slightly decreasing in 𝑇𝑇. When 
plans live longer, less switching will occur especially among involuntary switchers, who are also 
the ones with the higher switching cost. Table 3 shows that, in our base case, the percentage of 
switchers decreases from 50% to 27% as the life span increases from three to ten, and that the 
largest relative reduction occurred among involuntary switchers. The decrease in average 
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switching cost is also mainly driven by the significant reduction (78%) in switching costs of 
involuntary switchers. 
 
Figure 7: Average Premium, Average Total Cost to Consumers and Percentage of Switchers, for 
Different Life Spans 
 
While switching costs of voluntary switchers are taken into account by health plans that have to 
set premiums sufficiently low to compensate for switching costs, switching costs of involuntary 
switchers do not affect demand. It is true that, once forced to switch, involuntary switchers will 
select the plan offering the lowest premium but all involuntary switchers will select the 
youngest plan, even if its premium is just slightly below the cheapest of the remaining 
premiums. 
With average premiums increasing and average switching costs decreasing as plans live longer, 
it is not clear what will happen to the total cost borne by consumers (average premium plus 
average switching cost). Our simulations show that the total cost has a minimum at some 𝑇𝑇� <
𝑇𝑇, where 𝑇𝑇 is the steady-state equilibrium life span (Table 3). 
2.6.4. Base Case Competitive Equilibrium Simulation Results  
Table 4 presents the steady-state competitive equilibria of our model. There are four blocks 
(premium, profit, healthy and sick) with four columns each. Each column shows the simulation 
results for one premium payment system. Our base case competitive equilibrium results, 
discussed in this Section, are presented in column “BC” in each block. Comparison of the results 
for the different premium payment systems is performed in 2.6.5. 
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Table 4: Equilibrium Solution under Different Premium Payment Systems 
 
For any given life span, the optimal price sequence is always increasing and the correspondent 
sequence of profits is strictly decreasing, which confirms our analytical results presented 
earlier. More specifically, prices are below average cost in the first period, increase abruptly 
from the first to the second period and only slightly after that. Health plans have losses in the 
first period in order to establish their market share. Then, at vintage two, plans have their best 
opportunity to recover losses incurred in the previous period, because that is when the price 
differential with respect to the youngest plan is lowest and fewest enrollees have become sick.  
As plans become older, healthy enrollees become sick raising plan costs and prices over time. 
With higher costs, not only are plans incapable of attracting (healthy) incoming employees but 
they are also unable to hold their enrollees with lower switching costs. It is thus predictable, 
and Table 4 confirms it, that the number of healthy enrollees (𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 ) decreases as the plan grows 
older. 
As to the evolution of the number of sick enrollees with time, the results are not so obvious. On 
one hand, two forces drive the number of sick enrollees down. First, employees leave the firm 
at a rate 𝑑𝑑; Second, as the price differential between their current premium and the premium 
charged by the youngest plan increases, more and more sick enrollees will find it profitable to 
switch. On the other hand, healthy enrollees become sick, thus increasing the number of sick 
enrollees and it is not clear which force will a priori prevail. However, in all our simulations 
(even with 𝑠𝑠 much higher than 𝑑𝑑) the price spiral was steep enough to imply a decrease in the 
number of sick employees over time. 
Having summarized the main features, common to all simulations carried out and before we 
proceed to the comparison of the steady-state equilibria of the four premium payment system 
considered, it is interesting to do some comparative statics. As described in Section 2.4, with no 
closed-form solution to our model, comparative statics is performed locally. Table 5 shows the 
Year BC CS RA PF BC CS RA PF BC CS RA PF BC CS RA PF
1 $867 $823 $867 $1,155 -$1,107 -$1,276 -$1,123 $0 3.14 3.16 3.13 2.23 0.519 0.523 0.515 0.289
2 $1,516 $1,544 $1,518 $1,647 $304 $332 $299 $484 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.99 0.191 0.189 0.189 0.160
3 $1,528 $1,556 $1,528 $1,659 $240 $265 $238 $401 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.85 0.190 0.188 0.188 0.165
4 $1,539 $1,567 $1,538 $1,671 $186 $209 $186 $330 0.69 0.68 0.69 0.72 0.185 0.183 0.184 0.166
5 $1,550 $1,578 $1,548 $1,682 $141 $161 $143 $269 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.62 0.177 0.177 0.177 0.163
6 $1,561 $1,589 $1,558 $1,693 $102 $121 $105 $217 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.53 0.168 0.168 0.169 0.159
7 $1,571 $1,599 $1,567 $1,704 $70 $86 $74 $172 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.45 0.158 0.159 0.160 0.152
8 $1,581 $1,609 $1,576 $1,714 $43 $57 $47 $134 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.39 0.148 0.148 0.149 0.145
9 $1,591 $1,619 $1,585 $1,724 $20 $33 $24 $101 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.33 0.137 0.138 0.139 0.137
10 $1,600 $1,628 $1,593 $1,734 $1 $12 $5 $73 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.126 0.128 0.129 0.128
11 $1,743 $48 0.24 0.120
12 $1,753 $28 0.21 0.111
13 $1,762 $10 0.18 0.103
Note: BC: Base Case; CS: Cost Sharing; RA: Risk Adjustment; PF: Price Floor; Nt: Number of healthy employees at time t ; Mt: Number of sick employees at time t
Premium Profit Nt Mt
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impact of a 0.1 increase in 𝑘𝑘 and 𝑘𝑘, a 10% increase in 𝑊𝑊,𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 and 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁  on the equilibrium value of 
our dependent variables, the price sequence and first period market shares, for our base case. 
In performing such analysis, we have kept constant the life span. This implies that we are 
possibly comparing optimal solutions to non-optimal ones (accounting for the change in the 
optimal life span is performed in Section 2.7). Because the model is well-behaved, 
interpretation of the results presented in Table 5 shares much in common to the discussion 
presented in Section 2.7. Consequently, in order to avoid repetition we refer the reader to that 
Section. 
Table 5: Analysis of the Impact of the Parameters on the Equilibrium Values 
 
2.6.5. Competitive Equilibrium Simulation Results Under Different Premium 
Payment Systems 
Table 4 presents the steady-state competitive equilibria of our model, under each of the four 
premium payment systems considered, while Figure 8 graphs the correspondent price 
sequences. The first column refers to our base case, in which consumers pay the full premium; 
the second describes the equilibrium with costs sharing, assuming that employees pay ninety 
percent of the premium; column three provides the steady-state values under risk adjustment; 
and finally, the last column shows the results in the presence of a first period price floor yielding 
zero profit in the first period. 
∆k = - 0,1 ∆l = - 0,1 ∆W = +10% ∆CN = +10% & 
∆CM = - 10%
Ntotal 4.61 4.46 7.87 7.87
Mtotal 5.39 0.54 2.13 2.13
∆N1 1.16 2.12 0.00 0.00
∆M1 -1.60 1.10 0.00 0.00
∆P1 -$576 -$10 -$0.44 $0.60
∆P2 -$536 $81 $0.28 $0.63
∆P3 -$570 $79 $0.28 $0.61
∆P4 -$603 $76 $0.28 $0.58
∆P5 -$634 $74 $0.28 $0.56
∆P6 -$663 $72 $0.28 $0.54
∆P7 -$689 $70 $0.28 $0.52
∆P8 -$714 $68 $0.28 $0.50
∆P9 -$738 $66 $0.28 $0.48
∆P10 -$760 $64 $0.28 $0.46
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Figure 8: Optimal Price Sequences under Different Payment Systems 
 
Column two of each block in Table 4 provides the steady-state equilibrium values of our 
variables of interest, in the context of premium cost sharing. To make the results comparable to 
the risk adjustment scenario, we chose to model the very modest change of imposing only ten 
percent premium cost sharing. That is, whereas in our base case model we have the consumer 
paying one hundred percent of the difference between the lowest cost plan and all other plans, 
here we have the consumer paying ninety percent of this difference. The employer is sharing 
the cost of the premiums by paying ten percent of the difference. As discussed above, ten 
percent premium cost sharing is equivalent in our framework to having switching costs that are 
approximately ten percent higher, and hence, we conducted the simulation by assuming 
𝑊𝑊 = $1,100. 
In our model, switching costs are the reason for plans to have market power. Higher switching 
costs mean that health plans are able to extract higher rents from their enrollees. The results in 
column two of each block of Table 4 reflect precisely that. If plans have more market power, 
they charge higher premiums. This ability to charge higher premiums in the future enhances 
first period competition and lowers the first period premium, which in turn attracts more 
healthy employees and implies bigger losses. The difference in premiums with respect to the 
first, 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃1, is higher in all periods than in the base case. This causes much more switching 
than in the base case and, as a result, the cost of voluntary switchers is substantially higher with 
cost sharing (Table 6). The consequences of cost sharing, just described, prevailed in all 
simulations performed18
                                                          
18 In simulations performed with a lower proportion of healthy to sick, cost sharing did increase the optimal life span of the plan, 
but still at higher average premium plus average switching cost. 
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premium payment system enhances death spirals and total costs borne by consumers, with no 
additional increase in plans' profits. 
As discussed in our model section, risk adjustment in our framework is equivalent to 
considering moving both 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 and 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 towards the population average (𝐶𝐶 = 1,200). We chose to 
reflect the empirical observation that risk adjustment appears to only move payments about 
ten percent of the distance toward perfectly reflecting costs. Consequently, the simulation 
results presented in column three of each block of Table 4 were obtained assuming the cost of 
healthy and sick people as 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 = 0.9 ∗ $1,000 + 0.1 ∗ $1,200 = $1,020 and 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 = 0.9 ∗
$2,000 + 0.1 ∗ $1,200 = $1,980, respectively. 
 
Figure 9: Premium Difference Cost Sharing and Risk Adjustment 
Figure 9 compares price paths under risk adjustment and cost sharing with our base case. This 
figure shows that risk adjustment helps health plans by improving their resistance to death 
spirals. Health plans charge a first period premium only slightly lower than in our base case but 
prices increase less after the first period, implying a lower average premium for the same life 
span. With risk adjustment, there is less switching and the average switching cost is lower, as 
shown in Figure 8 and Table 6. 
Although the results presented do not reflect a significant impact of risk adjustment, it should 
be said that, qualitatively, the effects described were present in all simulations performed. 
Moreover, the magnitude of these effects increases as the proportion of sick employees in the 
total population increases. Indeed, with a higher prevalence of illness among employees, risk 
adjustment allows plans to live longer than in the base case. 
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Even when risk adjustment increases the optimal life span, the sum of average premium plus 
average switching cost is lower than in our base case, while intertemporal profits are equally 
null (Table 6). Thus, our simulations indicate that risk adjustment is welfare improving. 
The last premium payment system considered in our simulations is a price floor. Our discussion 
in Section 2.2 seems to indicate that death spirals are less frequent when a price floor is 
established by the employer. As our model exemplifies, health plans enter the market with an 
extremely aggressive first period price, in the prospect of making use of their future market 
power, over their enrollees, to extract rents. In the following periods, faced with new health 
plans entering equally aggressively, the health plans' best strategy is to "take advantage while 
they can", i.e. rapidly increase premiums to make up for first period losses, while able to retain 
some enrollees. The abrupt premium increase culminates in death spirals with huge switching 
costs to consumers. The rationale behind the price floor premium payment system is to curtail 
first period competition, in the hope of eliminating the need to drastically increase premiums in 
the following periods. 
The final column in each block of Table 4 presents the steady-state equilibrium values under a 
price floor premium payment system. The increase in prices is substantially lower than in all 
other systems considered. Not only do premiums, from the first to the second period, increase 
substantially less in the second period but plans also choose to live three additional years. 
Consequently, the proportion of switchers is almost half that of the base case and average 
switching costs decreases from $111 to $56 (Table 6). 
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Table 6: Comparing Switchers, Switching Costs, Premiums and Profits for Different Payment Systems 
 
In Table 6, it is possible to compare average switching costs and average premiums for the four 
premium payment systems considered. Indeed, average premiums plus average switching costs 
are $118 per person/year higher with a price floor than in our base case, but profits are also 
substantially higher. While in all other scenarios the sum of discounted profits over the life span 
of the plan was zero, in the price floor case health plans have an overall profit of $2.265, i.e. a 
profit of $226.5 per employee. This means that there is margin for Pareto movements, when 
comparing our base case (or, actually, any of the other three premium payment systems) with 
the price floor scenario. 
Figure 10 illustrates the evolution of the ratio of healthy to sick enrollees over time, in each of 
the four scenarios. The horizontal line at four identifies the population average ratio for healthy 
and sick employees. Points above that line reflect a favorable selection of enrollees, while 
points below indicate adverse selection. Under all four of the scenarios, new entrants attract 
favorable selections. In all but the price floor scenario, health plans have a favorable selection 
for only three periods. Both cost sharing and risk adjustment yield a more favorable (or less 
adverse) ratio than the base case in all periods, but the magnitude is bigger in the second (the 
difference is decreasing in time). Although risk adjustment somewhat slows down switching, it 
is not enough to maintain a favorable selection for more periods than cost sharing or the base 
case. The price floor scenario has the slowest rate of deterioration, with enrollments being 
above the average for four periods. After that, the ratio of healthy to sick falls below the 
population average but remains less adverse than in the other three cases. 
Base Case
Cost 
Sharing
Risk 
Adjustment
Price 
Floor
Life Span 10 10 10 13
Inv. Healthy Switchers 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.15
Inv. Sick Switchers 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.10
Vol. Healthy Switchers 1.92 1.94 1.90 1.07
Vol. Sick Switchers 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.19
% Inv. Switchers 3.4% 3.4% 3.5% 2.5%
% Vol. Switchers 23.2% 23.4% 23.0% 12.7%
Cost Inv. Healthy Switchers $191 $201 $194 $124
Cost Inv. Sick Switchers $104 $109 $106 $78
Cost Vol. Healthy Switchers $672 $748 $663 $297
Cost Vol. Sick Switchers $146 $161 $143 $58
Average Switching Cost (ASWC) $111 $122 $110 $56
Average Premium (AP) $1,490 $1,511 $1,488 $1,665
ASWC+AP $1,601 $1,633 $1,598 $1,720
Sum of Profits $0 $0 $0 $2,265
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Figure 10: Ratio of Healthy to Sick for Four Premium Payment Systems 
2.7. Sensitivity Analysis 
In Table 7 to Table 12, we provide the results of the sensitivity analysis. In each table, we allow 
one parameter to vary and keep the remaining parameters at their baseline values. In each 
table, we consider two alternative values for the parameter under analysis: one below the 
baseline value and one above it. For comparison, all tables include the baseline itself. 
Different parameter values result not only in different equilibrium values for  {𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡}, {𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡}, 
{𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡}  and {Π𝑡𝑡} but also in distinct optimal life spans. In Table 7, we provide an example of how 
the optimal life span is obtained in each sensitivity analysis table. This is done by solving the 
model for a sequence of possible life spans (three to seven years are shown in that table). 
Obviously, not all life spans considered are optimal life spans, in the sense that a profitable 
deviation might exist, but each column shows the optimal price sequence, given the life span. 
For example, as shown in Table 7, for a fixed cost of $500, a life span of 6 years yields a negative 
profit in the last year (−69$), which indicates that the optimal lifespan is 5 years. 
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Table 7: Equilibrium Results under Different Fixed Costs Values   
 
 
The optimal life span is highly sensitive to the value of fixed costs (Table 7). If no fixed costs are 
present, plans tend to live "forever" with minimal enrollments. But with fixed costs as low as 
one hundred (ten percent of treatment cost of a healthy enrollee), plans die after ten periods. 
Overall, the model is "well-behaved" in that if an increase in a given parameter yields a 
decrease in one independent variable, it does so regardless of the parameters’ chosen value or 
of how much it increases. To get a feel for how to interpret these tables, we describe the results 
from Table 8 in detail, and then focus on only the interesting features of the remaining tables. 
FC Period 0 100 500 0 100 500 0 100 500 0 100 500 0 100 500
1 $956 $986 $1,110 $901 $941 $1,111 $862 $912 $1,131 $833 $893 $1,164 $810 $880 $1,207
2 $1,583 $1,598 $1,659 $1,552 $1,572 $1,656 $1,530 $1,554 $1,662 $1,512 $1,541 $1,674 $1,498 $1,532 $1,692
3 $1,594 $1,609 $1,670 $1,563 $1,583 $1,667 $1,541 $1,565 $1,673 $1,523 $1,552 $1,686 $1,509 $1,543 $1,703
4 $1,574 $1,594 $1,678 $1,552 $1,576 $1,684 $1,534 $1,563 $1,697 $1,520 $1,554 $1,714
5 $1,562 $1,587 $1,695 $1,545 $1,574 $1,707 $1,531 $1,565 $1,725
6 $1,555 $1,584 $1,718 $1,541 $1,575 $1,736
7 $1,551 $1,585 $1,746
1 4.99 4.91 4.62 4.49 4.37 3.94 4.17 4.01 3.45 3.94 3.75 3.07 3.78 3.55 2.76
2 1.63 1.67 1.82 1.37 1.41 1.57 1.21 1.26 1.42 1.11 1.15 1.32 1.03 1.08 1.25
3 1.38 1.42 1.56 1.16 1.20 1.34 1.02 1.06 1.21 0.93 0.98 1.13 0.87 0.92 1.07
4 0.98 1.02 1.15 0.87 0.90 1.03 0.79 0.83 0.96 0.73 0.78 0.91
5 0.73 0.76 0.88 0.67 0.70 0.82 0.62 0.66 0.78
6 0.56 0.59 0.70 0.52 0.55 0.67
7 0.44 0.47 0.57
1 1.15 1.13 1.05 0.99 0.96 0.85 0.88 0.84 0.70 0.80 0.75 0.59 0.73 0.68 0.50
2 0.43 0.44 0.48 0.35 0.36 0.39 0.30 0.31 0.34 0.26 0.27 0.30 0.24 0.24 0.27
3 0.42 0.43 0.47 0.34 0.35 0.38 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.25 0.26 0.29 0.23 0.24 0.26
4 0.32 0.33 0.37 0.28 0.29 0.32 0.24 0.25 0.29 0.22 0.23 0.26
5 0.26 0.27 0.31 0.23 0.24 0.27 0.21 0.22 0.25
6 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.20 0.21 0.24
7 0.18 0.19 0.23
1 -$1,421 -$1,316 -$928 -$1,532 -$1,376 -$818 -$1,575 -$1,367 -$658 -$1,589 -$1,331 -$487 -$1,589 -$1,281 -$320
2 $769 $719 $539 $600 $554 $395 $502 $459 $324 $439 $400 $291 $396 $362 $279
3 $652 $596 $390 $506 $453 $267 $422 $372 $207 $368 $322 $179 $331 $289 $171
4 $427 $369 $157 $354 $299 $106 $308 $256 $84 $277 $227 $77
5 $298 $237 $20 $258 $200 $1 $231 $176 -$3
6 $216 $153 -$69 $193 $132 -$72
7 $161 $95 -$131
16% 17% 18% 12% 12% 14% 9% 9% 11% 7% 7% 9% 6% 6% 7%
35% 34% 29% 33% 31% 24% 32% 29% 21% 30% 28% 18% 30% 26% 15%
$245 $240 $222 $209 $202 $175 $185 $176 $142 $169 $157 $116 $156 $142 $96
Life Span 73 4 5 6
%VS
N
M
Profit
Note: FC=fixed cost, N=Healthy enrollees, M=Sick enrollees, IS=Involuntary sw itchers, VS=voluntary sw itcher, AVSWC=average sw itching cost
P
AVSWC
%IS
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Table 8: Equilibrium Results under Different Probabilities of Becoming Sick   
 
Table 8 provides the solution to our model, assuming 
{𝑘𝑘,𝑊𝑊,𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 ,𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 ,𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹,𝜌𝜌} = {0.9, 1000, 1000, 2000, 100, 1} and considering three possible values 
for s, {0.01, 0.03, 0.1}. Each of the three blocks in Table 8 provides the solution to the model 
under one value of  𝑠𝑠. The second block, where 𝑠𝑠 = 0.03, corresponds to our baseline. Each 
block has four columns providing the results for the four equilibrium series: {𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡}, {𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡}, 
{𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡}  and {Π𝑡𝑡}. Because varying 𝑠𝑠 and 𝑑𝑑 alters the (steady-state) total number of healthy (𝑁𝑁) 
and sick employees (𝑀𝑀) in the firm, Table 8 and Table 9 include two extra rows with the 
corresponding 𝑁𝑁 and 𝑀𝑀. The third column, where 𝑠𝑠 = 0.1, is of especial interest because it 
yields an equal number of healthy and sick employees in the firm, which allows us to isolate the 
effect of biased arrival per se. 
For a given life span, an increase in 𝑠𝑠 is associated with steeper spirals (defined as a higher 
difference between the price in the first period and prices in subsequent periods)19
Table 8
 and higher 
percentage of voluntary switchers. Nevertheless, because varying 𝑠𝑠, changes the ratio of 
healthy to sick employees, an increase in 𝑠𝑠 changes the optimal life span and results in a mixed 
effect on death spirals steepness. Note that, for the optimal life span associated with each value 
of s (as shown in ), the percentage increase in price from the first to the second period is 
decreasing in 𝑠𝑠 while the percent increase in price in subsequent periods is increasing in 𝑠𝑠. The 
first effect results from the fact that a market where individuals become sick at a lower rate is a 
more attractive one and plans are thus more willing to forgo profits in the first period. The 
second effect is a consequence of the fact that with a higher proportion of sick enrollees 
average cost increases faster. The overall effect results in a lower percentage of voluntary 
                                                          
19 Results not shown. 
s
Ntotal
Mtotal
Life Span
Prem. Profit
Nt/ 
Ntotal
Mt/ 
MTotal Prem. Profit
Nt/ 
Ntotal
Mt/ 
MTotal Prem. Profit
Nt/ 
Ntotal
Mt/ 
MTotal
t=1 $750 -$1,146 358 238 $876 -$1,107 398 268 $1,182 -$1,095 508 388
t=2 $1,408 $263 118 88 $1,516 $304 128 108 $1,827 $401 148 148
t=3 $1,412 $218 98 88 $1,528 $240 108 108 $1,857 $280 108 138
t=4 $1,417 $179 88 88 $1,539 $186 98 98 $1,883 $189 88 128
t=5 $1,421 $144 78 88 $1,550 $141 78 98 $1,906 $122 68 118
t=6 $1,426 $114 68 88 $1,561 $102 68 98 $1,926 $71 48 108
t=7 $1,430 $87 68 78 $1,571 $70 58 88 $1,945 $33 38 88
t=8 $1,435 $64 58 78 $1,581 $43 48 88
t=9 $1,439 $43 48 78 $1,591 $20 48 78
t=10 $1,444 $25 48 78 $1,600 $1 38 78
t=11 $1,448 $10 38 68
Switchers
Sw. Costs
0.01 0.03 0.1
T*=11 T*=10 T*=7
1 2 5
9
3% 29% 5%
Voluntary Involuntary Voluntary Involuntary Voluntary Involuntary
$1,076 $443
21% 3% 23%
Average 
Sw. Costs
$100 $111 $152
8
$818 $295
5
$718 $277
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switching for more favorable healthy to sick ratio (lower 𝑠𝑠). Because a lower probability of 
becoming sick allows plans to live longer (the optimal life span is decreasing in 𝑠𝑠) the 
percentage of involuntary switchers also decreases and, as a result, average switching costs 
(𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶) are lower for low values of 𝑠𝑠. 
Table 9: Equilibrium Results under Different Probabilities of Leaving the Firm   
 
In Table 9, we see that plans enter more aggressively (the entering price is lower) as 𝑑𝑑 
increases, which might seem unlikely. Why would plans be more willing to incur losses if they 
are less likely to be able to retain their enrollees? The reason being that the ratio of healthy to 
sick also changes; in particular the ratio is increasing with 𝑑𝑑. At 𝑑𝑑 = 0.15 the ratio is six, making 
this market a quite attractive one. This “healthier market” implies that, even at a lower first 
period price, losses incurred in the first period are lower than losses incurred when entering at 
a higher price with a less attractive ration of healthy to sick. Obviously, plans live longer when 𝑑𝑑 
is low. 
With respect to Table 11 and Table 12, it is worth mentioning that as health costs of healthy 
and sick become closer, spirals become less steep (𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 − 𝑃𝑃₁ is smaller). There is also less 
switching and lower average switching cost. 
d
Ntotal
Mtotal
Life Span
Prem. Profit
Nt/ 
Ntotal
Mt/ 
MTotal Prem. Profit
Nt/ 
Ntotal
Mt/ 
MTotal Prem. Profit
Nt/ 
Ntotal
Mt/ 
MTotal
t=1 $892 -$2,255 328 228 $867 -$1,107 398 268 $883 -$730 468 318
t=2 $1,589 $406 98 78 $1,516 $304 128 108 $1,502 $264 158 138
t=3 $1,599 $350 88 78 $1,528 $240 108 98 $1,514 $190 128 138
t=4 $1,608 $300 78 78 $1,539 $186 98 98 $1,526 $131 98 128
t=5 $1,618 $255 68 68 $1,550 $141 78 98 $1,538 $84 78 118
t=6 $1,627 $215 68 68 $1,561 $102 68 88 $1,549 $46 68 108
t=7 $1,636 $180 58 68 $1,571 $70 58 88 $1,560 $16 58 98
t=8 $1,644 $148 58 68 $1,581 $43 48 78
t=9 $1,653 $120 48 58 $1,591 $20 48 78
t=10 $1,661 $95 48 58 $1,600 $1 38 68
t=11 $1,669 $73 38 58
t=12 $1,677 $53 38 58
t=13 $1,684 $36 38 48
t=14 $1,691 $20 28 48
t=15 $1,698 $6 28 48
Switchers
Sw. Costs
Average 
Sw. Costs
$106 $111 $119
$1,658 $469 $818 $295 $540 $256
21% 3% 23% 3% 25% 5%
T*=15 T*=10 T*=7
Voluntary Involuntary Voluntary Involuntary Voluntary Involuntary
13 8 6
7 2 1
0.05 0.1 0.15
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Table 10: Equilibrium Results under Different maximum Switching Costs Values   
 
Table 10 shows the solution under three possible values for the maximum switching cost (𝑊𝑊). 
As clearly shown in the table, price escalation is highly associated with the presence of 
switching costs. As expected, for higher values of 𝑊𝑊, plans are more willing to invest in the first 
period because higher switching costs will allow them to compensate for initial losses, through 
higher future prices. Moreover, plans will not only charge higher prices but also survive longer, 
which, again, creates an incentive for aggressive entrance. 
Table 11: Equilibrium Results under Different Cost of Healthy Enrollees   
 
W
Life Span
Prem. Profit
Nt/ 
Ntotal
Mt/ 
MTotal Prem. Profit
Nt/ 
Ntotal
Mt/ 
MTotal Prem. Profit
Nt/ 
Ntotal
Mt/ 
MTotal
t=1 $1,116 -$371 498 418 $867 -$1,107 398 268 $639 -$1,827 388 238
t=2 $1,356 $171 178 178 $1,516 $304 128 108 $1,647 $410 118 88
t=3 $1,367 $111 148 168 $1,528 $240 108 98 $1,659 $338 98 88
t=4 $1,378 $63 118 148 $1,539 $186 98 98 $1,670 $275 88 88
t=5 $1,388 $25 98 138 $1,550 $141 78 98 $1,682 $222 78 88
t=6 $1,561 $102 68 88 $1,692 $176 68 88
t=7 $1,571 $70 58 88 $1,703 $137 58 78
t=8 $1,581 $43 48 78 $1,713 $104 48 78
t=9 $1,591 $20 48 78 $1,723 $75 48 68
t=10 $1,600 $1 38 68 $1,733 $50 38 68
t=11 $1,742 $29 38 68
t=12 $1,751 $11 28 58
Switchers
Sw. Costs $335
Average 
Sw. Costs
$68 $111 $154
9% 23% 3% 23% 3%
$378 $298 $818 $295 $1,208
Voluntary Involuntary Voluntary Involuntary Voluntary Involuntary
28%
T*=5 T*=10 T*=12
$400 $1,000 $1,500
CN
Life Span
Prem. Profit
Nt/ 
Ntotal
Mt/ 
MTotal Prem. Profit
Nt/ 
Ntotal
Mt/ 
MTotal Prem. Profit
Nt/ 
Ntotal
Mt/ 
MTotal
t=1 $154 -$1,106 448 328 $867 -$1,107 398 268 $1,268 -$1,131 378 238
t=2 $798 $371 148 128 $1,516 $304 128 108 $1,923 $268 118 88
t=3 $819 $274 118 118 $1,528 $240 108 98 $1,929 $220 108 98
t=4 $840 $196 98 118 $1,539 $186 98 98 $1,935 $178 88 98
t=5 $861 $133 78 108 $155 $141 78 98 $1,940 $142 78 88
t=6 $881 $82 68 98 $1,561 $102 68 88 $1,946 $111 68 88
t=7 $900 $41 58 88 $1,571 $70 58 88 $1,951 $84 58 88
t=8 $919 $9 48 78 $1,581 $43 48 78 $1,956 $60 58 78
t=9 $1,591 $20 48 78 $1,961 $40 48 78
t=10 $1,600 $1 38 68 $1,966 $22 38 78
t=11 $1,970 $6 38 68
Switchers
Sw. Costs
3%
$295
21%
$728
3%
$274
27%
$994
4%
$369
23%
$818
Average 
Sw. Costs
$136 $111 $100
Voluntary Involuntary Voluntary Involuntary Voluntary Involuntary
T*=8 T*=11T*=10
$100 $1,000 $1,500
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Table 12: Equilibrium Results under Different Cost of Sick Enrollees   
 
Table 11 and Table 12 provide the results of the sensitivity analysis to the cost of healthy and 
sick enrollees. Higher costs of healthy enrollees, while maintaining the cost of sick enrollees at 
its base value, reduces the cost disadvantage between incumbent and new entrants, thereby 
allowing plans to live longer. By the same token, reducing the cost of sick enrollees allows plans 
to live longer. 
As expected, for the same life span, if discounting is included (not shown) and the future is 
worth less, plans are less willing to incur losses in the first period and will set a higher first 
period price. This will, in turn, generate lower first period market shares, lower profits and 
lower switching. 
2.8. Discussion 
This paper has examined the implications of a premium payment system in a model in which 
identical health plans attract different mixes of healthy and sick enrollees, according to how 
long a health plan has been offered by an employer. We first reviewed some empirical evidence 
that highlights that some insurance organizations, namely the Blue Cross Blue Shield plans, have 
been regularly exiting and entering with different health plan options, as our theoretical model 
would predict. 
The experience at Boston University, Minnesota and California also differs in that the highest 
rates of exit and entry and greatest dispersion of pricing have occurred with partial premium 
cost sharing, and the lowest rates have occurred with premium price floors. Clearly, there are a 
CM
Life Span
Prem. Profit
Nt/ 
Ntotal
Mt/ 
MTotal Prem. Profit
Nt/ 
Ntotal
Mt/ 
MTotal Prem. Profit
Nt/ 
Ntotal
Mt/ 
MTotal
t=1 $691 -$1,149 368 78 $867 -$1,107 398 268 $1,305 -$921 468 368
t=2 $1,353 $236 118 88 $1,516 $304 128 108 $1,934 $450 158 148
t=3 $1,354 $201 98 88 $1,528 $240 108 98 $1,968 $309 128 138
t=4 $1,356 $169 88 88 $1,539 $186 98 98 $2,000 $200 98 118
t=5 $1,357 $140 78 88 $1,550 $141 78 98 $2,032 $116 78 108
t=6 $1,358 $115 68 88 $1,561 $102 68 88 $1,064 $53 68 98
t=7 $1,359 $92 58 88 $1,571 $70 58 88 $1,094 $5 48 78
t=8 $1,360 $72 58 78 $1,581 $43 48 78
t=9 $1,361 $54 48 78 $1,591 $20 48 78
t=10 $1,362 $38 48 78 $1,600 $1 38 68
t=11 $1,363 $23 38 68
t=12 $1,364 $10 38 68
Switchers
Sw. Costs
$91 $111 $100
$656 $253
20% 3% 23%
Voluntary Involuntary
3%
$818 $295 $1,113 $400
Average 
Sw. Costs
$1,100 $2,000 $4,000
Voluntary Involuntary
T*=12 T*=10 T*=7
30% 4%
Voluntary Involuntary
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great many other changes taking place in these markets for health plans, however our model 
provides a rationale for this empirical evidence and our simulations confirm it.  
Our model shows that, in the presence of switching costs, cost sharing is potentially harmful 
because it increases plans' market power. 
In our simulations, we show that, by contradicting the forces driving prices up, the increase in 
costs due a deterioration of the mix of enrollees, risk adjustment creates the right incentives for 
plans not to follow a death spiral pattern. Slowing down death spirals, risk adjustment also 
decreases switching costs, thus increasing consumers’ welfare with no impact on profits. 
Price floors were found to be extremely effective at reducing switching costs. They are also 
found to increase average premiums and profits but, at least in our simulations, the increase in 
profits is higher than the increase in total costs to consumers, implying a margin for welfare 
improvement. We are perfectly aware of the fact that our simple model may not capture many 
relevant aspects and that simulations are simulations. However, the possibility for price floors 
to be welfare improving exists, and it is our hope that this paper will stimulate further research 
on the subject. 
Such research will shed light on the full policy implications of our findings. The “churning” 
phenomenon, widely referred to in the health policy literature [1, 2], has led some States in the 
United States of America to administratively establish an upper limit to price increases in health 
plan premiums. More often than not, such policy has led the insurance companies to anticipate 
product removal from the market, thereby generating elevated switching costs to consumers. 
If, as suggested by our model, price floors are found to be more effective than current 
approaches aimed at minimizing the impact of “churning” and death spirals, than such option 
should be tested and implemented. 
What is more, lessons to be learned from such analysis are relevant to other countries, such as 
Portugal, where the employer-provided private insurance market is growing [33]. Because 
death spirals are a consequence of how contracts are written between health plan providers 
and employers, awareness of both the consequences and the mechanisms to minimize such 
consequences, will be useful in setting the appropriate grounds on which the employer-
provided private insurance market is to grow.   
The model we use is limited in a number of ways that could be relaxed and studied in future 
research. We mention a few that seem particularly important to us. The first, which we have 
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mentioned previously, is that it assumes an equal distribution of switching costs for healthy and 
sick enrollees. One would expect that a consumer who visits his physician quite often to be less 
willing to change provider than someone who almost never makes use of his insurance plan. 
Second, we focus on the simple case in which there are only two types of consumers, healthy 
and sick, whereas in the real world there are a continuum of types, with different demand 
responsiveness and treatment costs. Health care spending is stochastic and, for this reason, 
consumers may need to make choices prior to knowing their health costs needs. We focus on 
the case in which plans are all identical, and the only switching cost is a fixed cost for changing 
plans.  An alternative framework, that might be interesting to contemplate, is one that is closer 
to a matching model, in which consumers derive utility each period that depends on the quality 
of their match with a health plan. Finally, there is no moral hazard problem in our paper, and 
plans do not explicitly adopt strategies to affect health plan choices other than through pricing. 
If service distortion and/or explicit dumping are permitted, it would clearly change the optimal 
pricing, entry, and exit decisions.  
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3. Price Regulation and Product Survival in the Portuguese 
Pharmaceutical Market 
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Price Regulation and Product Survival 
 The Portuguese Pharmaceutical Market 
 
Filipa Aragão*  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
As in many European countries, price regulation of pharmaceuticals is one of the cost control 
measures adopted by the Portuguese government. When such regulation decreases the 
products’ real price over time it may create an incentive for product turnover. 
Using panel data for the period of 1997 through 2003 on drug packages sold in Portuguese 
pharmacies, this empirical analysis addresses the question of whether price control policies 
create an incentive for product withdrawal.  
Our work builds the product survival literature by accounting for unobservable product 
characteristics and heterogeneity among consumers when constructing quality, price control 
and competition indexes. These indexes are then used as covariates in a Cox proportional 
hazard model. 
We find that indeed price control measures increase the probability of exit and that such effect 
is not verified in OTC market where no such price regulation measures exist. We also find 
quality to have a significant positive impact on product survival. 
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Abbreviations 
 
   
Abbreviations Description
Autorização de Introdução no Mercado
Maketing authorization
BB Banjari and Benkard
BLP Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 
Autoridade Nacional do Medicamento e Produtos de Saúde, I.P.
National  Authori ty of Medicines  and Heal th Products , IP
NHS National Health Service 
ICD International Common Denomination 
Direcção-Geral das Actividades Económicas
Directorate Genera l  for Economic Activi ties
NROTC Over-the-counter, non-reimbursable drugs
PD Prescription drugs 
ROTC Reimbursable OTC
OTC Over-the-counter drugs
IO Industrial Organization 
ATC Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical 
ATC3 Level 3 Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical 
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PH Proportional Hazard 
LR likelihood ratio 
AIM
INFARMED
DGAE
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3.1. Introduction 
 
In Portugal, health expenditure represented, in 2008, 10.8% of the Gross Domestic Product and 
pharmaceuticals and other medical non-durable accounted for 21% of the total expenditure on 
health [35]. In an attempt to reduce the National Health Service (NHS) deficit, several cost 
containment policies have been implemented over the years.  
Oliveira and Pinto [36] and more recently Barros and Nunes [37] have assessed the impact of 
such measures on pharmaceutical expenditure. The overall conclusion in both papers is that 
policy measures aimed at controlling pharmaceutical expenditure have, in general, been 
unsuccessful. 
As in many European countries, price regulation of pharmaceuticals is one of the cost control 
measures adopted by the Portuguese government [38]. Commercialization of pharmaceutical 
products in Portugal requires a license (“Autorização de Introdução no Mercado” (AIM)). This 
license provides a number that uniquely identifies the product and all its characteristics 
(packaging, dosing, International Common Denomination (ICD), dosage, therapeutic class and 
the population to whom it is recommended).  
The owner of such license then proposes a price to the Direcção-Geral das Actividades 
Económicas (DGAE)20 [39].  While the price of over-the-counter, non-reimbursable (NROTC), 
drugs may be freely set by the firm at the resale level [40], in the case of  non-generic 
prescription drugs (PD) or reimbursable OTC  (ROTC), the Government sets a maximum price, 
based on the average price of the same product in Spain, France, Italy and Greece21 [41, 42]. 
Comparison is based on the pharmaceutical form, dosage and packaging format, and these 
price setting rules apply to both new products and changes in pharmaceutical form and 
dosage.22
                                                          
20 NROTC drug prices although freely set are to be “approved” by the Direcção-Geral Comércio e Concorrência (Portaria 713/2000 
de 5 Setembro, DR I Série B, 4693) 
 If the firm applies for reimbursement, the price should be revised by National 
Authority of Medicines and Health Products, IP (INFARMED), based on both clinical efficacy and 
the cost-effectiveness evaluation results.   
21 This rule was introduced by Decreto-Lei n.º 65/2007 de 14 de Março de 2007. DR I Série  n.º 52, de 14 de Março de 2007 - 
Ministério da Saúde. Before that, the rule was to take the maximum price of 3 reference countries. 
22 Special rules apply for generic drugs. In that case, the price has to be 20% or 35% below the reference product or reference 
homogenous group price. Also, different sets of rules apply for drugs sold in ambulatory and those sold exclusively through the 
hospital.  
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Once the initial price is set, subsequent price increases are rarely allowed and decreases may be 
mandated [43, 44]. The initial price will remain unchanged for 3 years23 [42], after which, 
periodic price variations will be determined by the annual pharmaceutical prices’ revision, 
determined by the Government in office. These annual pharmaceutical prices’ revision set the 
maximum allowed price increase24
Although both the formula for initial price determination and the formula for annual 
pharmaceutical price revisions have changed over the years, one essential feature remains: 
once the initial price is set, the pharmaceutical company loses control over subsequent price 
variations, that is, all subsequent price increases are exogenous to the firm
 and are often set below the inflation rate [45, 46], which 
means that the real price decreases over time, as the product ages.  
25
One way to regain control over the price is to replace the existing product by a “renewed 
version” of the same. Although, the new product’s price will still be set under the general rules, 
a price negotiation again takes place. This renewed version may reflect something as simple as 
a new packaging.  
. 
The aim of the present analysis is to take a first step towards understanding whether price 
regulation of the Portuguese pharmaceutical market creates an incentive for product turnover, 
defined as the substitution of existing products by slightly different versions of the same 
product. Our approach is to evaluate whether price control measures have an impact on 
product survival after controlling for quality and competition. 
There is evidence in the literature to suggest that price regulation creates an incentive for 
product turnover when such regulation decreases the products’ real price over time. Danzon 
and Chao [47] use data from seven countries to examine price competition between generic 
competitors (different manufacturers of the same compound) and therapeutic substitutes 
(similar compounds), under different regulatory regimes. The authors find that “generic 
competition is ineffective and may be counterproductive in countries with strict price or 
reimbursement regulation”. In interpreting their findings the authors argue that one plausible 
explanation is that in regulatory regimens (which decrease the products’ real price over time), 
                                                          
23 The law has recently changed to 1 year (Decreto-Lei 48/A 2010, de 13 de Maio de 2010, DR I Série, n.º 93 de 13 de Maio de 2010 
– Ministério da Saúde) 
24 Currently, the review is based on the comparison with the average of the prices in force in the reference countries on 1st January 
each year (Decreto-Lei 48/A 2010, de 13 de Maio de 2010, DR I Série, n.º 93 de 13 de Maio de 2010 – Ministério da Saúde). 
25 Exceptional price revisions are contemplated in the Law. These may occur due to public interest or by initiative of the Marketing 
Authorization owner. Any such change must be approved by DGAE, INFARMED I.P, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Economy. 
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generic equivalents are often me-too products introduced by the manufacturers as a strategy to 
obtain higher prices.  
This issue is relevant because introducing new products, especially in such regulated markets, is 
expensive and time consuming, both for applying firms and for licensing authorities. Moreover, 
both the prescribing physician and the consuming patients incur in non-neglectable switching 
costs. These costs may well exceed potential savings obtained through price control. 
Oliveira and Pinto [36] argue that the growth in pharmaceutical expenditure is related, among 
others, to a shift towards more expensive drugs. Are these, "more expensive drugs", new 
chemical entities (recovering research and development cost while protected by patent 
legislation) or "me-too" products”?. In Danzon, Wang &Wang [48], Portugal appears second to 
last in terms of the number of launches of new chemical entities among major markets in the 
90s. Nevertheless, as shown in Table 13, Portugal has a product turnover rate of about 7% a 
year26 and as noted by Cardoso [49] the proliferation of me-too drugs was one of the main 
reasons for authorities to allow, in 200127
Using panel data for the period of 1997 through 2003 on drug packages sold in Portuguese 
pharmacies, this empirical analysis addresses the question of whether price control policies 
create an incentive for product withdrawal.  
, the transformation of branded drugs into generic 
drugs.  
Methodologically, our work builds on the product survival literature [50-52] by first estimate 
unobservable characteristics and preference parameters for both observable and unobservable 
characteristics using one method commonly applied in the empirical IO literature, namely that 
developed by Bajari end Benkard (BB) [53], and then using those preference estimates to build 
an index of product quality. While proxies for unobserved product quality have previously been 
considered as a determinant of exit in the product survival literature, to our knowledge, the 
methodology followed had not previously been applied in the product survival literature.  
Our approach is as follows: First, we apply the methodology developed by Bajari and Benkard 
(BB) [53] to estimate structural preferences parameters for both observable and unobservable 
characteristics. Secondly, we use these preferences parameters’ estimates to construct quality, 
competition and market structure indexes. Thirdly, we perform a (reduced-form) survival 
analysis for product exit using the constructed indexes, along with a proxy for price control, as 
                                                          
26 The two-digit figures for new products in 2002 and 2003 are due regulatory changes and consequent massive entrance of 
generics. 
27 This regulatory change only became effective in October 2003. 
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covariates. Finally, we compare the determinants of product withdrawal in the prescription and 
OTC markets.  
The structure of the paper is the following: In Section 3.2, we briefly review the two strains of 
literature in which our work is based. In Section 3.3 we describe the key features of the 
Portuguese pharmaceutical market and describe our data. In Section 3.4, we describe the 
hedonic approach to demand estimation used in this analysis and present our preference 
parameters’ estimates. In Section 3.5, we describe our modeling approach to estimate the 
determinants of product survival. This includes presenting both the covariates (constructed 
indexes of quality, differentiation, price control, age and market structure) and the estimation 
framework. In Section 3.6 provides our results and in the last section, we discuss and conclude. 
3.2. Literature Review 
Our work relates to two distinct strains of the economic literature: the product survival 
literature and the differentiated products empirical literature of Industrial Organization (IO). In 
essence, our work contributes to the literature by incorporating developments of the second 
into the first. As such, we will begin by reviewing the product survival literature, thereby 
contextualizing the benefits of the developments in the IO literature and then proceed to a 
brief review of empirical IO literature of relevance for the present work. 
 
Product survival literature 
The idea that price regulation of pharmaceutical products has an impact on the firm’s entry 
decisions is not new [38, 47, 48, 54-56] and the general conclusion has been that price 
regulation contributes to launch delay novel products while apparently encouraging the 
introduction of me-too products. 
In 2000, Danzon and Chao [54] use 1992 data from 7 countries to evaluate the impact of 
different regulatory environments on competition.  Evidence provided in that paper, namely, 
that of ineffective competition among same compound products in more regulated countries 
supports (as noted by the authors themselves) our hypothesis of me-too introductions as a 
strategy to overcome price regulation.  
Following that work, Danzon and several colleagues have produced a series of papers on the 
impact of regulation on launch delay and innovation at the country level [38, 48]. While that 
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line of research focuses on the delayed introduction of novel products resulting from price 
regulation, the present analysis focuses on a complementary aspect, the impact of price 
regulation on the probability of withdrawal after controlling for quality and competition 
indicators. 
A few studies have analyzed survival at the product level. Determinants of survival which have 
been studied include, among others, product characteristics, market structure and firm 
characteristics. In 1995, Stavins [50] investigated product quality as a determinant of the 
likelihood of exit of models in the US personal computer market (without accounting for 
product duration). Later, Greenstein and Wade [57] estimated the relationship between the 
number of competitors and the survival of products in the US mainframe computer market. And 
Asplund and Sandin [58] studied the  relationship  between market share and the survival of 
products in the Swedish beer market. Neither of these two studies examined quality as a 
determinant of the product life cycle.  
In 2005, Figueiredo and Kyle [51], improve on the previous work by including three proxies for 
quality, one of which was the residual from the hedonic regression on product characteristics, 
and complement the survival analysis (exit decision) by also modeling the determinants of 
product entry. In the same year Ruebeck [59] models the determinants of product exit in a 
vertically differentiated market (applied to the computer hard disk). The work by Requena-
Silvente and Walker [52], in the UK automobile market, innovates by including indexes of 
quality, intra-firm and inter-firm competition constructed from the parameter estimates 
obtained from a hedonic regression (similar to those used by Stavins [50]).  
Our work builds on this vein of literature, by applying a more flexible methodology to estimate 
unobservable product characteristics, estimating its associated preference parameter and 
incorporating this information when constructing the indexes. Some of the indexes we use are 
also different from those of Requena-Silvente and Walker since our main focus is the impact of 
price regulation on product withdrawal.  
Most recently, Cardoso [49] analyzed survival of pharmaceutical products in three countries, 
including Portugal. Part of her analysis refers to approximately the same period as ours and 
utilizes a sample of one of the databases we also use in our analysis (the INFARMED database). 
Her analysis focused on the impact of regulatory changes on product withdrawal (including 
both market withdrawal and transformation in to generic products) while ours focuses on the 
impact of price regulation on product withdrawal. Our analysis differs from Cardoso’s in that we 
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include price and quantity information (not available to her) to construct quality, competition 
and price control indexes which are included are regressors in the survival analysis.  
Empirical IO literature 
Estimation of demand in differentiated products markets has seen major developments in the 
empirical IO literature in the last two decades. Within such developments, unobservable 
characteristics and consumer heterogeneity have been shown to be of significant relevance in 
markets of differentiated products [53, 60, 61].  
In 1994, Berry [62] operationalized the empirical framework for demand estimation of  
differentiated products with unobservable characteristics and heterogeneous consumers. One 
year later, Berry, Levisohn and Pakes (BLP) [60] applied that methodology and estimate a 
structural model of demand (and supply) in the automobile industry. This line of research has 
had many followers and consequent advances over the years [63, 64]. As shown by these 
authors omitting unobservable characteristics from the demand system will generate biased 
estimates of the willingness to pay for product attributes28
In 2005, Banjari and Benkard (BB) [53] presented an alternative approach - the hedonic 
approach - to demand estimation with unobservable characteristics and heterogeneous 
consumers. Building
.  
29
Simply put, in the hedonic approach consumer demand is deterministic (unlike the BLP-like 
random utility models). This method has advantages and disadvantages with respect to the 
random utility BLP approach.  The BB approach avoids the need for available valid instruments, 
does not require an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) random error in the utility 
function, and is computationally simpler (see BB for a formal discussion). However, it is more 
demanding on the data and may require a stronger assumption of independence among 
observable and unobservable characteristics. In practice, the two approaches may lead to 
different results, although more research is needed (see [61, 64] for a discussion on this issue). 
 on the pioneer work by Rosen [65], the authors develop an easily 
implemented, although data demanding, two-step method which overcomes (i) some of the 
limitations identified in the BLP approach [61, 63] and (ii) some of the criticisms to Rosen work  
[53]. The BB approach has since been applied in several settings [66, 67]. 
                                                          
28 If unobservable characteristics are correlated with prices, as expected, price elasticity estimates will be biased downward. 
29 BB relax three assumptions in Rosen’s work, namely, perfect competition, continuum of products and perfect observability of 
characteristics. 
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Although accounting for unobservable characteristics has become the rule rather than the 
exception in empirical IO, to our knowledge, we are the first to explicitly incorporate preference 
parameters for both unobservable and unobservable characteristics in the survival analysis 
literature30
3.3. The Database 
. In doing so, we closely follow the BB approach to estimate structural preferences 
parameters for both observable and unobservable characteristics.  
The analysis performed is based on the Intercontinental Medical Systems (IMS) database for the 
period 1997-2003. This panel data provides information, at the product level, for all outpatient 
drug sales in Portugal, with revenues above 300 Euros. The data set includes information on 
brand name, Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC), manufacturer, mode of administration, 
pharmaceutical form, strength, package size, prescription requirements, value added tax (VAT) 
class, reimbursement rate, consumer price per pack and first marketing date.  
This data set was matched to the INFARMED website information [68] in order to identify the 
International Common Denomination (ICD), the marketing authorization license (AIM) owner, 
AIM number, AIM date, details on interior packaging, prescription requirements, licensing 
status and reference price. The licensing date refers to the licensing date of the first package. 
The reference price is that of 2004, the time at which the website was consulted.  
It should be noted that the licensing date, quite often, differs significantly from the first 
“positive” sales date, as reported by IMS. The average difference is 4 years between the 
marketing date and the licensing date, but with a wide variation from -46 years to 52 years. 
Although a posterior marketing date may be due to entry deterrence strategies, a marketing 
date before the licensing date (5% of the sample) implies that, in legal terms, (and for pricing 
concerns) the product has been replaced. Given the aim of the present analysis, the most 
recent of the two dates will be assumed as the entering date. In those cases where the AIM 
date was not available, the date reported by IMS was assumed. 
The INFARMED website provides information on licensed products, independently of whether 
these products have actually been placed on the market. Likely due to economies of scale in the 
licensing process, the number of variants of the same product, licensed but not introduced in 
                                                          
30 Note that while the residual of the hedonic regression has been used as a proxy of unobserved quality, in our work we use flexible 
non-parametric methods based on the techniques developed by Fan and Gijbels (1996) to estimate the hedonic unobservable, then 
estimate its associated preference parameter (as with any other observable characteristic). 
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the market, is significant. This phenomenon, certainly of interest in a structural approach to 
entering strategies, is beyond the scope of the present analysis and this information was, 
therefore, discarded.          
On request, INFARMED also kindly provided information on all AIM requests and revocation 
requests in the period of analysis. The AIM number was used to link this information to the 
remaining data.  
Due to price control, price variations are determined jointly by the Ministry of Health and the 
Ministry of Economics. Any price variations beyond that, are to be reported (and approved) by 
Direcção-Geral das Actividades Económicas (DGAE). Information on all requests for price 
changes in the period of analysis were kindly provided by that governmental department and 
used to validate the prices provided by IMS. As expected, a lag was often found between the 
new price year of approval and the year in which the drug was sold at the new price. In the 
analysis, the IMS price was assumed, since this reflects the price faced by consumers (and AIM 
owners).  
The relevant price from the patients’ perspective is the co-payment they will be charged. If 
price sensitivity were driven solely by consumer co-payments, we might expect small quantity 
elasticity’s with respect to manufacturer prices. However, considering that demand decisions 
also reflect physicians’ incentives through detailing and pharmacists’ through more attractive 
margins, the full price was used in the analysis. The price per pack was used in the analysis to 
reflect the possible waste associated with package size.   
Table 13: Product Turnover in the Portuguese Pharmaceutical Market 
 
As shown in Table 13, the data consists of 6,899 distinct products sold, at some point, during 
the 7 year period of analysis. A product is, in the present context, defined by the complete set 
of characteristics (active ingredient, dosage, strength, packaging format and size, administration 
mode, generic or not, prescription drug or OTC) and AIM number. This means that if a product 
Year
# AIM 
owners
#ICDs Products Entries Exits
Generics Volume 
mk share
OTC Volume 
mk share
1997 217 1,273 3,843 5% 0.07% 23%
1998 222 1,268 3,921 7% 8% 0.07% 21%
1999 217 1,266 3,947 8% 7% 0.14% 20%
2000 216 1,261 3,947 7% 6% 0.20% 19%
2001 218 1,255 4,079 9% 6% 0.42% 18%
2002 221 1,225 4,687 18% 9% 1.35% 17%
2003 229 1,199 5,378 21% 3.32% 18%
1997-2003 268 1,491 6,899 44.3% 22%
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is withdrawn from the market and reintroduced with the exact same characteristics but a new 
licensing process (and thus a new AIM number), it is assumed as a new product. By the same 
token, if a product is transformed into generic, it is considered a new product. The only 
exception concerns the reimbursement rate, which in case of change from one year to the 
other, it is not considered to be a new product. 
These 6,899 products are built on 1,491 different ICD and registered to 268 different 
pharmaceutical firms. An ICD is defined as an active ingredient or a combination of active 
ingredients. Thus, for example, acetylsalicylic acid is different from acetylsalicylic+ascorbic acid. 
We are aware that multiple links between pharmaceutical companies exist and that, as a 
consequence, these 268 entities possibly reflect a much smaller number of firms. Nevertheless, 
in the absence of such information, these firms were assumed to act independently. 
Although generic products had legally been introduced in the Portuguese pharmaceutical 
market for almost a decade, the impact of such regulation in terms of actual sales/market 
shares was so diminute that new regulation, creating incentives for generic substitution, was 
published in the 2000-2003 period [69].  The increase in the percentage of new products in the 
2002-2003 period reflects precisely that legislation. This increase in the number of new 
products result not only from the generics introduced, but also from the “response” of the 
branded market to that new environment, as shown in Table 14. As noted by Cardoso [49] the 
possibility of transforming branded products in generic ones only became effective in the end of 
2003, consequently our data does not show too much of an abnormal increase in the number of 
exits in the period of analysis. 
Table 14: Entry and Exit, Branded Versus Generics 
 
Due to the already mentioned divergence between the licensing year and the year of first 
reported sales, we assume a product enters the market in year X if it was not sold in year X-1 
Year
Total % Entries Exits Total % Entries Exits
1997 3,826 5% 17 12%
1998 3,901 99% 7% 8% 20 1% 25% 10%
1999 3,901 99% 8% 7% 46 1% 61% 4%
2000 3,881 98% 6% 6% 66 2% 33% 3%
2001 3,955 97% 8% 6% 124 3% 48% 6%
2002 4,459 95% 17% 9% 228 5% 49% 6%
2003 4,811 89% 16% 567 11% 62%
Average 4,105 96% 10% 7% 153 4% 46% 6%
Generic MarketBrand Market
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and it exited the market if it was not sold the following year. Consequently, we do not have 
information on which products were launched in 1997, so it is not possible to estimate the 
percentage of entries in that year. The same occurs with respect to exits in 200331
The generics market share, in terms of packages sold, increased significantly during the period 
of analysis, reflecting the incentives created, but was still less than 4% at the end of the study 
period. The OTC market share remained fairly constant over the period of analysis, with an 
average of 19%. 
. Overall, 44% 
of the 6899 products in the data were introduced after 1997 and 22% exited between 1997 and 
2003. There was, in the analysis period, a turnover rate of about 7% per year in this market. 
As shown in Table 15, the turnover rate (excluding the abnormal 2002-2003 years in the 
prescription market) was about the same in the OTC and the prescription drug market. The 
average age of the products in the market was higher (𝑝𝑝 < 0.001) in the OTC market. 
Table 15: Entry and Exit, Prescription Versus OTC 
 
Due to control measures, price increases determined by the Government are often below 
inflation rate, implying a decline in real prices over the product’s life cycle. Our sample is left 
censored with respect to price, as we do not have information on launch prices for products 
launched before 1997, nor do we known about subsequent negotiated price changes. It is, 
therefore, not possible to have an estimate of the real price of each product. We may, 
nevertheless, evaluate the loss, in real terms, in the 7 years of analysis, as shown in Table 16. 
Real price estimation were based on the inflation rates provided by UNECE Statistical database 
[70]. 
                                                          
31 The IMS data does actually provided such information with a coded sign next to each registry. Because our data was obtained by 
scanning paper versions of the data set, often signs were missing and such information was discarded.  
Year
Total % Entries Exits
Average 
Age
Total % Entries Exits
Average 
Age
1997 3,156 82% 5% 11.5 687 18% 6% 16.8
1998 3,248 83% 8% 7% 11.7 673 17% 4% 9% 17.7
1999 3,296 84% 9% 7% 11.8 651 16% 6% 7% 18.2
2000 3,317 84% 7% 6% 12.2 630 16% 4% 6% 18.7
2001 3,427 84% 9% 6% 12.2 652 16% 9% 7% 18.3
2002 4,056 87% 20% 9% 11.1 631 13% 4% 8% 18.5
2003 4,757 88% 22% 9.8 621 12% 6% 18.2
Average 3,608 85% 13% 7% 11.5 649 15% 6% 7% 18.1
OTC DrugsPrescription Drugs
Note: OTC= Over the Counter Drugs
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As presented in Table 16, there is an average loss over the follow-up period of 5.7% (median 
6.8%) in package price, and an average annual loss of 1.1% resulting from a loss of 1.2% in 
prescription drugs and 0.02% in OTC drugs. Among products that have been in the market 
during the whole study period (not shown), the average total loss is 10% (median 12%) resulting 
from an average loss of 12% in prescription drugs and a gain of 0.6% in OTC drugs.  
Table 16: Real Price Variation 
 
With respect to competitive pressure, analyzing at the three-digit level anatomic therapeutic 
category, there are, on average, 7.5 firms with around 2.6 products each. Although this suggests 
a significant level of competition, it should be noted that the average number of ICD per level 3 
ATC class (ATC3)32
Table 17: Competitive Indicators at the ATC3 Level 
 is 6.4. Since initial price setting rules are based on identical or similar 
products defined according to (in order of importance) active principle, pharmaceutical form, 
strength and closest package, the “price competition” may be less severe than the number of 
firms/products per ATC3 would suggest. 
 
                                                          
32 Defined by grouping all drugs with the same therapeutic and pharmacological characteristics. 
Median Average Median Average Median Average
Total during follow-up -6.80% -5.67% -6.80% -6.47% -3.77% -0.21%
Average per year in market -1.52% -1.06% -1.53% -1.21% -1.01% -0.02%
All Prescription OTC
Note: OTC= Over the Counter Drugs
1997 221 7.32 17 2.4 6.4
1998 219 7.37 18 2.4 6.4
1999 222 7.25 18 2.5 6.3
2000 221 7.28 18 2.5 6.3
2001 213 7.67 19 2.5 6.5
2002 213 7.76 22 2.8 6.4
2003 211 8.15 25 3.1 6.3
Note: OTC= Over the Counter Drugs; ICD= International Common Denominator; 
ATC=Anatomic Therapeutic Category
Number of 
ICD by ATC3 
(average)
Year
Number 
of ATC3
Number 
of Firms 
per ATC3 
(average)
Number of 
Products 
per ATC3 
(average)
Number of 
Product per 
Firm per 
ATC3 
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For the purpose of the analysis, we have excluded classes V (diagnostic agents) and T (various). 
These classes represented 0.3% of the sample and introduced a lot of noise with respect to 
relevant variables, such as units and dosage.  
3.3.1. Product characteristics 
Table 18 provides summary statistics of the observable product characteristics in the data. 
Hedonic regressions would ideally include the characteristics that are of intrinsic value to 
consumers and regulator, namely, therapeutic value, convenience (side-effects, intake 
frequency, brand associated quality). Moreover, relevant characteristics should include those 
that affect the physicians’ decision to prescribe [71, 72], and the pharmacists’ decision to have 
the product in stock (or to recommend the product in the case of OTC drugs). Since that kind of 
data is not available, we use proxies such as those summarized in Table 18. We fully realize that 
these characteristics may not be the determinant in the purchasing decision for several reasons. 
This is precisely the reason why it is important to account for unobservable characteristics in 
estimation.  
Strength is defined as the quantity of active ingredient per IMS standard unit33
Table 18
, which is a rough 
proxy to a dose. Since strength will depend on the active principle under consideration, the 
variable was normalized to the interval 0-1. This normalization is obtained, by subtracting the 
product strength from the highest strength available for that ICD, and diving this value by the 
difference between the highest and the lowest strength in that ICD. Assuming firms will place 
themselves at the middle (in the Hotelling sense) first, a value of 0.5 was assigned to those 
active principles with a single strength. Strength was then divided in three classes (𝑠𝑠 < 0.33; 
0.33 <= 𝑠𝑠 < 0.66; 𝑠𝑠 > 0.66). The majority of products (42%) are in the weak strength class, as 
shown in  . 
Units were defined as the number of IMS standard units in the pack. This variable was also 
normalized to 0-1 in the same spirit. The option for a small pack is the most frequent (43%). In 
an unregulated market, package size should be inversely related to price per unit, if 
manufacturers pass on economies of scale to consumers. In the Portuguese pharmaceutical 
market this effect is mitigated by pack size regulation of drugs subject to reimbursement. 
                                                          
33 The IMS standard unit is a proxy for the dose for each formulation, e.g. one tablet or capsule, 5ml. for liquids, etc. 
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Administration mode is an indicator of convenience and was therefore included among the 
relevant characteristics in the analysis34
Reimbursement rate classes are determined by the Government. Drugs can be reimbursed at 
20%, 40%, 70% or 100%
. 
35
Prescription is a dummy variable for whether the product requires prescription. The variable 
was included to control for the fact physicians’ preferences are also involved in the purchasing 
decision. Whether the product is a generic, or not, may affect perceived quality and is, thus, 
also included in the analysis. By the same token, because the reference price system involves 
products for which a generic reimbursed alternative is available in the market and to account 
for characteristics specific of products (and diseases) placed in therapeutic classes with a 
reference price, we have included a dummy variable for whether or not the product had a 
reference price in 2004.    
. Generic products obtain an additional 10% reimbursement in the 
40% and 70% classes. In the IMS databse we found no product with reimbursement level d 
(20%) and the majority of products are in the 70% or 40% classes, 36% and 33% respectively.  
Licensing year reflects age. While molecule age may be an inverse indicator of relative 
therapeutic value, assuming that recent molecules are on average more effective than older 
molecules, individual product's age will not be related to therapeutic value if new products are 
me-too versions of existing ones. Although, ideally both age indicators’ (molecule and product) 
would be included in the analysis, because we do not have information on the first data each 
molecule was introduced, we focus on product age and include it as continuous variables in the 
analysis.  
Dummy variables for ATC3 were also included in the analysis as a proxy for the disease, and 
thus of need, to consider the possibility that more serious diseases will be associated with a 
higher willingness to pay.  
 
 
 
                                                          
34 In doing so, for dimensionally reasons we have grouped letters “e” into “d”, “b” into “a”, ”f” into “g”, “o” and “p” into “n”, “j” and 
“k” into “I” and “q” into “v”. Letters follow IMS Health definitions. 
35 Reimbursement rates have changed over the years. Currently, there are 4 levels: 95%, 69%, 37% and 15%. (Decree-Law n.º 48-
A/2010, May 13th). The pharmacotherapeutic groups which integrate the different reimbursement levels have also been subject to 
changes over the years.  
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Table 18: Descriptive Statistics of Product Characteristics 
  
Although fairly complete, the data set is far from perfect for the analysis at hand. 1997-2003 
was a period of significant regulatory changes. New incentives were created for generic 
adoption, and the reference price system was introduced, just to name a few. The data is 
influenced by all of these factors, and isolating the effect of price regulation on product’s 
survival becomes more difficult. 
3.4. Consumer Preferences 
In order to understand the determinants of product survival, it is necessary to account for 
patients/physicians preferences, so that robust quality indexes may be constructed. Such is the 
aim of the present section. 
In 2005, Bajari and Benkard (BB) [53] proposed an approach to demand estimation, which in 
essence, consists of a two-step estimation. In the first step, unobservable characteristics are 
estimated non-parametrically, and in the second step, those estimates are included as an 
additional (now observable) characteristic. Gibbs sampling is, then, used to obtain structural 
demand parameters. 
Strength 6,709 ATC1 6,880 Administration Mode 6,880
Low 42% a Alimentary tract and metabolism 15% Systemic 58%
Medium 29% b Blood and forming organs 2% a Oral solid 4%
High 29% c Cardiovascular system 19% b Oral solid retard 11%
IMS Standard Units 6,880 d Dermatologicals 7% d Oral l iquid 0%
Low 43% g Genito-urinary system and sex hormones 5% e Oral l iquid retard 7%
Medium 26% h Systemic hormonal preparations 2% f Injectable 1%
High 31% j Anti-infectives systemic 13% g Injectable retard 2%
Reimbursement Class 6,871 l Cytostatics 1% h Rectal, Excl. Hemorroidal 1%
0 20% m Muscular-skeletal system 9% i Nasal
0.4 33% n Central nervous system 16% j Other
0.5 2% p Parasitology 1%
0.7 36% r Respiratory  system 9%
0.8 5% s Sensory organs 3% Local
1 5% m External topics 8%
Generic 9% n Ophtalmologics 3%
Prescription 87% p Otic 0%
Reference Price 12% q Nasal 1%
Licensing Year r Pulmonar administration 2%
<1970 5% t Vaginal 1%
1970-1979 5% v Others 1%
1980-1989 27%
>=1990 63%
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3.4.1. Estimation framework and results 
Estimation is performed following the methodology described in detail in BB with exemplifying 
applications in Bajari and Khan  [66, 67]. As such, we will briefly describe the framework 
referring the reader to the original papers for a complete discussion on the subject. 
Let j ∈ ℶ represent a product. Let the vector  �𝐱𝐱j , ξj� = �xj1, … , xjK , ξj�  ∈  ℝ
K+1  represent 
product attributes; 𝐱𝐱j  represents perfectly observable characteristics to both consumers and 
the econometrician; while  ξj identifies the characteristic which is observable to consumers but 
not to the econometrician36
Assuming unit demand
. In our analysis there are t = 1, … 7 markets. Let It  be the set of all 
consumers in market 𝑡𝑡 and I = ⋃tIt be the set of all consumers in all markets.  
37
Where yit  is the individual 𝑖𝑖’s after-taxes income at 𝑡𝑡, 𝑐𝑐 is the composite good which price has 
been normalized to one and  pjt  is the price of product j at time t. 
 for the product 𝑗𝑗, consumer 𝐼𝐼 in market 𝑡𝑡 solves the following 
maximization problem: 
𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀(𝑗𝑗 ,𝑐𝑐)𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗 , 𝜉𝜉𝑗𝑗 , 𝑐𝑐�  subject to  𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 + 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  
The price function 𝐩𝐩t �𝐱𝐱j , ξj� is the equilibrium relationship between prices and characteristics 
in market t. It is a map from the set of product characteristics to prices that satisfy pjt =
𝐩𝐩t �𝐱𝐱j , ξj� ,∀j∈ℶ . This equilibrium price function depends on market primitives, thus, the 𝑡𝑡 
subscript. It does not inform about the price of a good that is not yet on the market, since its 
entry would affect the primitives and thus the whole price function. 
In order to estimate the hedonic price function flexibly, we use a local linear model, whereby 
we assume that locally the hedonic price function 𝐩𝐩t �𝐱𝐱j , ξj�  satisfies (ignoring the 𝑡𝑡 subscripts):  
𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 = 𝛼𝛼𝑇𝑇 ,𝑗𝑗 ∗ + �𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘 ,𝑗𝑗 ∗
𝑘𝑘
�𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗 ,𝑘𝑘 − 𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗∗,𝑘𝑘�+ 𝜉𝜉𝑗𝑗  
That is, we assume that in a neighborhood of �xj∗, ξj∗� the hedonic function is approximately 
linear. However, unlike a linear regression, where the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables is globally linear, the relationship here is only locally linear. Thus, the 
                                                          
36 The method allows for only a single-dimensional, vertically differentiated unobserved characteristic although the work has been 
extended in Benkard, C.L. and P. Bajari. J. Bus. and Econ. Statis., 2005. 23: p. 61-75.to account for a multidimensional vector of 
characteristics. 
37 See the discussion at the end of the present section. 
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coefficients have a subscript α.,j∗to emphasize that they will be specific to a particular bundle of 
characteristics �xj∗, ξj∗� . This approach, followed by BB, is based on the techniques described 
by Fan and Gijbels [73]. 
For any  j∗  ∈  ℶt , we use weighted least squares to estimate αj∗ with weighting matrix: 
𝑊𝑊 = 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑�𝐾𝐾ℎ�𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗 − 𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗∗�� = 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑 �
𝐾𝐾 �
𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗 − 𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗∗
ℎ �
ℎ �
= 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑
⎩
⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪
⎧∏ 𝑁𝑁�
𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗 ,𝑘𝑘 − 𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗∗,𝑘𝑘
ℎ
𝜎𝜎�𝑘𝑘
� 𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1
ℎ
⎭
⎪⎪
⎬
⎪⎪
⎫
 
, where K(z) = ∏ N �Zk
σ�k
� Kk=1  and Kh(z) =
K�zh�
h
 . K is thus a product of standard Normal 
distributions evaluated, for each characteristic k, at  Zk
σ�k
 where σ�k is the sample standard 
deviation of characteristic z . h is the bandwidth chosen large enough to insure a smooth 
distribution function. Note that the kernel weights W are a function of the distance between 
product j∗ and product  j, thus assigning greater importance to observations near j. 
 
Our estimates of the price function parameters allow us to recover an estimate of the 
unobservable product characteristic. This estimate is obtained as the residual of the local linear 
kernel regression model. Since the unobservable characteristic has no intrinsic units (and a 
separate regression is estimated for each product), normalization is required for identification. 
Following BB, we normalize such that the marginal distribution of ξ ∈ U[0,1].38
 
 
In order to reduce the dimensionality, following BB we assume the price function to be 
additively separable in the ATC3 fixed effects39
                                                          
38 In order to do this, simply associate the estimated omitted attribute with its percentile. I thank Patrick Bajari for this clarification. 
 and proceed by first estimating these effects by 
ordinary least squares, then subtracting the ATC3 fixed effects from the price and applying the 
local linear kernel regressions described above to the price net of ATC3 effects. In a first step, 
we run a linear regression of price on strength, pack size, pharmaceutical form, administration 
mode, generic status, reimbursement rate, existence of reference price in class, licensing year 
and ATC3 fixed effects. ATC3 absorb a number of important attributes, such as severity of 
disease.  We use dummies for categorical characteristics and the log of continuous 
39 Such assumption allows to apply the nonparametric techniques to a 7-dimensional problem (instead of the approximately 300-
dimensional one). 
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characteristics. Due to the domain of the variables strength and pack size variables, we do not 
transform these variables.  Figure 11 provides the histogram of the estimated normalized 
unobservable characteristic. 
 
Figure 11: Histogram of normalized residuals from the local linear kernel regression 
Once an estimate of the unobservable is obtained, it is included in the set of observable 
characteristics and preferences estimation, with only observable characteristics, follows. In 
what follows, 𝜉𝜉 is thus be included in the 𝑀𝑀 vector of product characteristics and we redefine 
𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗 ≡ �𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗1, … , 𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝐾𝐾 , 𝜉𝜉𝑗𝑗 � and 𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖 = �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,1, … ,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝐾𝐾 ,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝜉𝜉�. 
As noted by BB, a parametric assumption on the utility function is required for identification. 
We assume a quasi-linear parametric function for utility, loglinear in continuous 
characteristics40
, where 𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗 ≡ �𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐 ,𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑� , 𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗 ∈ ℝ𝐾𝐾+1 , 𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖 ≡ �𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 ,𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑� , 𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖 ∈ ℝ𝐾𝐾+1 and the coefficient on 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗  is 
normalized to one. 
 and linear in discrete characteristics. The utility function is thus described as 
(omitting the 𝑡𝑡 subscripts): 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗 ,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 ;𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖� = 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑�𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗𝑐𝑐�𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 + 𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 + 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 � 
Since we do not have information on income distribution, we will assume the approach 
suggested by BLP, whereby a random draw is taken from the income distribution of the 
Portuguese population and we will assume the distribution of income to be independent of 
preferences. Given the link between health and income, as well as the agency problems in the 
market under consideration, the distribution of income for the entire population is not the 
distribution that should be taken into consideration. This issue is nonetheless mitigated by the 
                                                          
40 The log specification allows product characteristics to have diminishing marginal utility. 
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fact that Portugal has National Health Insurance with null co-payment for most chronic 
diseases, where income effects are likely to be more significant. 
The average value of after-tax equivalent income per deciles (Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, OECD, modified scale) based on the National Health Survey 
2005/2006 was used to obtain after-tax income distribution per equivalent adult41
Figure 12
. In order to 
sample from that distribution in the simulation, we have adjusted a parametric distribution in 
RiskPalisade®, which is present in .  
If different segments of the population (retired individuals, for example) purchase more 
products than younger individuals, this National distribution of income should be adjusted to 
account for different weights of different income segments, with respect to pharmaceutical 
production consumption. Such information is not available, however, so the general distribution 
was assumed. 
  
Figure 12: After-Taxes Income Distribution, per Equivalent Adult, in the General Population 
The distribution of consumer preferences is processed by using the Gibbs sampling algorithm 
proposed by BB for the case where the commodity space is discrete. The consumer chooses 
from a finite set of 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽 products. If the consumer 𝑖𝑖 chooses product 𝑗𝑗  it must be the case 
that: 
                                                          
41 Data kindly provided by the National School of Public Health. 
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𝑢𝑢�𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗 , 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 ;𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖� ≥ 𝑢𝑢(𝒙𝒙𝑘𝑘 ,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ;𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖),∀𝑗𝑗≠𝑘𝑘  
The aim is therefore to estimate the set: 
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = �𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖 : 𝑢𝑢�𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗 ,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 ;𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖� ≥ 𝑢𝑢(𝒙𝒙𝑘𝑘 ,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ;𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖),∀𝑗𝑗≠𝑘𝑘� 
The likelihood function for this model is thus: 
𝐿𝐿(𝑗𝑗|𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ,𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖) = �
1   𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓              𝑢𝑢�𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗 ,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 ;𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖� ≥ 𝑢𝑢(𝒙𝒙𝑘𝑘 ,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ;𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖),∀𝑘𝑘≠𝑗𝑗
0  𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓                              𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡ℎ𝐻𝐻𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝐻𝐻                                             
  
The Gibbs sampling algorithm, as any Bayesian analysis, requires an assumption on the prior 
distribution of the coefficient parameters. Following BB, we have assumed that the prior 
distribution for 𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖  has a uniform distribution defined by a set of conservative lower and upper 
bound for each taste coefficient. These limits were defined as 100 times the 95% confidence 
interval bounds of our initial guess of the corresponding willingness to pay of each variable 
(obtained by ordinary least squares). In that case, for each 𝑘𝑘 = 1, … ,𝐾𝐾 + 1, the conditional 
distribution 𝑝𝑝�𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘 |𝒙𝒙,𝑝𝑝,𝐶𝐶(𝑖𝑖) = 𝑗𝑗,𝜷𝜷−𝑘𝑘�, will be  𝑈𝑈�𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 ,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀  �, where 
 
A estimate of the parameters' distribution may then be obtained with the following algorithm. 
Let 𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖
(0) = �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,1
(0)𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖,−1
(0) � be an arbitrary point of support, then, 
1. Given  𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖
(0) draw 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ,1
(1) from the 𝑈𝑈�𝛽𝛽1,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 ,𝛽𝛽1,𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀  �  
2. Draw 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘  conditional on vector 𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖 ,−𝑘𝑘  as in step 1 for l = 2, … , K 
3. Return to 1. 
 
After discarding the first 50 draws, we simulated 1,000 taste coefficient draws per product for a 
total of 4,993 products in the market in 2003. Parameters were estimated for a single year due 
to the long running time of simulations42
                                                          
42 Including the initial draws, this process took about one month running at the CEFAGE – Universidade de Évora server. 
. We are thus not able to evaluate changes in 
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘 ,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀
= 𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀 �𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘|𝛽𝛽−𝑘𝑘  𝐹𝐹,𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠.𝑡𝑡 .𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘,𝑗𝑗>𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘 ,𝑘𝑘 �
∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚�𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑�𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 ,𝑘𝑘� − 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑�𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 ,𝑗𝑗 �� + 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 � − 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘)𝑚𝑚≠𝑘𝑘
𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑�𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘 ,𝑗𝑗 � − 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑�𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘,𝑘𝑘�
 �� 
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘 ,𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀
= 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 |𝛽𝛽−𝑘𝑘  𝐹𝐹,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠.𝑡𝑡 .𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘 ,𝑗𝑗<𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘,𝑘𝑘 �
∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘 �𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑�𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 ,𝑘𝑘� − 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑�𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 ,𝑗𝑗 �� + 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 � − 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘)𝑚𝑚≠𝑘𝑘
𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑�𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘,𝑗𝑗 � − 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑�𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘 ,𝑘𝑘�
  �� 
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consumer preferences over time and thus assume those preferences to be constant over time. 
Moreover, as noted by BB, in the case of discrete product space, in general, it is not possible to 
obtain a point estimate for the 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠 but rather a bounded interval. As a point estimate, the 
midpoint of the interval was assumed.   
Table 19: Summary statistics and OLS coefficients 
 
 
Table 19 provides summary statistics and OLS coefficients for the variables included in the Gibbs 
sampling algorithm and  Figure 13 graphs the (kernel smoothed) taste distributions for some 
characteristics, namely, strength (dosage), pack size (units), age and the unobservable 
characteristic converted to minimal willingness-to-pay. The estimated distribution of 
willingness-to-pay are centered around the mean value estimated by OLS. It should be noted 
that since demand for pharmaceuticals is influenced by such factors as insurance coverage, 
imperfect information, physician prescribing, switching costs, etc., these estimates are still 
implicit prices, but cannot be interpreted as marginal value to consumers. 
Average St.Dev. Min Max OLS Coef  P>|t| 
Strength 47.52 37.93 0 100 0.12 0.000 0.13 0.16
Package size 48.04 37.59 0 100 0.15 0.000 0.18 0.21
Age (ln) 1.83 1.14 0 3.989 -8.61 0.000 -8.94 -6.96
Reference Price 0.15 0.36 0 1 1.52 0.000 2.08 4.25
Prescription 0.89 0.31 0 1 10.74 0.000 11.33 15.52
Reimbursement rate (0% is reference)
40% 0.32 0.47 0 1 -3.68 0.018 -5.98 -0.57
70% 0.43 0.49 -10.71 0.000 -15.97 -9.73
100% 0.05 0.21 0 1 -4.74 0.301 -10.07 3.11
Generic 0.10 0.31 0 1 -14.73 0.000 -19.56 -15.07
Unobservable (ln) 0.56 0.28 2E-04 1 47.75 0.000 49.10 58.55
Constant -10.93 0.000 -20.64 -16.25
R2=0.3595; N=4,993
[95% Conf. Interval]
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Figure 13: Willingness-to-pay for characteristics 
The sequence of random draws may then be used to recover the distribution of tastes for the 
entire population of consumers since:  
lim
𝑆𝑆→∞
1
𝑆𝑆
�𝑑𝑑�𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖
(𝑠𝑠)�
𝑆𝑆
𝑠𝑠=1
= �𝑑𝑑 �𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖
(𝑠𝑠)�𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒(𝜷𝜷𝑖𝑖|𝐶𝐶(𝑖𝑖),𝒙𝒙,𝑝𝑝) 
Given the aggregate nature of the data, the above expression has to be adjusted to account for 
the fact that observations represent more than one consumer. If 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗  out of a population of 𝑁𝑁 
consumers chooses product 𝑗𝑗, then a weight of 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 /𝑁𝑁 is attached to each observation.  
In performing such adjustment we made two simplifying assumptions. First, we assumed the 
market share of the outside option is zero. Demand estimation requires knowledge of market 
size, so that the market share of outside option (not buying) may also be estimated. The entire 
Portuguese population is, in principle, the market of interest, although ideally, and if available, 
market for each therapeutic class should be used. In the lack of such information and due to the 
annual structure of our data, we assume the market share of the outside option to be zero. This 
assumption is likely to be less relevant in prescription drugs where, for the most part, people 
see products essential and are thus less likely to forgo buying it if prescribed. The assumption is 
more relevant in the OTC market, where goods may be seen as less essential.  Given the fact 
that we are interested in average value of preferences parameters and do not aim at welfare 
analysis, this unrealistic assumption becomes less of an issue.  
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Second, we assume that products are purchased individually and that no dynamic effects exist. 
Demand for differentiated products’ models, in the BLP and BB literature assume unit demand 
or at least that the purchase of one product is independent of the purchase of another. In 
practice, this assumption is unlikely to hold for two reasons. First, on average, 2.12 drugs are 
obtained by prescription [74] and physicians’ prescription habits would suggest that, for a given 
diagnosis, a physician will prescribe the same (approximate) bundle of products. Using data at 
the individual level, Dubé [75] has addressed this issue, suggesting how to account for multiple 
discreteness but such micro level data is not available to us. Secondly, patients learn from past 
experience and purchase of a product one month increases the changes of buying the same 
product next month. These learning effects are beyond the scope of this paper. 
3.5. The Survival Model 
In order to evaluate the determinants of product survival, namely price control measures, the 
preference estimates obtained in the previous section are used to construct indexes of quality, 
differentiation, and competition. We will first describe the indexes in detail and then present 
the results of the survival analysis using the Cox proportional hazard model. 
3.5.1. Explanatory Variables 
We begin with the quality index 𝜓𝜓, reflecting the value attached by 
consumers/physicians/pharmacists to the product of interest. Let 𝜷𝜷� = �?̅?𝛽1, … , ?̅?𝛽𝐾𝐾+1� be the 
weighted average of the willingness-to-pay coefficients estimated by the Gibbs sampling 
algorithm. Then, for each product 𝑗𝑗, in market 𝑡𝑡, the quality index is defined by:  
𝑄𝑄𝑢𝑢𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 ,𝑡𝑡 ≡ 𝜓𝜓𝑗𝑗 ,𝑡𝑡 = � ?̅?𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘 ,𝑗𝑗
𝐾𝐾+1
𝑘𝑘=1
 
Note that one of the characteristics in 𝑀𝑀 is the estimated unobservable which may now be 
handled as any other (observable) characteristic. 
We define market segments at the 3-digit ATC level. Consequently competition indicators, both 
intra and inter firms, are constructed at that level. Let 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 = 1𝑡𝑡 , … , 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡  represent the set of market 
segments in year 𝑡𝑡 and let 𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 = 1, … 𝐽𝐽𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡  represent the set of products in segment 𝑠𝑠 at time 𝑡𝑡.  
Also, let 𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 = 1, …𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡  represent the set of AIM owners in segment 𝑠𝑠 at time 𝑡𝑡 , 𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓 ,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 =
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1, … , 𝐽𝐽𝑓𝑓 ,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡  represent the set of products of firm 𝑓𝑓 in segment 𝑠𝑠 at time 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑗𝑗−𝑓𝑓 ,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 = 1, … , 𝐽𝐽−𝑓𝑓 ,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡  
represent the set of products not owned by firm 𝑓𝑓  in segment 𝑠𝑠 at time 𝑡𝑡. 
We are interested in understanding whether price control measures have an impact on product 
survival. Ideally, we would like to compare the products’ real and nominal price and understand 
if such difference (accumulated over the years since licensing) increases the probability of exit, 
when controlling for other factors such as quality, innovation and competition. In our sample, 
we have a significant portion of products that were already in the market on January 1st, 1997. 
Some products are licensed as far back as 1950. Since then, Portugal has had a revolution, the 
National Healthcare System was created, and rules have changed significantly. It is, therefore, 
not possible to estimate the real price of products dating back so far. As a proxy, we have used 
the average annual real price variation. That is, we estimated the (%) variation between the first 
nominal price observed in the sample and the last real price observed, and then divided that 
variation by the number of years the product was observed to be in the market during the study 
period.  
Let π𝑡𝑡  be the inflation rate in year 𝑡𝑡,  𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 ,𝑇𝑇   be the real price of product 𝑗𝑗 in the last year  (T) it 
was observed to be in the market (𝑇𝑇 ∈ {1, … ,7}, and 𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 ,1 be the first observed nominal price 
for product 𝑗𝑗. Then our proxy for the impact of price control measures is: 
𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻 𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗 = −�
𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 ,𝑇𝑇 − 𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 ,1
𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 ,1
𝑇𝑇 �
∗ 100 
, where 𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 ,𝑇𝑇 = 𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 ,1 ∏ �
1+�
𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝 𝑗𝑗 ,𝑡𝑡−𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝 𝑗𝑗 ,𝑡𝑡−1
𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝 𝑗𝑗 ,𝑡𝑡−1
�
1+𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡−1
�𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=2  
Product survival depends on the degree of competition and the ability of firms to respond to 
such competition by means of product differentiation and innovation. We, therefore, construct 
several indexes meant to account for such effects. 
 We use three measures of competition at the ATC3 level:  
1. Cannibalization: the number of products owned the AIM owner 𝐽𝐽𝑓𝑓 ,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 . 
2. Rivals’ competition: the number of products 𝐽𝐽−𝑓𝑓 ,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡  owned by other AIM owners 
3. Similar product competition: the number of similar products (where similar is defined 
by same ICD, pharmaceutical form and strength)  
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To measure rival quality differentiation, following Stavins [50] and the literature thereafter,  we 
construct a distance measure for each variant, with respect to rivals’ variants in the segment, 
but excluding own firm’s products in the corresponding segment.  
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘 𝑞𝑞𝑢𝑢𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐻𝐻𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗 𝑓𝑓 ,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 =
�∑ �𝜓𝜓𝑗𝑗 𝑓𝑓 ,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 − 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘−𝑓𝑓 ,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 �
2𝐾𝐾−𝑓𝑓 ,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
𝑘𝑘−𝑓𝑓 ,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡=1
𝐽𝐽−𝑓𝑓 ,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
,∀𝑗𝑗∈ 𝐽𝐽𝑓𝑓,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡   
In our sample, because we have several segments with no competitors, after estimating the 
index for those who do have rival firms in the same segment, we normalize the variable to the 
0-1 interval and assign a value of 1 to stand alone firms. 
We construct an equivalent index among products of the same AIM owner in a given ATC3 in 
year 𝑡𝑡 to evaluate within firm quality differentiation: 
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚 𝑞𝑞𝑢𝑢𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐻𝐻𝑒𝑒𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗 𝑓𝑓 ,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 =
�∑ �𝜓𝜓𝑗𝑗 𝑓𝑓 ,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 − 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘𝑓𝑓 ,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 �
2𝐾𝐾𝑓𝑓 ,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
𝑘𝑘𝑓𝑓 ,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡=1
𝐽𝐽𝑓𝑓 ,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
,∀𝑗𝑗∈ 𝐽𝐽𝑓𝑓 ,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡   
While a firm can only choose to differentiate a model when it is first launched, proliferation 
allows the firm to expand its coverage of the product spectrum. Requena-Silvena [52] suggests 
using the variance of product quality among products owned by the same firm, in segment s at 
time t as an indicator of proliferation. This index is thus at the firm level, per ATC3. 
𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐻𝐻𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓 ,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 =
∑ �𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘𝑓𝑓 ,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 − 𝜓𝜓�
𝑓𝑓 ,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 �2𝐾𝐾
𝑓𝑓 ,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
𝑘𝑘𝑓𝑓 ,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡=1
𝐽𝐽𝑓𝑓 ,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 − 1
 
,where 𝜓𝜓�𝑓𝑓 ,𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡  represents the average quality of products owned by firm 𝑓𝑓, in segment 𝑠𝑠 at time 
𝑡𝑡. 
We characterize the firm’s positioning strategy in the market with the following indexes: 
a. Firm size: Number of product owned by the same AIM owner. 
b. Firm atc3: Number of ATC3 groups in which the firm is present 
c. Firm quality: Average quality of all products owned by the same AIM owner. 
Lastly, we have included two additional variables: an indicator variable for whether prescription 
is required for product purchase and a binary variable for the 2001-2002 period. This last 
variable was included following Cardoso’s finding that due to regulatory changes the hazard of 
exit was increased in that period [49]. 
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3.5.2. Estimation framework 
We are interested in understanding the determinants of product exit. Therefore parametric or 
semi-parametric analysis is in order. Because we do not aim at using the model to predict 
product survival but only to understand the impact of a set of covariates of interest on the 
hazard, the Proportional Hazard (PH) Cox proportional model [76] was considered.  
Our covariates, described in the previous section, reflect market structure and product quality, 
which vary over time. These along with a proxy for the effect of price control and prescription 
requirements are our covariates of interest. 
Since, in our data, approximately 56% of all products were already in the market before 1997, 
we have included these observations accounting for left-truncation43
The PH Cox model provides the required information without making any assumption on the 
hazard over time; what is assumed is that there exists a common baseline hazard function and 
that the hazard function for a product depends on the values of the covariates and the value of 
the baseline hazard. Given two products with particular values for the covariates, the ratio of 
the estimated hazards over time will be constant. This assumption can be tested using several 
methods as described in detail in Cleeves et al. [79] and if valid, the hazard rate may then be 
estimated, conditional on the obtained parameters. Moreover, random effects, left-truncation 
and time-varying covariates are easily included in the model with the available software 
packages, namely Stata11® which was used for estimation. 
. Left-truncation occurs 
when the date the subject becomes at risk is known but the follow-up period begins at a 
delayed time and in this case, subjects with a short survival period are likely to be overlooked, 
causing overestimation of the survival rate [77-79]. Although we do not observe products over 
the complete lifespan, we do have information on when these products were licensed; so it is 
possible to correct the likelihood function to account for the fact that had the subjected failed, 
it would never have been observed.  
Three variants of the Cox proportional hazard model were considered and tested for the 
proportional hazard assumption. A model with ATC3 fixed effects, a model with ATCs random 
effects  and a model stratified by ATC3 level. The stratified model differs from the fixed effects 
model in that the Cox model is estimated with an entirely separate hazard function for each 
                                                          
43 Left-censoring means that it is only known that the subject failed at some point between the onset of risk and the beginning of 
the study (so the subject never enters), but exactly when, in that period, it occurred, cannot be ascertained. In their analysis, 
Requena-Silvente discard products that were already in the market before the study period, arguing that no method exists to 
account for left-censoring and time-varying covariates. 
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ATC3 while in the fixed effects version (that is, including binary variables for ATC3) a common 
baseline hazard is assumed and the hazard function for one ATC3 is a multiple of the hazard 
function for the other ATC3. A third approach is to treat ATC3 classes as a random effect. In the 
Cox proportional hazard model with shared frailty, the random effects enter multiplicatively on 
the hazard function [80]. The data is organized in f = 1, …Ϝ groups, with j = 1, . . Jf  products. 
For the product 𝑗𝑗 of firm 𝑓𝑓 the hazard is:  
ℎ𝑓𝑓 ,𝑗𝑗 = ℎ0(𝑡𝑡)𝛼𝛼𝑓𝑓𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝�𝒙𝒙𝑓𝑓 ,𝑗𝑗𝜷𝜷� 
, where 𝛼𝛼𝑓𝑓  is the group random effect (usually named frailty in the context of survival analysis). 
Frailties are positive quantities assumed to have a Gamma distribution with mean one and 
variance 𝜃𝜃. Large values of 𝜃𝜃 reflect heterogeneity among ATC3, and values of 𝜃𝜃 close to zero 
suggest little improvement from the traditional Cox model. ATC3 classes with 𝜃𝜃 > 1 tend to 
have shorter survival times. To compare the Cox model and the Frailty model, we applied the 
likelihood ratio (LR) test. 
Given the annual structure of our data and the fact that if time is continuous but one only 
observes it in grouped form, then the Discrete Time PH Model (complementary log-log link) is 
considered more appropriate [81, 82], and we also tested for this specification. 
3.6. Results 
Massive generic entry occurred at the end of the study period introducing significant noise 
unrelated to the main purpose of the analysis which is to understand whether price control 
measures and the associated real price decrease over the life cycle of the product have an 
impact on the probability of exiting. Consequently, in the analysis of the determinants of 
product withdrawal, generic products were excluded44
The summary statistics of the covariates described in 
.  
3.5.1 are presented in Table 20. The 
average loss, in real prices over the study period was 6.3%. After exclusion of generic products 
and 13 outliers, a total of 5,941 products are included in the analysis with a mean follow-up of 
4.5 years, yielding a total of 26,918 observations. 
                                                          
44 Moreover, while testing for the proportional hazard assumption, we found that this assumption would not hold if generic 
products were included. This non-proportionality was violated in covariates, such as the number of products owned by other firms 
in the segment or the number of products at the ATC3 level, thus reflecting the entrance of generic products at the end of the 
period due to a new regulatory environment. Although obviously of extreme interest to understand the impact of generic entrance 
in the pharmaceutical market, that effect is beyond the scope of this paper and introduces noise in the analysis of product 
replacement as a strategy to overcome price regulation. We could either have discarded the years of 2002-2003 or discarded 
generic products. We have chosen the latter, given the short time span and the percentage of generics in the sample. 
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Table 20: Descriptive statistics of covariates in the survival parametric analysis 
 
Between 1997 and 2002, in the estimation sample, 1,334 market exits occurred. The Kaplan-
Meier survival estimate is presented in Figure 14. The non-parametric analysis estimates a 
median survival age of 14 years (95% 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼: [14; 15]).  
 
Figure 14: Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates 
The PH Cox model assume proportional hazards, that is, that the ratio of hazards is constant 
over time, so that assumption should be tested if such model is to be used. Following Cleves et 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Price control overa l l 1.224 3.408 -63.17 58.40
between 3.408 -63.17 58.40
within 0.000 1.22 1.22
Quality overa l l 2.058 1.200 0.28 23.15
between 1.248 0.35 20.21
within 0.177 -9.55 9.22
Cannibalization overa l l 4.585 3.909 1 23
between 4.071 1 21
within 1.017 -1.1 18.3
Rival's competition overa l l 60.953 68.059 0.00 355.00
between 76.914 0.00 354.00
within 18.548 -30.71 175.45
Number of similar products overa l l 3.783 4.579 1 37
between 5.235 1 37
within 1.153 -10.9 26.0
Rival quality differentiation overa l l 0.028 0.118 0.00 1.00
between 0.104 0.00 1.00
within 0.045 -0.83 0.88
Within firm quality differentiation overa l l 0.237 0.353 0 8.46
between 0.340 0 6.43
within 0.097 -3.5 2.27
Own firm proliferation overa l l 0.381 2.886 0.00 89.50
between 2.551 0.00 62.83
within 1.121 -53.59 36.00
# of products overa l l 51.758 41.027 1 197
between 40.866 1 197
within 6.415 28.8 101.6
# of ATC3 overa l l 17.349 11.859 1.00 52.00
between 11.772 1.00 52.00
within 1.128 12.21 24.21
Average quality overa l l 2.058 0.475 0.59 6.18
between 0.504 0.63 6.18
within 0.127 0.65 3.76
Prescription overa l l 0.857 0.350 0 1
between 0.332 0 1
within 0.000 0.86 0.86
N = 26,918; n = 5,941 ;T-bar = 4.5.
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al. [79], we used the Grambsh and Therneau [83] test, based on Schoenfeld residuals, to 
evaluate the proportional hazard assumption for each variable and for the global model.  
In the exploratory analysis, we found that a unique baseline hazard for all segments did not fit 
the data well and did not comply with the proportional hazard assumption. Once we allowed 
for different baseline hazards, by ATC3, proportional hazard assumption was satisfied and the 
analysis of scaled Schoenfeld residuals indicated a good fit. The graphical analysis of such 
residuals is presented in Appendix II. Table 21 presents the results of the PH test assumption for 
the PH Cox model stratified by ATC3. 
Table 21: Test of Proportional Hazard Assumption 
  
We also tested the proportional hazard assumption using the graphical method of comparing 
the Kaplan-Meier estimate with the Cox estimate for each ATC3, and while a few misfits did 
exist (mainly in classes with few observations), the two models yields similar curves for the 
majority of ATC3. Figure 15 compares the Kaplan-Meier estimate with that obtained using the 
stratified Cox model for the first 2 ATC3 classes. 
 
Figure 15: KM Versus Cox Null Model Stratified by ATC3 
rho chi2 df Prob>chi2
Price Control -0.034 1.5 1 0.2203
Quality -0.003 0.02 1 0.8991
Competion
Cannibalization -0.043 2.91 1 0.0882
Rival's competition 0.053 4.13 1 0.0421
Number of similar products -0.008 0.1 1 0.7521
Rival quality differentiation -0.040 2.79 1 0.0946
Within firm quality differentiation -0.018 0.49 1 0.4829
Own firm proliferation 0.020 0.8 1 0.3722
Firm Characteristics
Number of products 0.032 1.73 1 0.1885
Number of ATC3 -0.032 1.68 1 0.1953
Average quality -0.033 1.75 1 0.1854
Prescription drug (Yes=1) 0.016 0.42 1 0.5186
Year 2001 or 2002 0.050 4.12 1 0.0423
Global Test 14.44 13 0.3439
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The Martingale residuals were used to graphically evaluate the functional form of each 
covariate and, when necessary, the variables were transformed. Fractional polynomial analysis 
was used to select the most adequate transformation. We use the base e logarithm for 
Cannibalization, Rival differentiation and Number of similar products and applied no 
transformation to the remaining variables. Appendix II provides the Martingale residuals 
analysis for the covariates.  
Efficient score residuals were used to evaluate outliers and influential points. 13 outliers were 
discarded in the final version of the model. Appendix II provides the efficient score residuals 
graphs after excluding the identified outliers. 
Lastly, as suggested in Cleves et al. [79] goodness of fit was evaluated using the cumulative 
hazard of the Cox-Snell residuals. As shown in Figure 16, the model has some degree of lack of 
fit since the cumulative hazard is slightly above the 45 degree line, but it does not diverge 
significantly in 𝑡𝑡. 
 
Figure 16: Testing for Goodness of Fit with Cumulative Hazard of Cox-Snell Residuals 
While the 𝜃𝜃 in the frailty model was found to be statistically significant (𝜃𝜃 = 0.3065, likelihood-
ratio test of  𝜃𝜃 = 0: 𝜒𝜒2 = 160.38;𝑝𝑝 < 0.001), neither the fixed effect nor the random effects 
models complied with the PH assumption (𝑝𝑝 < 0.001 𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝑘𝑘𝑠𝑠) and were therefore 
discarded.  
Given the tested requirement of stratification by ATC3 in the continuous time Cox model in 
order to comply with the proportional hazard assumption, the discrete time hazard mode 
l [82] was also stratified by ATC3 . Results obtained were similar to those of the PH Cox model 
and are presented in Appendix II.  
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Table 22 provides the result of the Cox proportional hazard model stratified at the ATC3 level. 
Price control and quality are both significant at 1% significance level and have the expected 
sign. Indeed, a one percent increase in the average annual difference between the nominal and 
the real price, increases the hazard by 6.9%. This result suggests that indeed price control and 
real price decline over the lifespan of products creates an incentive for product withdrawal. 
Quality has a protective effect on the hazard; a unit increase in quality decreases the hazard by 
50%.  
Table 22: Stratified Cox Regression Results 
 
With respect to competition measures, while the unadjusted for quality number of products 
owned by the firm in each segment (cannibalization) is not statistically significant, the within 
firm quality differentiation and own firm proliferation are both significant at 1% and have the 
expected signs. That is, quality differentiation among products of the same ATC3 owned by the 
firm has a protective effect while an increase in the firms’ coverage of the quality spectrum in 
each ATC3 results in a higher hazard.  
Unexpectedly, we find that the number of me-too products (same ICD, pharmaceutical form 
and strength) actually has a protective effect on the hazard rate. What is interesting is that the 
same result is obtained by Cardoso [49], who suggests that the protective effect may be 
Cox Regression Stratified by ATC3
Breslow method for ties
No. of subjects = 5,941
No. of failures = 1,334 Number of obs = 26,918
Time at risk    = 26,918 LR chi2(11) = 286.12
Log l ikelihood  =  -2,968.83 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
(Std. Err. adjusted for 5,941 clusters in id)
_t Haz. Ratio Std. Err. z P>z
Price Control 1.069 0.010 7.160 0.000 1.050 1.089
Quality 0.502 0.035 -9.880 0.000 0.437 0.575
Competion
Cannibalization 1.011 0.013 0.880 0.380 0.987 1.036
Rival's competition 0.998 0.001 -1.890 0.059 0.995 1.000
Number of similar products 0.975 0.009 -2.800 0.005 0.957 0.992
Rival quality differentiation 0.359 0.458 -0.800 0.422 0.029 4.371
Within firm quality differentiation 0.403 0.088 -4.160 0.000 0.263 0.618
Own firm proliferation 1.053 0.016 3.510 0.000 1.023 1.084
Firm Characteristics
Number of products 0.994 0.003 -2.200 0.028 0.988 0.999
Number of ATC3 1.005 0.010 0.560 0.574 0.987 1.025
Average quality 0.866 0.071 -1.750 0.080 0.736 1.018
Prescription drug (Yes=1) 1.259 0.167 1.740 0.083 0.971 1.632
Year 2001 or 2002  (Yes=1) 1.460 0.095 5.840 0.000 1.286 1.658
[95% Conf. Interval]
Notes: ATC3=Level 3  Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical Class.
Economic Analysis in Health Care Regulation 
 
102 
 
capturing the fact that markets with higher number of competing products are more profitable 
markets and, therefore, even with competition, products tend to last longer in those markets.  
 
We also find that, although not significant at 5% but significant at 10%, the number of products 
owned by rival firms in the same ATC3 does not increase the probability of exiting. This variable 
was found not to be statistically significant in Cardoso’s analysis. 
At 10% significance level, prescription drugs have a hazard of exiting 1.26 times that of OTC 
drugs45
The number of products owned by firm 𝑓𝑓 is a proxy for firm size and results suggest that bigger 
companies will have longer product life cycles. Qualitatively in line with the result obtained by 
Cardoso, the binary variable accounting for the 2001-2002 period of significant regulatory 
changes has the highest hazard ratio. The hazard rate is this period is 46% higher than in the 
remaining study period. 
. The estimated higher probability of survival of OTC drugs is also described in the 
analysis by Cardoso, who finds that OTC drugs have a hazard rate approximately 60% of the 
hazard of prescription drugs.  
According to the Portuguese pharmaceutical price regulation, non-reimbursable OTC products’ 
prices may be freely set and are, thus, not subject to annual price revision rules. We, therefore, 
analyze our results separately in the two market segments46
An increase in the number of products owned by the firm in the segment has a protective 
effect, suggesting possible economies of scope in the OTC market. Firm size is estimated to 
have some protective effect in the prescription market but not in the OTC market, possibly due 
scale economies in terms of marketing and market access procedures. As expected, the changes 
in the regulatory environment captured by the 2001-2002 indicator, are highly significant in the 
prescription market and not statistically significant in the OTC market suggesting that such 
regulatory changes has no impact on product survival in the OTC market. 
 and, indeed, find that, as expected, 
the price control index is not significant in the OTC market. Results suggest a crowding-out 
effect in the OTC market (captured by statistically significant hazard ratio of 2.8 in the rivals’ 
quality differentiation) while such effect is not significant in the prescription market.  
                                                          
45 Equivalently, OTC drugs have 20% lower hazard of exiting than prescription drugs because prescription coefficient= Ln(1.26)=0.23; 
exp(-0.23)=0.79. Thus we estimate the hazard of OTC to be 80% of that of prescription drugs. 
46 Estimation for the OTC market was not stratified by ATC3 given the number of products in the OTC market (751),  the number of 
ATC3 classes (219) and the fact that the model without stratification estimated on the OTC market binds with the proportional 
hazard assumption. 
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Table 23: Comparison of OTC Versus Prescription Drug Market 
 
3.7. Discussion 
The aim of the present analysis was to understand whether price control measures have an 
impact on product life-cycle. While novel product introductions are expected to have a positive 
welfare impact due to therapeutic improvements, replacement of existing products carries 
costs to society (switching costs, marketing costs and licensing costs) with little or no benefit to 
consumers.  
The reduced form analysis performed, suggests that, indeed, price control measures influence 
the decision of product withdrawal and, consequently, have an impact on turnover rates in the 
pharmaceutical market. According to INFARMED, in 2003, 108 ICDs were approved for 
reimbursement and, of these, only 15% were novel ICDs [84]. It could be argued that, even 
though the new products are not new ICDs, they still provide better quality from the 
consumers’ point of view. We believe, therefore, it was important to account for product 
quality in estimation. Such quality, as perceived by consumers and physicians, will inevitably 
include characteristics that are not observed by the econometrists. If such unobservable 
characteristics are correlated with prices and are not accounted for, quality indexes will be 
biased. We have, thus, improved on the line of research followed by Requena-Silvente [52] by 
accounting for such unobservable characteristics when constructing quality and differentiation 
indexes. Moreover, we have included a proxy of price control rules among the determinants of 
product survival. 
Haz. Ratio p-value Haz. Ratio p-value
Price Control 1.083 0.000 0.968 0.126
Quality 0.487 0.000 0.622 0.020
Competion
Cannibalization 1.024 0.071 0.908 0.030
Rival's competition 0.998 0.051 1.005 0.065
Number of similar products 0.978 0.019 0.981 0.491
Rival quality differentiation 0.451 0.530 2.796 0.043
Within firm quality differentiation 0.476 0.002 0.541 0.550
Own firm proliferation 1.043 0.007 0.347 0.550
Firm Characteristics
Number of products 0.992 0.016 1.004 0.582
Number of ATC3 1.010 0.379 0.964 0.130
Average quality 0.840 0.059 0.978 0.911
Year 2001 or 2002  (Yes=1) 1.504 0.000 1.077 0.608
Notes:  ATC3=Level 3  Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical Class.; OTC=Over the Counter. *stratified by ATC3
Prescription Drugs* OTC Drugs
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Given the fact that Cardoso [49] performs an analysis of the determinants of product exit in the 
Portuguese pharmaceutical market and that part of her analysis is performed in the 1996-2003 
period which almost coincides with ours (1997-2003), it is of special interest to compare results 
obtained. In doing so, it should be noted that not only the focus of the analysis but also the 
methodology and the datasets used diverge in the two analysis. A major difference is that price 
and quantity information in which most of our explanatory variables were constructed were not 
available in their analysis. Even so, it is worth noting that for the most part comparable results 
obtained in the two analyses do not contradict each other. 
We find that the number of similar products (independently of the owner) reduces the 
probability of exit. This result is in line with those obtained by Cardoso, namely that the number 
of competitors and own firm similar products decreases the probability of exit.  Such finding 
could also be related to the reported anecdotal effect of generic products on price competition 
reported by Danzon and Chao [54] and consistent with the idea that “in countries with strict 
regulation, generic competitors are predominantly either licensed co-marketers or ‘‘new’’ 
versions of old molecules that manufacturers introduce in order to obtain a price increase”. 
Although we do not incorporate products classified as generics in our analysis, the same 
argument may apply. 
Cardoso also finds that the number of close substitutes (same therapeutic sub-class) owned by 
competitors is not a statistically significant determinant of exit. This result is in line with ours 
since we do not find a statistically significant impact of the number of competitors (close 
substitutes or identical products) on the hazard rate.  
We do not find a statistically significant effect of cannibalization (close substitutes or identical 
products) on the exiting probability. This result may reflect the opposite effects captured in the 
Cardoso analysis, namely that identical products of the same firm have a hazard lower than 
one47
The present analysis has several limitations. In terms of data, we have a short span of data on 
an annual basis. Such structure limits the ability to evaluate product replacement, since gaps 
between exit and entry may exist due to licensing (and reimbursement) timings. Felix et al. [85] 
 while close substitutes of the same firm have a hazard higher that one. In accordance 
with our results, the authors find that products from larger firms (measured by the number of 
products) have a smaller hazard rate. 
                                                          
47 As noted by Cardoso (2010), usually, the range of own products at the same sub-market of chemical substitutes is not of self-
competitors but different packages of exactly the same product. Therefore, it is expected that firms take advantage from scope 
economies of those portfolios. 
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report a median of 9.9 months for reimbursement requests processes in Portugal in 2007 after 
the licensing process has been completed, which will take months in itself. The period of 
analysis (1997-2003) is also not ideal for the analysis of the phenomenon under study, since 
several confounding factors occurred simultaneously48
Given the main purpose of the analysis, an additional important limitation is that our price 
indicator of real price decrease with product age is restricted to an average of (at the 
maximum) 7 years period. Administrative price decreases implemented by the government and 
significant fluctuations in inflation rates in the last decades provide a strong argument for the 
“recent average loss” not to be a perfect indicator, especially for products that have long been 
on the market. 
, namely, new regulation on generic 
products which led to a substantial increase in the number of entries unrelated to the 
phenomenon at stake. 
In the pharmaceutical market, physicians act as patients’ agents and, for the most part, select 
the products to be consumed by patients. Demand for pharmaceuticals is, thus, a mixture of 
physicians’ and patients’ preferences. While estimating demand parameters, it would be of 
interest to recover both sets of preferences, but taking into account the data available, only the 
mixed bundle was estimated. Our estimated preferences are thus capturing marketing efforts 
and other promotional activities performed by pharmaceutical companies to which physicians’, 
as utility maximizing agents, may be sensitive. Since our aim is to investigate the determinants 
of product survival and given the fact that both patients’ and physicians’ preferences are 
relevant to the decision made by pharmaceutical companies to withdraw products from the 
market, the fact that we can only recover a mixed bundle of preferences does not a priori 
invalidate our results. 
The fact that physicians’ act as patient agents’ does nonetheless aggravate the issue of unit 
demand, usually assumed in the demand for differentiated products literature, since the same 
bundles are more likely to be repeated. Furthermore, demand for pharmaceuticals are 
inherently dynamic, in the sense that a consumer who buys (or a physician who prescribes) 
product 𝑗𝑗 today, is more likely to buy (or to prescribe) product 𝑗𝑗 tomorrow. These issues were 
not accounted for in the present analysis. 
                                                          
48 These are described and analyze in detail in Cardoso (2010) and include the introduction of a major public reimbursement for 
generics, relative to branded drugs in 2000; the introduction of the reference-price system of reimbursement for some products in 
December 2002 and the possibility of transforming branded drugs into generics in October 2003. 
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Such dynamic effects are also present on the supply side. Products’ entry and exit are based on 
multiproduct firms, who optimize their portfolio over time. Only a dynamic structural model 
would allow for a full understanding of the impact of any given health policy. Such analysis is 
beyond the scope of the present paper. Such approach has been followed by Filson [86] who 
within a behavioral dynamic equilibrium model estimates the welfare impact of price controls in 
the pharmaceutical industry arguing that removing price controls increases firm value, R&D, 
the flow of new drugs, and consumer welfare globally, but reduces consumer welfare in the 
countries changing their policies.  
The analysis here performed provides empirical evidence on the fact that, indeed, price control 
measures may lead to higher turnover rates. Further research is necessary on the welfare 
impact of such turnover, when switching costs, licensing costs and marketing costs are taken 
into consideration. 
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4. A Framework for Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of HIV Treatment 
in Portugal 
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A Framework for Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of HIV Treatment 
In Portugal 
 
Filipa Aragão* 
 
ABSTRACT 
We develop a microsimulation discrete events model (MSDEM) for cost-effectiveness analysis 
of Human Immunodeficiency Virus treatment, simulating individual paths from antiretroviral 
therapy (ART) initiation to death. Four driving forces determine the course of events: CD4+ cell 
count, viral load resistance and adherence.   
A novel feature of the model with respect to the previous MSDEMs is that distributions of time 
to event depend on individuals’ characteristics and past history. Time to event was modeled 
using parametric survival analysis. Events modeled include: viral suppression, regimen switch 
due virological failure, regimen switch due to other reasons, inpatient care episodes and AIDS 
events and death. Disease progression is structured according to therapy lines and the model is 
parameterized with cohort Portuguese observational data.  
An application of the model is presented comparing the cost-effectiveness ART initiation with 
two nucleoside analogue reverse transcriptase inhibitors (NRTI) plus one non-nucleoside 
reverse transcriptase inhibitor(NNRTI) to two NRTI plus boosted protease inhibitor (PI/r) in HIV-
1 infected individuals. We find 2NRTI+NNRTI to be a dominant strategy. 
Results predicted by the model reproduce those of the data used for parameterization and are 
in line with those published in the literature. 
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Keywords: Regulation, cost-effectiveness, microsimulation, discrete events, HIV, antiretroviral 
therapy. 
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Abbreviations 
 
Abbreviation Description
ACSS Administração Central do Sistema de Saúde
Healthcare System Centra l  Adminis tration
AE Adverse Events
AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ART Antiretroviral Therapy
ARV Antiretroviral
CAPS Catálogo Público de Aprovisionamento da Saúde
Cata logue of Heal th Procurement 
CART Combined Antiretroviral Therapy
CD4+ CD4+ T-Lymphocyte count per µL
CE Cost-Effectiveness
CHC Centro Hospitalar de Cascais
Casca is  Hospi ta l  Center
CI Confidence Interval
CVEDT Centro de Vigilância Epidemiológica das Doenças Transmissíveis
Communicable Diseases  and Epidemiologica l  Survei l lance Center
DCE Discrete Choice Experiment
DES Discrete-Event Simulation 
DRG Diagnosis-Related Group
EAS Economic Evaluation Study
EQ-5D EuroQol 5-D
HAART Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy
HCV Hepatitis C Virus
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HIV-1 Human Immunodeficiency Virus - Type 1
HIV-2 Human Immunodeficiency Virus - Type 2
HUI3 Health Utilities Index 3
ICD9 International Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision
ICD9-CM International Classification of Diseases 9th Revision, Clinical Modification
ICER Incremental Cost-Effectiveness Ratio
IDU Injection Drug User
INE Instituto Nacional de Estatística
National  Statis tics  Insti tute
INFARMED Autoridade Nacional do Medicamento e Produtos de Saúde, I.P.
National  Authori ty of Medicines  and Heal th Products , IP
IP/r Boosted Protease Inhibitor
Log10VL Log10 HIV RNA copies per mL
LVHEM Laboratório de Virologia do Hospital de Egas Moniz – Centro Hospitalar de Lisboa Ocidental, E.P.E.
Egas  Moniz Hospi ta l  Vi rology Laboratory - Western Lisbon Hospita l  Center
LY Life Years
MOS-HIV Medical Outcome Study-HIV Health Survey
MQoL-HIV Multidimensional Quality of Life Questionnaire for Persons with HIV/AIDS
MRS Marginal Rate of Substitution
N Number of Observations/Individuals
NHS National Healthcare Service
NNRTI Non-Nucleoside Reverse Transcriptase Inhibitors
NRTI Nucleoside Reverse Transcriptase Inhibitors
NS Non-Suppressive
OI Opportunistic Infections
P Probability
PI Protease Inhibitor
PLWHA People Living With HIV/AIDS
QAdjLY Quality Adjusted Life Years obtained using the QoLIndex
QALY Quality Adjusted Life Years
QoL Quality of Life
QoLIndex Quality of Life based on DCE utility estimates
RNA Ribonucleic Acid
SD Standard Deviation
SE Standard Error
SF-6D Short-Form—6 Dimensions
SG Standard Gamble
TTO Time Trade-off
VF Virological Failure
VL Viral Load
WHO World Health Organization
WHOQOL-HIV World Health Organization Quality of Life Questionary for HIV Patients
WHOQOL-HIV-Bref World Health Organization Quality of Life Questionary for HIV Patients, Brief Version
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4.1. Introduction 
According to the latest report by the Communicable Diseases and Epidemiological Surveillance 
Center (CVEDT) in December 31st, 2009, a total of 37,201 cases of infection have been notified 
in Portugal since the beginning of the epidemic in 1983 [87]. 24% of these have been notified to 
have died. Of the 28,388 notified cases alive, 29% have been diagnosed with AIDS, 11% have 
developed symptoms and the remaining 60% are in an asymptomatic stage of infection. 
The number of infected individuals is unknown and likely to be significantly higher than the 
diagnosed and notified number of cases. According to the UNAIDS estimates [88], there were a 
total of 34,000 (20,000 to 63,000) infected individuals in Portugal by the end of 2007 with an 
adult prevalence of 0.5% (0.3% to 0.9%).  Within the European region, as defined by the World 
Health Organization, Portugal had the second highest incidence of HIV infection (251.1 cases 
per 1,000,000) and the highest incidence of AIDS (79.5 cases per 1,000,000). Moreover, 
HIV/AIDS infection was the most prevalent cause of death among individuals aged 30 to 39.  
In 2007 a National Program for the Control and Prevention of HIV/AIDS infection was defined by 
the Government [89]. This National plan aimed at (i) reducing the number of new infections by, 
at least, 25%; (ii) contribute, at an international level, to reduce transmission and improve care 
to those infected. Its implementation led to the establishment of a special financing regimen 
within NHS hospitals with regard to HIV infected individuals. Since 2007, hospitals admitted to 
the program receive an additional annual payment of 11,040€ per infected individual initiating 
antiretroviral therapy, conditional on satisfying the pre-defined inclusion and performance 
criteria. 
According to the data recently published by the National Coordinator for HIV/AIDS infection, 
the number of patients on antiretroviral treatment (ART) increased 66% in the 2006-2009 
period while the average annual cost per patient decreased by 7% [90]. In 2009, and according 
to the same source, there were a total of 22,409 HIV infected individuals on ART. Antiretroviral 
drug expenditure, in that year, was estimated as 193.23 million Euros. The financial burden of 
HIV infection is also reflected in the 11.4 million Euros spent on HIV related NHS 
hospitalizations49
In 2009 pharmaceutical expenditure had reached 4,727.9 million Euros, with 24.2% referring to 
the NHS hospital market [91]. Between 2008 and 2009, pharmaceutical expenditure grew 7% in 
, in the same year. 
                                                          
49 Data kindly provided by ACSS. 
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the NHS hospital market and antiretroviral drugs were a major driver in such increase [92], 
representing about 17% of the pharmaceutical expenditure in the hospital market. The 
country’s excessive deficit in 2009 has lead to the proposal and implementation of a series of 
cost containment measures.  Within that context, antiretroviral drugs’ expenditure has been 
singled out as a target. 
The present article aims at providing a framework for cost-effectiveness analysis of HIV 
treatment in Portugal. It does not aim at comparing A to B but instead it provides a model, 
general enough to allow, among others, for comparison of antiretroviral treatment options, of 
different cut-offs for treatment initiation, or different adherence promoting strategies.  
While all efforts have been made to parameterize the model so as to reflect Portuguese clinical 
practice, given the unavailability of a national database complete enough for estimation of all 
parameters of interest, several databases were used. Some of the databases are local ones and, 
in that context, it may be argued that it does not reflect the national clinical practice or that the 
patient characteristics are not representative of the HIV infected population in Portugal. The 
databases used are nonetheless, the largest most complete electronic based sources currently 
existing in Portugal50
The present model should be regarded as one, among several, instruments to support resource 
allocation decisions. It is by no means a sufficient instrument, namely because it does not 
incorporate the externalities resulting from the infectious nature of the disease. Accounting for 
such externalities requires an epidemiological model, which although obviously of major 
relevance, was beyond the scope of this paper.  Bearing in mind the importance of such 
externality, and the association between infectiousness and viral load, the model was designed 
to provide, as one of the outputs, the number of months without viral suppression. The goal, 
for future research, is to link such output to the epidemiological model. 
. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt at creating a practical 
instrument that may be used to support a vast number of HIV treatment resource allocation 
decisions in the Portuguese context. Moreover, the instrument here developed may be re-
parameterized with more representative samples, once these become available. 
The work here developed contributes to the existing literature in that the methodology applied, 
namely a microsimulation discrete events model has not, to our knowledge, been applied to 
cost-effectiveness of HIV treatment.  
                                                          
50 In the scope of the HIV financing program, data are being collected nationally since 2007. This database is nonetheless 
unavailable even upon request for academic use. The EuroSIDA Portuguese cohort including 529 patients, 280 of which currently 
under follow-up. EuroSIDA. 
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The article is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) 
infection and the impact of highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) are briefly described. 
This section draws the line in which the simulation model was built. In Section 4.3, a review of 
the existing literature in cost-effectiveness of HIV treatment is performed. In Section 4.4, the 
discrete events microsimulation model is described and Section 4.5 provides the econometric 
estimation details for the input parameters. In Section 4.6, model outputs are presented in the 
context of an application. In the last section, we compare model predictions to those published 
in the literature and discuss its limitations.  
4.2. The Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Infection 
4.2.1. Natural Evolution of HIV Infection 
HIV's primary cellular targets are CD4+ T-Cells, the memory cells of the immune system. To 
reproduce itself, HIV converts its RNA genome to DNA, which is then imported into the host 
cell's nucleus and inserted into the host genome through the action of HIV integrase. Once 
integrated, HIV can remain dormant for the duration of these cells’ lifetime. To actively produce 
the virus, certain cellular transcription factors need to be present, the most important of which 
is upregulated when T-cells become activated. This means that the cells most likely to be killed 
by HIV are those currently fighting infection [93]. 
 
Figure 17: Natural Evolution of HIV Infection (Source: Pantaleo et al. 1993) 
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The natural progression of the HIV infection has been widely described in literature and may be 
classified in three main stages, as described in Figure 17 [94]: 
1. Primary infection and acute HIV syndrome; 
2. Asymptomatic period (“clinical latency”) with progressive depletion of CD4+ T-cells; 
3. Advanced immunodeficiency and AIDS. 
In the absence of highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART), progression from HIV infection to 
AIDS has been observed to occur at a median of nine to ten years and the median survival time 
after developing AIDS is only 9.2 months [95]. 
4.2.2. Evolution of HIV Infection with Antiretroviral Therapy 
Since the introduction of HAART in 1996, many HIV-infected individuals have experienced 
remarkable improvements in their general health and quality of life, which has led to a large 
reduction in HIV-associated morbidity and mortality in the developed world [96-99]. The 
Antiretroviral Therapy Cohort Collaboration [100, 101] estimates that the life expectancy of an 
HIV infected individual at the age of 35 years old is 32 years from the time of infection, if ART is 
initiated at 350 CD4+ cells/mm3. 
Current standard of care treatment for antiretroviral treatment of HIV infection consists of 
HAART and so much so that the “Highly Active” (HA) part of the name has, for the most part, 
been dropped to simply Antiretroviral Treatment (ART). Recommended ART options are 
combinations (or "cocktails") consisting of at least three drugs belonging to at least two types, 
or "classes," of antiretroviral agents. Typically, these classes are two nucleoside analogue 
reverse transcriptase inhibitors (NARTIs or NRTIs), plus either a boosted protease inhibitor (PI/r) 
or a non-nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitor (NNRTI). New classes of drugs such as entry 
inhibitors and integrase inhibitors provide treatment options for patients who are infected with 
viruses already resistant to common therapies.  
Despite its success in controlling HIV infection and reducing HIV-associated mortality, current 
drug regimens are unable to completely eradicate HIV infection. Many people on ART achieve 
viral suppression, HIV RNA drops below the limit of detection of standard clinical assays, for 
many years. Viral suppression minimizes the changes of developing resistant strains and slows 
down CD4+ cell count depletion and disease progression. Viral suppression, if achievable, is 
thus the aim of therapy.  
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However, upon withdrawal of ART or treatment failure, HIV RNA rebounds quickly with a 
subsequent decline in CD4+ T-Cells and possible clinical progression. In case of virological 
failure, the regimen should be changed, since the probability of developing resistant strains 
depends on the level of viral replication, on duration and on the regimen components [102]. 
When treatment failure occurs, a new ART regimen is selected based on:  resistance assays, 
previous sequence (and duration) of ART medication, viral load, CD4+ cell count (and other 
clinical indicators); previous adverse events/intolerance; and personal characteristics, which 
influence adherence levels [102]. In the present model, each time a virological rebound occurs, 
the individual is said to start a new therapy line.  
HIV infection may thus be described as a sequence of therapy lines, where each line starts with 
a detectable viral load (and in response to which a new regimen is selected) and ends with an 
ART regimen change as a result of a virological rebound. The first therapy line starts at the 
moment ART is introduced and ends when the regimen is switched in response to the first 
virological failure. The reasoning for subsequent therapy lines is analogous. The lag between 
virological rebound and therapy implies an inversion of the viral load trajectory before each line 
switch. When the lag between virological rebound and therapy change is long enough, a 
subsequent decrease in CD4+ may occur. Once viral load is undetectable, the CD4+ cell count 
starts recovering (more in earlier lines when the individual is fully susceptible to ART). This 
process is presented graphically in Figure 18. 
Over time, as sequential virological rebounds occur and resistance develops, available 
medication will no longer be able to suppress viral load. At this stage, denominated non-
suppressive therapy, incidence of opportunistic infections (OI) severely increases as CD4+ cell 
count decreases.  Most patients at this stage, will die from OI or malignancies associated with 
the progressive failure of the immune system. 
 
Figure 18: Therapy Line, CD4+ Cell Count and Viral Load over Time 
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4.3. Literature Review 
HIV infection is a chronic disease where current treatment options not only have an impact on 
disease progression, but also have an impact on the future availability of treatment option. 
Moreover, individual characteristics and the complete history of past events are also important 
in determining present and future treatment strategies [102]. 
The economic evaluation literature regarding HIV prevention and treatment strategies is 
abundant, as recently shown in the systematic review performed by Hornberger et al. [103].  
Markov models have been the standard framework for predicting long-term clinical and 
economic outcomes using the surrogate marker endpoints from clinical trials and cohort 
studies. Nevertheless, in the last decade, developments in computer capability have opened the 
gate to individual simulation models, which avoid some of the limitations of Markov models, 
namely (i) independence of transition probabilities from time spent in the current state, (ii) 
independence of transition probabilities from states visited before the current state and (iii) 
events timed to multiples of a fixed cycle time. An overview of the main available HIV related 
cost-effectiveness models may be found in Giguère [104]. 
Two papers have been published comparing Markov models to individual microsimulation 
models in cost-effectiveness analysis of HIV treatment. In 2007 Kuhne et al. [105] conclude that, 
for advanced treatment-experienced patients, the two types of models generated comparable 
estimates of life expectancy and costs. According to the authors, the cohort model minimizes 
computing time and simplifies the incorporation of probabilistic analysis of uncertainty, while 
microsimulation model allows a fuller set of model inputs, avoids over-simplifying assumptions 
and may have greater face validity among clinicians. In 2009, Simpson et al. [5], conclude that 
individual simulation models performed better than the Markov model in isolating long-term 
implications of small but important differences in crucial input data. The authors argue that, 
while more demanding in terms of data requirements, individual microsimulation models 
impose fewer restrictions, which may explain why these models consistently predict better 
survival. 
To the best of our knowledge, four microsimulation models (along with plenty applications and 
derivations from those) have been developed, and are currently up to date, to perform cost-
effectiveness analysis of HIV treatment. 
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In 2001, Freedberg et al. developed the Cost-Effectiveness of Preventing AIDS Complications 
(CEPAC) model [106], programmed in C51
In 2002, Ritcher et al. [110] developed the (now called) Antiretroviral Drug Valuation and Cost-
Effectiveness (ADVANCE)
. In its original format, the model included three 
general categories of health and vital status (chronic illness, acute illness, and death), which 
were stratified according to important clinical characteristics (e.g., the CD4+ cell count, the HIV 
RNA level, and the history of clinical events). The characteristics of each patient (age, gender, 
CD4+ cell count, and HIV RNA level) are randomly drawn from distributions derived from clinical 
trials. Progression of HIV disease and risks of clinical events and death are derived from cohort 
data. HIV progression, effects of treatment, and use of resources are linked to both the CD4+ 
cell count and the HIV RNA level. Monte Carlo simulation is used to individually model the 
clinical courses of 1 million hypothetical patients, and outcomes are tracked on a monthly basis. 
The model tracks individual patient statistics regarding time spent in each health state, the 
sequence of clinical pathways, time on therapy, and length and quality of life; it then tallies the 
cohort’s summary statistics on completion of all individual patient simulations. This model has 
been extensively applied by the authors and others [107-109]. 
52
In 2010, Kuhne et al. [112] published the first full article application of the AntiRetroviral 
Analysis by Monte Carlo Individual Simulation (ARAMIS) model to the cost-effectiveness of 
maraviroc. This model is property of Pfizer and, unlike the CEPAC, no appendix is available with 
a detailed description of the model. From the information available, ARAMIS is structurally 
similar to the CEPAC model. ARAMIS is developed in TreeAge Pro 2007®, populated with data 
from clinical trials and validated against the CEPAC model in treatment-experienced patients.  
 model, a microsimulation model, designed in Microsoft Excel®, to 
simulate the impact of differing drug sequencing strategies. The original version had 3-months 
cycles and three therapy lines after which the patient was assumed to follow the natural course 
of disease. In a recently published version/application (Kauf et al. in 2010 [111]), patients are 
eligible to receive up to five sequential antiretroviral regimens. The model is parameterized 
with a mix of cohort and clinical trial data. CD4 and viral load, both stratified, are the main 
model drivers. The model takes into account not only disease progression, but also short term 
adverse events of ART.  
In 2010, Johnston et al. [113] developed a new individual microsimulation model innovating in 
two ways. First, all baselines characteristics and processes were modeled using statistical 
                                                          
51 The coding for the CEPAC model is not freely available.  
52 The name is attributed to the most recent version published by Kauf et al. 
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analyses of individual-level data for 1,895 individuals in British Columbia receiving ART 
treatment, that is, cohort observational data. Second, the microsimulation model describing the 
clinical and economic course of HIV is integrated with a previously built mathematical model 
describing transmission of HIV [114]. Resistance development is estimated using a survival 
analysis. Monthly cycles are assumed and, at each step, variables are updated. The software 
used is not described. The model was built to perform a comprehensive economic evaluation of 
a program to increase the uptake of HAART in British Columbia. 
Our model differs from CEPAC in that (i) it is structured by therapy lines instead of general 
categories of health and vital status (ii) uses only observational data, (iii) uses survival analysis 
to estimate the parameters of interest and (iv) links progression of HIV disease, risks of clinical 
events, effects of treatment, and use of resources not only to CD4+ cell count, HIV RNA level 
and history of past events (as in theirs) but also to adherence and resistance. Our model shares 
an important feature with that of Ritcher et al.: the fact that it is structured by therapy line and 
not disease stage; it differs from ADVANCE in that it is based solely on cohort data and has 
adherence and resistance, along with CD4 and viral load as model drivers. Our model is much in 
line with that of Johnston et al. although we have not yet included the transmission part. At the 
time the present model was developed, we had no knowledge of the work being developed in 
British Columbia.  
One main difference remains between our model and the five existing ones. The difference 
relies in cycle length. While applying an individual simulation approach, these models maintain 
a fixed cycle length structure. At each cycle, according to a random draw, individuals will either 
move to a new state or remain in the same. With such structure, random draws are necessary 
even for patients to simply stay in the same state. Moreover, only one event will occur in each 
cycle, and the shorter the cycle the more computationally demanding the model will become. In 
discrete-event simulation (DES), event occurrences determine time advances and outcomes are 
updated at the time of the event occurrence, not at the end of a predetermined time period. 
Moreover, DES is particularly useful when interaction between individuals is of relevance as is 
the case with infectious diseases53
DES has been suggested and applied in a variety of settings [3, 116-118]. Of particular similarity 
to our model is that developed by Barton et al. [3] - The Birmingham Rheumatoid Arthritis 
Model (BRAM). The two models share important features, namely, they are both programmed 
 [115].  
                                                          
53 This feature will be of benefit once the present model is linked to an epidemiological model. 
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in TreeAge Pro2009® and use the same method to determine timing of activities (in Section 
4.5.3 the method is described in detail).  
Our model differs from BRAM in that we model the parameters of the time to event 
distributions as a function of patient characteristics and history of past events while in the 
BRAM model, distribution parameters are assumed fixed. Moreover, it obviously relates to a 
different disease. 
4.4. The Microsimulation Discrete Events Model 
The Discrete Event Microsimulation Model was designed to fit the description of the disease 
presented in the Section 4.2.2. Figure 19 provides the model diagram; the main structure and 
assumptions are discussed next, and Section 4.5 provides details on model parameterization. 
Following guidelines, we assume in the model that an individual switches line if viral 
suppression is not reached within 6 months of line initiation or if, after viral suppression has 
been achieved, virological failure is confirmed. Such assumption is imposed in the model when 
moving from first to second and from second to third line. In line three, where individuals 
agglomerate between the second failure and non-suppressive therapy, several virological 
failures are allowed; that is, regardless of the number of virological failures, the individual will 
remain in line 3 as long as his resistance level is not above 10 (resistance class 4). 
 
Figure 19: Discrete Events Microsimulation Model Designed in TreeAge ProSuite® 2009 
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When resistance level reaches a value above 10, the individual enters what is called non-
suppressive therapy. In non-suppressive therapy, viral suppression is no longer possible with 
the available set of antiretroviral drugs. At this point, the treatment goal is to slow down the 
(inevitable) rate of depletion of CD4+ T-cell. 
Individuals enter the model on the day they start antiretroviral therapy. At this moment, the 
individual is characterized in terms of the following variables: age, gender, mode of 
transmission, employment status, co-infection with hepatitis C virus (HCV), AIDS diagnosis, HIV 
resistance level, adherence level, CD4+ cell count, viral load and age of death due to non-HIV 
related causes. The individual specific values for each of these variables are obtained by 
sampling from the distributions observed in the data. Some of these variables are assumed 
constant over time, while others will change over time, conditioning and being conditioned by 
individual progression and sequence of events. Section 4.5.1, presents the distributions 
assumed for each of the above mentioned variables as well as the corresponding database 
source while Section 4.5.2 describes their evolution over time.  
Once characteristics are assigned, “time to next occurrence” is sampled from each of the 
conditional distributions of the modeled events. The event with the shortest samples “time to 
next occurrence” is the event which will occur next [3]. Seven groups of events are modeled: (i) 
Viral suppression, (ii) Regimen switches without virological failure, (iii) Resistance development, 
(iv) Hospitalization, (v) AIDS-defining event, (vi) Line switch, and (vii) Death.  
Section 4.5.3 describes each of the events and provides estimates for each distribution of time 
to event. These distributions depend on past and present individual characteristics, as well as 
on the therapy line numbers.  
State variables, costs and benefits are updated at the occurrence of the event (Figure 20). The 
process is repeated until death becomes the next event to occur. Death determines the end of 
the individual simulation.  
This microsimulation process is repeated for a large number of individuals (1 million) and the 
average values are used for cost-effectiveness results.  
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Figure 20: Discrete Event Microsimulation Process 
4.5. Model inputs 
Given the aim of the present model, all efforts were made to parameterize the model according 
to Portuguese data. When such parameterization was not possible due to lack of information, 
external (international) sources were used.  
For the most part, the therapy model was parameterized according to five main databases: 
1. The Cascais Hospital (Centro Hospitalar de Cascais - CHC) database, which provides 
information on 1,306 HIV-1 infected individuals on ART aged above 13 years-old, in an 
immunodeficiency treatment unit in the Lisbon area, between 2001 and 2008; 
2. The Virological Laboratory of the Egas Moniz Hospital (Laboratório de Virologia do 
Hospital Egas Moniz - LVHEM) database, which provides information on 5,456 patients 
who have been tested for antiretroviral resistance, (almost) all over continental 
Portugal, between 2001 and 2008; 
3. The Communicable Diseases and Epidemiological Surveillance Center (Centro de 
Vigilância Epidemiólogica das Doenças Transmissíveis - CVEDT) database, which is the 
national epidemiological database of HIV infection in Portugal and included 34,888 
individuals in August 2009;   
4. The National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estatística - INE) database, 
which provided information on HIV-related mortality and general population mortality, 
by age and gender, between 1988 and 2006. 
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Update State 
Variables
Sample of Time 
to Event
Age 
CD4+
log10VL
Resistance
Adherence
ARV Regimen Characteristics
Costs
Quality of Life
Events (      ):
Virological Response
Regimen Switch
Line Switch
Hospitalization
AIDS Episode
Death
),...,,( 21 NeeeMint =∆
ie
Notes: AIDS=Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome,  ARV= Antiretroviral, CD4+= CD4+ T-Lymphocyte count per mm3, HCV=Hepatitis C Virus, 
HIV=Human Immunodeficiency Virus , log10VL=log10 HIV RNA copies per mL
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5. The Central Administration of the Healthcare System (Administração Central do Sistema 
de Saúde – ACSS) database, which provides information on all HIV-related inpatient 
care episodes in 2009. 
These databases are described, in detail, in Appendix III. Written consent for access to the 
databases was approved by the Ethics Committees and/or the entities responsible for the 
databases, as required.  
Significant difference in treatment options exist for pediatric cases and adults/adolescents 
[119]. Moreover, in the CVEDT database, only 124 out of 26,066 cases alive in 2009 with known 
age, were children under 13 years-old. Consequently, individuals under the age of 13 were 
excluded from the analysis.  
Due to differences in antiretroviral treatment options, HIV-2 individuals were also discarded 
from the analysis. Individuals infected with HIV-2 account for 3.4% of individuals registered in 
the CVEDT database and alive as of August 2009.  
Regression models were estimated in Stata 11®. RiskPalisade5.5® was used to fit distribution 
when required. Selection of the distribution with the best fit was based on the Chi-Square (χ2) 
Goodness of Fit Test54
In this Section, model inputs are described in detail. We start with disease progression and 
treatment related parameters (distributions from which individual characteristics are sampled 
at the start of each microsimulation, driving forces of the model and time to event estimates) 
then move to quality of life and cost related parameters. 
 [120]. Ungraph V5® software was used to recover values generating 
published graphs. 
4.5.1. Characteristics at ART Initiation 
The CVEDT database provides an overview of the (notified) cases in the whole country. It 
describes the situation at a given moment in time (dead or alive, HIV stage, age, etc.) and 
                                                          
54 The test evaluates the null hypothesis that the data are governed by the assumed distribution against the alternative that the 
data are not drawn from the assumed distribution. Unlike the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the Anderson-Darling test or the root 
mean squared error, the Chi-Square goodness of fit test has can be used with sample input data, and any type of distribution 
function (discrete or continuous). While most critical values and P-values for the A-D and K-S fit statistics have been found by very 
detailed Monte-Carlo studies, not all distributions have been analyzed in enough detail and are therefore not reported by the 
software. 
It should be noted that distribution parameters are defined differently in TreeAgeProSuite2009® and RiskPalisade5.5® (and for that 
matter Stata11®). Consequently, parameters obtained in RiskPalisade5.5® have been re-scaled to match the TreeAgeProSuite2009® 
definitions. The three software manuals provide the necessary information for such transformations. 
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although it does provide some information about the past, such as, the time of diagnosis it 
contains no information about ART therapy initiation. Consequently, its usefulness was limited 
in terms of parameterizing the model with respect to baseline characteristics at ART initiation. 
Most of the variables (and distributions) described in this section were, therefore, taken from 
either the LVHEM database or the CHC database. The LVHEM database has the advantage of 
including individuals from (almost) all over the country but it has a selection bias, since this 
database tends to include the “difficult” cases – those individuals who needed a resistance 
assay. The database also includes resistance tests performed before ART initiation, although 
such practice is still not fully implemented. The CHC database, on the contrary, represents only 
a local sample of individuals but no a priori selection bias is expected. 
Along with the common baseline characteristics assumed in microsimulation models, we have 
also included HCV co-infection, mode of transmission, employment status and AIDS diagnosis 
and regimen characteristics (number of protease inhibitors, daily frequency and number of pills 
per day). 
 Employment status was found to be a significant variable in determining quality of life (QoL) 
among HIV infected individuals (See Section 4.5.4.5.1) and was consequently included in the 
model in spite of no direct effect being modeled in terms of disease progression.   
The disease stage at which individuals are diagnosed is a relevant policy variable, as patients 
diagnosed at a late stage have poorer prognosis [121-123] and there is evidence to suggest that 
efforts should be made towards earlier diagnosis in Portugal [124-126]. This variable was, 
therefore, included in the individual characteristics in the model.  
As resistance develops and the infection advances, the required number of PIs for successful 
treatment increases. Such increase in the number of drugs results in a higher cost and possibly 
more toxic effects. This variable was, thus, included in the model to reflect modifications in 
treatment options.  
The complexity of antiretroviral regimens means that adherence remains a problem [127]. Daily 
frequency [128, 129] and total number of pills per day [130, 131] have been shown to influence 
adherence level. These effects have also been evaluated in the Portuguese context by Reis et al. 
[132]. We have therefore, also included these variables in the model.  
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Table 24 provides the summary statistics of the distributions used in the simulation as well as 
the corresponding sources55
Table 24: Characteristics at ART initiation 
.  
 
4.5.2. Evolving State Variables 
In the model, most of these characteristics evolve over time and are updated upon event 
occurrence thereby influencing, along with the accumulated history of events, the distribution 
of time to next event occurrence. Employment status, HCV co-infection, mode of transmission 
and gender are assumed constant over time due to either being immutable or due to lack of 
information in the database. 
                                                          
55 Table distributions are step-function distributions built based on the observed frequency of each value. To sample from a Table 
distribution, a uniform random number is generated and matched with the cumulative distribution to obtain the corresponding 
value of the variable of interest. When relevant, a discussion on the value assumed and a histogram from which the Table 
distribution was constructed is presented in Appendix IV. 
.  
Characteristics at ART initiation Distribution assumed Source
Age (median) 40.1 Table Naive at CHC
Gender (female proportion) 28.4% Bernoulli CVEDT
Employment status 66.0% Bernoulli CHC and Reis et al. 2007**
HCV Co-infection 29.5% Bernoulli Naive at CHC
AIDS diagnosis 32.2% Bernoulli CVEDT/Naive at CHC
Model of transmission 
Injection Drug User 27.8% Table CVEDT, 2004-2008
Heterosexual 57.5%
Homosexual 13.7%
Other 1.0%
CD4 cell count /μL (median) 239.5 Table Naive at CHC
Log10 Viral Load 4.8 Table Naive at CHC
Adherence (average) 86% Table Naive at CHC
Genotypic Sensitivity Score (inverted*)
<1 91.2% Table Naive at LVHEM
1<=R<5 6.7%
5<=R<10 1.6%
R>10 0.5%
Number of PIs in regimen (median) 1 Table Naive at CHC
Daily frequency (median) 2 Table Naive at CHC
Number of pills per day (median) 5 Table Naive at CHC
Note: PI=Protease Inhibitor; *inverted to reflect resistance instead of sensitivity; **calculated
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4.5.2.1. CD4+ Cell Count and Viral Load 
The average monthly variation of CD4+ in each therapy line was estimated by weighted non-
linear least squares, based on the information provided by the CHC sample. Several functional 
forms were considered based on the following criteria: (i) possibility to explicitly condition 
variation on the initial CD4+ (at line start) and (ii) lowest Akaike's information criterion (AIC) 
[133]. The logarithmic function of the form iCD4n + bn ∗ ln t, where  iCD4n  is the CD4+ cell 
count at line n start and 𝑏𝑏𝑀𝑀  is the estimated coefficient for line n, attained the lowest AIC in all 
lines and was therefore selected.  
At start of a new therapy line, log10 of HIV RNA copies per mL (log10VL) is assumed to decrease 
at the average rate observed in the CHC sample. This average variation is conditional on line 
number, but not on the remaining state variables. The methodology used to estimate the 
average monthly variation of log10VL in each therapy line was identical to that used for CD4+. 
Table 25 provides the estimation results for both CD4+ and viral load56
Table 25: Monthly Variation of CD4+ and Viral Load, by Therapy Line 
. 
  
Then, either the individual responds to the new regimen and reaches viral load suppression or it 
does not. If the individual does not respond, log10VL will continue the same average path until 
virological failure is declared due to lack of response. If suppression is achieved, it is assumed 
that the log10VL decreases instantaneously and remains constant (at the mean point between 
zero and the detection level) until a rebound occurs.  
The (fitted) distributions of log10VL at first, second and third rebound did not differ 
significantly57
Figure 
44
  in the CHC sample. Consequently, a common “log10VL rebound” distribution was 
assumed for all virological failures, regardless of the line in which it occurred. The fitted 
distribution is a Uniform distribution [1.70; 6.24] ( χ2 = 53.6, p = 0.023, Appendix IV, 
). In non-suppressive therapy, most individuals will have high levels of resistance, this being 
                                                          
56 In Section CHC of Appendix III, a graphically comparison of observed and fitted values is presented. 
57 The two-sample T test with unequal variance does not reject the null of equal means in either pair considered. 
b0 b1 SE t P>t LogLikelihood AIC N. Obs
Average CD4+ - Line 1 305.7 71.6 0.384 186.2 0.000 70.8 72.3 -12203.2 24408.4 2274
Average CD4+ - Line 2 390.6 56.2 0.176 319.5 0.000 55.9 56.6 -21835.0 43672.0 4464
Average CD4+ - Line 3 351.0 51.0 0.385 132.6 0.000 50.2 51.7 -14411.1 28824.2 2631
Average CD4+ - Line NS 516.7 -13.2 2.0 -6.7 0.000 -17.1 -9.3 -2616.1 5234.2 429
Average log10VL - Line 1 4.6 -0.4 0.014 -28.1 0.000 -0.4 -0.4 -1047.8 2097.6 787
Average log10VL - Line 2 4.1 -0.2 0.006 -35.0 0.000 -0.2 -0.2 -1389.0 2780.0 1532
Average log10VL - Line 3 3.8 -0.1 0.006 -11.4 0.000 -0.1 -0.1 -743.5 1489.1 1197
Average log10VL - Line NS 3.5 0.1 0.0 17.8 0.000 0.1 0.1 -203.8 409.5 511
[95% CI]
Notes: CI=Confidence Interval, log10VL=log10 HIV RNA copies per mL, NS=Non-Suppressive, SE=Standard Error
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the cause for not achieving viral suppression. The (fitted) distribution of log10VL at “rebound”58
Figure 45
 
in non-suppressive therapy, is a Normal distribution, with parameters μ=4.247 and σ=0.790 
obtained from 3,757 observations in the LVHEM database (χ2 = 183.7, p < 0.001, Appendix IV, 
). 
4.5.2.2. Adherence Level 
Adherence is a broad concept which has recently been discussed and evaluated by Reis  [132, 
134] in the Portuguese context. Non compliance results in virological failure and resistance 
development over time [135-138]. It is, thus, a major factor in determining disease progression.  
In the present analysis, adherence to pharmacy refill was used as a proxy for adherence to 
treatment59
The most common described predictors of adherence in the literature are individual 
characteristics, disease and treatment characteristics and social factors. In the HIV context, 
adherence level is likely to depend on both individual characteristics (age, gender, race, life 
style, attitude towards infection, social integration, etc.) and on ART regimen characteristics 
(number of doses per day, number of pills, incidence of adverse effects, etc.).  
. Obviously, the usefulness of such proxy depends on the validity of the assumption 
that individuals do take all the given doses. This is a strong assumption, especially among 
problematic HIV infected individuals, such as drug addicts. Nonetheless, in the work by Reis 
[134] adherence to pharmacy refill along with general feeling of somatization, and the domain 
Environment of the World Health Organization Quality of Life Bref questionnaire (WHOQOL-
Bref) were found to be the main determinants of adherence. 
Although the CHC database did contain more individual characteristics than those included in 
the model (age and gender), the number of missing values in those variables was significant and 
they were, therefore, not included. ART regimen characteristics included in the model were the 
number of pills per day and daily dosage frequency [129]. In addition, we included the regimen 
number to reflect the possible impact of regimen switches, and the therapy line to reflect 
disease progression. There is evidence in the literature that adherence tends to decrease over 
time among HIV infected individuals although a recent study by Cambiano et al. [139] suggests 
otherwise. We have, therefore, included time since ART initiation as an explanatory variable.  
                                                          
58 Individuals in non-suppressive therapy do not have rebounds, in the sense that viral load does not jump from undetectable to 
detectable, but new resistances to the current regimen imply jumps in viral load and consequent regimen switches. 
59 A detailed explanation of the methodology used to estimate adherence using pharmacy refill data is provided in Appendix IV. 
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Given the fact that our adherence variable is a proportion, following Papke and Wooldridge 
[140, 141], we made use of a generalized linear model with a binomial family and a Logit link on 
relevant (and available) regressors. Results are presented in Table 26.  
The average adherence level in the sample was 0.857 (95% CI: [0.851; 0.864]) and the predicted 
average is 0.86. In our analysis, we find that ART duration does not have a significant impact on 
the probability of adherence. We do find that disease progression (as measured by therapy line 
number) has a significant negative impact on adherence and the accumulated number of 
distinct regimens has the same effect. The total number of pills per day is not significant at 5% 
level, but the daily frequency of intake suggests better adherence to once-per-day regimens. 
Age at ART initiation has a significant and positive impact on adherence, possible reflecting the 
mode of transmission effect (mean age of diagnosis in the IDU mode is lower than that of the 
heterosexual class, and adherence is expected to be lower among IDUs). Female gender is also 
found to be associated with better adherence. 
Table 26: Regression Model for the Probability of Adherence to ART 
 
In the simulation model, individual adherence level at ART initiation is calculated using the 
regression model, evaluated at the (randomly assigned) individual initial characteristics. This 
variable is then updated at each event occurrence. 
Generalized Linear Models
Optimization     : ML No. of obs= 3,205
Deviance  =  690 Residual df= 3,192
Pearson  =  734 Scale parameter= 1
Variance function: V(u) = u*[Binomial] (1/df) Deviance= 0.21619
Link function    : g(u) = ln(u/ [Logit] (1/df) Pearson= 0.22984
Log pseudolikelihood = -1,020 AIC= 0.645
BIC= -25,077
(Std.Err. adjusted for 1,302 clusters in id)
Probability of Adherence Coef. SE z P>z dP/dx X
Number of Doses per Day (2 is reference)
1 0.149 0.070 2.1 0.034 0.011 0.287 1.8% 0.249
3 -0.194 0.164 -1.2 0.235 -0.515 0.126 -2.5% 0.025
Number of Pills per Day 0.001 0.011 0.1 0.941 -0.021 0.023 0.0% 5.9
HCV -0.081 0.069 -1.2 0.242 -0.216 0.055 -1.0% 0.484
Age at ART Initiation 0.011 0.004 3.2 0.002 0.004 0.018 0.1% 36.9
Gender (Female=1) 0.111 0.030 3.7 0.000 0.052 0.170 1.4% 2.7
Number of PIs -0.102 0.037 -2.7 0.007 -0.175 -0.028 -1.2% 0.973
Regimen Number -0.128 0.065 -2.0 0.051 -0.256 0.000 -1.6% 0.352
Line (1 is reference)
Line 2 -0.137 0.063 -2.2 0.029 -0.261 -0.014 -1.7% 0.429
Line 3 -0.237 0.110 -2.2 0.031 -0.452 -0.022 -3.1% 0.129
ART Duration (years) -0.001 0.016 -0.1 0.943 -0.032 0.030 0.0% 2.0
Monthly ART Cost 0.000 0.000 2.0 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.0% 824
Constant 1.1 0.193 5.8 0.000 0.743 1.5 Predicted mean=0.86
Notes: ART=Antiretroviral Therapy, HCV=Hepatitis C-Virus, PI=Protease Inhibitors
 [95% CI]
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4.5.2.3. Resistance Level 
In order to parameterize the model regarding resistance over time, resistance level was defined 
as the sum of the inverted Genotypic Sensitivity Score (GSS) obtained from the REGA 8.0 
algorithm. By inverted, we mean that while the GSS measures sensitivity to the drugs, we 
transform it to reflect resistance. The resistance score was grouped in four classes (R<1; 
1<=R<5; 5<=R<10; 10<R<=25)60
4.5.2.4. AIDS Status 
. For simplicity, it was assumed that individuals will sequentially 
follow the resistance class, that is, no jumps from non-adjacent classes were allowed. Time to 
resistance class change was estimated using survival analysis and it was included as one 
additional event in the model. At the time of event occurrence, the new resistance level 
assigned to each individual is sampled from a Uniform distribution within the class. 
An AIDS-defining event may occur at any point during HIV infection, and the individual is 
permanently classified as having AIDS from that point forward. Other episodes of AIDS-defining 
clinical conditions will occur over the life span of the individual, but the first of these sets the 
change from asymptomatic or symptomatic stages to the AIDS stage. In the model, the 
individual will remain in his initial AIDS status until an AIDS event occurs or the CD4+ cell count 
drops to less than 200 cells per mm3.  
4.5.2.5. Regimen Characteristics 
The number of PIs reflects regimen characteristics over time. This variable, along with the 
frequency of daily dosing and the total number of pills per day are updated after each regimen 
switch or line switch. Upon event occurrence, a random draw from a Table distribution 
determines the new value for each variable in the new regimen. These Table distributions are 
conditional on line number.  
4.5.3. Clinical Events 
 
Model parameterization required estimating the relation between time to event and individual 
characteristics and accumulated history. Survival analysis was used to link the time to event to 
                                                          
60 A full explanation is provided in Section LVHEM of Appendix III. Values used to create class limits are arbitrary although 
considered reasonable by Dr. Camacho who is in charge of the LVHEM database. 
Economic Analysis in Health Care Regulation 
 
128 
 
those characteristics, so that during the simulation process, the distribution from which time to 
event is sampled reflects characteristics and history of the simulated individual.  
Seven major groups of events were considered: virological suppression, therapeutic 
modification without virological failure, line switch, resistance development, hospitalization, 
AIDS-defining events, and death. 
Depending on data availability, explanatory variables considered in the survival analysis were: 
1. Individual Characteristics: Age, Gender, Resistance Level, Adherence Level, IDU, HCV 
Co-Infection, Viral Load, CD4+ Cell Count; 
2. Past History: Accumulated Number of Regimens, of Virological Failures, and AIDS status; 
3. Regimen Characteristics: Number of PIs, Daily ART Cost and Year of First ART. 
 
Several methods may be used to (randomly) determine timing of activities: (i) Determine event 
first, then time, (ii) Determine time first, then event or (iii) Sample times for each possible event 
and use the shortest [3]. In the latter case, which is the approach followed in the BRAM model 
and in the present analysis, a survival curve is required for each event, then a time is sampled 
for each event and the earliest time determines which event occurs next. Other events are 
taken as censored and may be discarded. This method has the advantage that the individual 
survival curves for the events can be calculated independently of each other. Nonetheless, 
when sampling “time to next occurrence”, it is necessary to sample from conditional survival 
distributions, allowing for time already spent ‘at risk’ to be considered.  
In the case of the Weibull distribution, such conditional survival distributions are easily handled 
due to the link between the Weibull and the Exponential distribution. A random variable X has a 
Weibull distribution with shape parameter p and scale parameter 𝝀𝝀 if �x
λ
�
p
 has an Exponential 
distribution with mean 1. The Exponential distribution has the property that the conditional 
distribution of time to event remains constant as long as no event has occurred. As such, to 
sample “time to next occurrence” (of a given event), let 𝑡𝑡 be the time already spent at risk and 
μ be a value sampled from an Exponential distribution with mean 1. Then, time to next 
occurrence of a given event (𝑅𝑅)  is given by: 
𝑅𝑅 = 𝜆𝜆 ���
𝑡𝑡
𝜆𝜆
�
𝑝𝑝
+ 𝜇𝜇�
1
𝑝𝑝
� − 𝑡𝑡 
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In the present analysis, a Weibull distribution was used to parameterize survival curves for each 
event in the model. Obviously, the Weibull distribution with shape parameter p and scale 
parameter λ generalizes the Exponential distribution so that if p = 1 it equals the Exponential 
distribution, if p <  1, the risk decreases over time, and if  p >  1, the risk increases over time. 
 
Table 27 provides the estimated marginal effects of each covariate on median time to event 
occurrence as well as the estimated shape parameter, the source of information used, the 
median time to event predicted by the model (at the estimation sample mean values of the 
covariates) and the Kaplan Meier predicted median time to event. Full results of each 
regression are presented in Appendix V. 
Table 27: Estimated Marginal Effects on Median Time to Event Occurrence and Adherence Level.  
 
4.5.3.1. Virological Suppression 
Time to virological suppression was only available in the CHC sample. That sample was used to 
estimate the time span from therapy line initiation to the first undetectable viral load registry.  
Event
Viral 
Suppression  
(Line 1&2)
Viral 
Suppression 
(Line 3)
Virological 
Failure    
(Line 1&2)
Virological 
Failure (Line 
3)
Switch Without 
Virological 
Failure (All lines)
First 
Resistance
Resistance 
class switch
Hospitalization AIDS Death
Adherence 
Level
Predicted median* (months) 6 80 36.5 41 338 86 90 If AIDS: 116
Predicted 
Mean=0.86
KM estimated median (months)
7 (95% 
CI:[6;8])    
72 (95% CI: 
[67;80])
31 (95% CI: 
[29;34])
35 (95% 
CI:[32;39])                          
Not Reached
87 (95% CI: 
[85;89])
72  (95% CI: 
[64;82])               
If AIDS: 126  
Sample 
Mean= 0.86
Gender (Female=1) -0.554 7.653 0.643 -2.702 8.59 -0.486 11.149 1,523 1.4%
Age -0.111 0.559 -0.080 -0.079 -5.18 -0.555 -2.502 -153 0.1%
Log10VL 0.951 -19.563 -1.550 1.321 -84.45 -3.249 -18.216
CD4+ 0.000 0.026 0.003 0.146
HCV -1.680 10.094 -5.223 -26.00 -32.008 -1.0%
Adherence -0.062 0.184 -0.940 2.91 0.424
Year 1st ART 0.022 2.448 -5.188 -1.189 -22.29 0.020 1.295
Number of PIs 0.297 -6.120 -0.618 -5.678 -33.89 6.850 -3.453 -1.2%
Resistance Level -0.847 -1.894 0.269 -7.927
Regimen Number -8.963 0.239 1.071 3.99 -6.310 -1.6%
Line (1 is reference)
2 0.485 -10.658 -2.836 -34.500 -1.7%
3 -1.444 -64.061 -3.1%
Resistance Class (1 is reference)
1<=R<5 -6.225
5<=R<10 -7.348
R>=10 -7.021
Year of Diagnosis 660
Transmission Group (Heterosexual is reference)
IDU -3,692
Homosexual -900
Other -2,300
HIV Stage (Non-AIDS is reference)
AIDS -18,143
p 1.030 1.447 1.873 1.499 1.501 1.524 0.733
(stratified by 
AIDS status)
Number of Doses per Day (2 is reference)
1 1.8%
3 -2.5%
Number of Pills per Day 0.0%
ART Duration (years) -0.01%
Monthly ART Cost 0.00%
Source CHC 
Clinical Trails 
(POWER 1 &2)
CHC LVHEM CHC CHC LVHEM CHC
May et al. 
(2004)
CVEDT CHC
Note: *At estimation sample mean values. Coefficients significant at 5% are marked in bold and shaded. Coefficients significant at 10% are shaded but not bold. KM=Kaplan Meier, ART=Antiretroviral Therapy, Log10VL=Log10 
HIV RNA copies per mL, PI=Protease Inhibitors, Resistance=Inverted Genotypic Sensitivity Score based on REGA 8.0 Algorith, AIDS= Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, HIV=Human Immunodeficiency Virus, IDU=Injection 
Drug User, HVC=Hepatitis C-Virus
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Time to viral suppression is expected to depend on disease stage and, namely, on the previous 
number of virological failures. Nonetheless, the log rank test for equality of survival functions 
(of the event “time to viral suppression”) does not reject the null of equal survival functions 
among naive and non-naive individuals in the CHC sample ( 𝑝𝑝 = 0.083) and we have therefore 
used a common regression for lines 1 and 2. In the CHC sample, median time to viral 
suppression among naive individuals is 7 months and the median predicted by the model is 6. In 
this regard, it should be noted that while current guidelines indicate that virological failure 
should be declared if viral suppression is not reached within 6 months, 12 months was the 
threshold considered for the most part of our period of analysis. Given this fact, we have 
calibrated the model to allow for a 12 month period for viral suppression.  
The shape parameter is not statistically significant different from one, indicating a constant rate 
over time. Viral Load, Adherence Level and Resistance Level are all statistically significant and 
have the expected signs. Co-infection with hepatitis C is found to decrease median time to viral 
suppression, which is unexpected especially because the prevalence of HCV co-infection, among 
HIV infected individuals, is highest among injection drug user. We do not find evidence that 
more recent therapies are more effective at reaching viral load suppression in a shorter time, 
which is likely due to period of analysis and the weight of no longer considered first choice 
drugs.  
Line 3 in the model reflects patients at a symptomatic stage of infection; individuals who most 
likely have developed resistance. Therefore, the proportion of patients not reaching viral 
suppression is expected to be significantly higher relatively to previous lines. Given such 
characteristics of the patients, the LVHEM database should, in principle, be used as an estimate. 
Unfortunately, that database does not contain information on the timing for viral suppression 
(focusing instead on virological failure); consequently, occurrence of this event in the model 
was obtained from the international literature and is, thus, not conditioned to individual 
characteristics of the individual or past history. 
Data from the POWER 1 and 2 clinical trials [142, 143], was used to parameterize the model.  
The POWER trails compare a recently introduced protease inhibitor (darunavir) to currently 
available protease inhibitors (“other PIs”) in treatment of experienced patients. Patients 
included in the POWER trials, had at least two virological failures on regimens containing PIs 
and had characteristics similar to those modeled in line 3. The proportion of viral suppression in 
that arm was 45%, compared to only 10% in the “Other PIs” arm, so the darunavir arm was 
used to reflect the expected progress in ART therapy.  
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4.5.3.2.  Regimen Switch without Virological Failure 
While all line switches imply a regimen switch (due to virological failure), within the same 
therapy line, several regimen switches may occur. Treatment modification is here defined as 
changing at least one of the drugs in the regimen, adding a new drug or withdrawing a current 
one. 
These switches are not associated with a virological rebound, and do not, therefore, originate a 
line change in the context of the model here developed. Because the consequences in terms of 
disease progression are different in nature from those switches generated by virological failure, 
that event was modeled separately.  
Regimen switch without virological failure may occur for several reasons and, according to the 
literature, these reasons account for the majority of treatment modifications [144]. Information 
on regimen switches was available in both the CHC and the LVHEM samples, but the reason for 
switching was not clear. Treatment modification due to intolerance (serious adverse events 
causing regimen modification) is of special interest as it has become one of standard endpoints 
in clinical trials [145]. Given the impossibility to identify the cause of regimen switch due to 
reasons other than virological failure, it was assumed that the cause of regimen switch without 
virological failure was proportional to that observed in the Swiss Cohort [144]61
The log rank test for equality of survival functions (of the event “time to regimen switch without 
virological failure”) does not reject the null of equal survival functions among naive and non-
naive individuals in the CHC sample ( 𝑝𝑝 = 0.826). Moreover, switches without virological failure 
are likely to be unreported in the LVHEM database.  Consequently, it was assumed that the 
distribution estimated from the CHC sample holds for all lines. Different values for the 
covariates reflecting characteristics in each line do, nevertheless, obviously generate different 
sampling distributions 
. It was, hence, 
assumed that 54% of those regimen switches occurring without virological failure were due to 
toxic effects, while the remaining 46% were due to other reasons. With this assumption, the 
model will reproduce the observed number of switches but it may not be correctly assigning 
costs and quality of life to those switches, since both are likely to depend on the cause of 
switch. 
The accumulated number of virological failure (i.e. the therapy line) has an impact on the 
probability of viral suppression and on the probability of virological failure, but it is not a priori 
                                                          
61 A comparison of Elzi et al. results with those of the CHC sample is provided in the Section CHC of Appendix III . 
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clear how and if it has an impact on time to regimen switch due to reasons other than 
virological failure. Therapy line number was therefore included as a regressor to identify 
whether this distribution differs between therapy lines.  
The Kaplan-Meier estimated median time to regimen switch without virological failure was 35 
months (95% 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼: [32;  39]) and the predicted median is 6 months longer. 
No evidence was found that time to regimen switch without virological failure varies with 
therapy line but the accumulated number of different regimens is statistically significant 
indicating that, patients who have switched a higher number of times will have a longer time to 
the next regimen switch.  As expected, the higher the number of PIs and the adherence level, 
the shorter the time to regimen switch due to (among others) toxic effects.  
4.5.3.3. Line Switch - Virological Failure 
A line switch event is defined as a ART regimen modification as a result of virological failure. 
Virological failure may occur for several reasons; it may be due to non-adherence, to resistance 
development or to other reasons. Non-adherence and resistance are also linked, since, over 
time, one may cause the other. Reasons for virological failure were not available and are not 
directly modeled, instead a unique event “virological failure” is considered regardless of the 
cause.  
It should be noted that the event modeled is regimen switch preceded by virological failure, 
that is, the time of event considered is the data of regimen switch and not the time of actual 
virological failure. While in principle, these two events should be close, unpublished work by Dr. 
Camacho suggests that a significant lag between the two exists.  
Our results indicate no statistically significant difference in time to line switch among naïve and 
non-naïve individuals at 5% level although it is significant at 10%. To this regard, it should be 
noted that when considering the subsample of naïve individuals initiating therapy with the 
currently recommended regimen composition (2NRTI+NNRTI or 2NRTI+PI/r), time to line switch 
does differ among naïve and non-naïve individuals. The Kaplan-Meier estimated median time to 
regimen switch without virological failure was 72 months (95% 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼: [67;  80]) and the predicted 
median is 80 months. 
In lines 1 and 2, gender has an impact on time to regimen switch due to virological failure, with 
longer time for virological failure among female HIV infected individuals. As expected, Log10VL is 
found to increase the probability of the same event while adherence (significant at 10%) 
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decreases that probability. The number of PIs in the regimen has a negative marginal effect, 
which is in line with results published in the literature [146]. We find the same effect with 
regard to the accumulated number of regimens. 
Resistance level is not statistically significant, which is an unexpected result since resistance is 
known to be a major determinant of virological failure. This result suggests that in the CHC 
sample, virological failure is mostly been driven by non-adherence or lack of viral response. One 
other explanation would be that those assumed not to have resistance (those without a 
resistance test), have indeed developed it but a resistance test is not available.  
Indeed, in the estimation based on the LVEHM (used to model time to event in line 3), time to 
line switch is predicted to be shorter among individuals with high resistance levels. In that 
regression, significant coefficients have the expected sign but the difference between the 
Kaplan-Meier estimated median time to line switch and that predicted by the model (6 months 
higher), suggests a lack of fit.  Median predicted time is less than half of that estimated for lines 
1 and 2, reflecting cross-resistances and increased inability of currently available ART to contain 
viral replication as the panoply of susceptible drugs is reduced. The hazard rate is, as in earlier 
lines, increasing in time. 
4.5.3.4. Resistance Development  
Excluding those for whom information on ART therapy regimens is not available, the LVHEM 
provides a sample of individuals who have some positive level of resistance (and 76% are 
resistant to at least two drugs). This sample is, thus, a useful source of information in terms of 
characterizing disease progression amongst those who develop resistance. It cannot, on the 
other hand, be used to parameterize the model with respect to first resistance development62
Regarding first resistance development, adherence and viral load, which are the a priori main 
expected drivers of resistance development, the estimated coefficients are both significant and 
have the expected sign. An increase in adherence leads to longer time to resistance 
development while an increase in viral load has the opposite effect. Rigorously, no 
predetermined sign should be expected on the adherence marginal effect because the 
relationship between adherence and resistance is not a linear one and depends on the class of 
drug under analysis [135, 147-150]. Age is also found to be a determinant of both time to first 
, 
and that information was, therefore, obtained from the CHC sample.  
                                                          
62 The Kaplan-Meier estimates of time to first resistance development in each database is provided in the Section LVHEM of 
Appendix III 
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resistance development and to resistance class switch after the first resistance has occurred. 
The reasons for such are unclear. 
Time to resistance class switch once the first resistance has developed was estimated on the 
LVHEM sample. In that sample we do not have information on adherence, consequently such 
relationship could not be estimated. Predicted median time to resistance is much longer for the 
first resistance than for when some level of resistance has already been developed (28 years 
versus 7 years) likely reflecting cross-resistance and cumulative exposure. An increase in viral 
load or in the accumulated number of regimens63
 
 reduces the median time to event. The year 
of ART initiation has a slight positive effect on decreasing the probability of resistance possibly 
capturing advances in ART. The number of PIs also has a protective effect, likely reflecting the 
documented more frequent emergence of drug resistance in the NNRTI class [151]. 
When the individual reaches non-suppressive therapy, he will be in the highest class of 
resistance (see Section 4.4). In order to account for the fact that resistance will eventually 
increase within class 4, we have used the model in Table 58 to sample time to resistance 
increase within line 4. Upon such event occurrence, the new resistance level is assumed to be 
the maximum between the current level of resistance and a random draw from a distribution 
fitted on resistance levels above 10 (among individuals in line 4 of the LVHEM sample). The best 
fit, when bounding the lower limit to 10, was a Triangular distribution between 10 and 22.5 and 
20.75 as the most likely value (χ2 = 12, p = 0.213, Appendix IV, Figure 46).  
4.5.3.5. Hospitalization 
The CHC database contains information on all inpatient care episodes and the corresponding 
Diagnoses Related Group in which the episode was classified. Duration of episodes is not known 
since the only information available is the discharge date. We use the discharge date as a proxy 
for the date of event occurrence. In defining the event, we have not considered those 
hospitalizations occurring right before ART initiation since these are related to the absence of 
ART (late diagnosis, late treatment initiation, etc). 
The Kaplan-Meier estimated median time to hospitalization was 72 months (95% 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼: [64; 82]) 
and the predicted median is 90 months. As expected CD4+ cell count has a postponing effect on 
                                                          
63 Which in that database is close to the accumulated number of line switches since switches due to reasons other than virological 
failure are likely to be sub-notified. 
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hospitalization events while viral load and age have the opposite effect. Median time to 
hospitalization is decreasing in therapy line reflecting disease progression.  
4.5.3.6. AIDS-defining Event 
As the CD4+ cell count decreases, the immune system’s ability to react to infections 
deteriorates. Infections that, in a non-HIV infected individual, would be of no major 
consequence become serious events and for that reason they are denominated opportunistic 
infections (OI). Many OI, along with cancer related diseases are included in the list of AIDS-
defining conditions established by the Center for Disease Control. In the symptomatic and AIDS 
stages of the disease, these conditions become more common, eventually culminating with the 
inability of the immune system to respond to such threats.  
Bezerra and Roxo [152] report the number and type of OI in a sample of 185 HIV infected 
individuals on ART therapy, while Vieira et al. [153] report the number and type of AIDS-
defining illnesses occurring in HIV infected individuals followed in a Portuguese hospital, 
between 1995 and 2003. Nonetheless, neither these references nor the CHC database provide 
enough information to allow for the estimation of time to AIDS. 
Consequently, time to AIDS-defining conditions was parameterized with the prognostic model 
for survival of HIV positive patients treated with antiretroviral therapy, published by May et al. 
[154, 155] and later validated by the same authors on the CASCADE cohort [154]. May et al. use 
data from the ART Cohort Collaboration, to examine rates of progression to AIDS or death 
among HIV-1 positive patients64
The authors considered the probability of progression to a combined endpoint of a new AIDS 
defining disease or death from any causes. There were 870 new AIDS events and 344 deaths. In 
our analysis, we would be interested in modeling the AIDS and death events separately, in order 
to be able to use Portuguese mortality data. Given this limitation, we parameterized the model 
under the assumption that all deaths in the May et al. model were preceded by an AIDS event. 
This fact is likely to overestimate the number of AIDS events, and the model should surely be 
improved on this aspect, once data becomes available. 
. The authors find that the best was a Weibull proportional 
hazards model stratified on CD4+ and transmission risk.  
                                                          
64 AIDS events were not considered as a separate endpoint because information on causes of death did not allow for the distinction 
between deaths due to AIDS-defining conditions and deaths from other causes. 
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4.5.3.7. Immunological Failure 
Immunological failure is defined as a decrease in CD4+ cell count below the initial CD4+ at ART 
initiation. In non-suppressive therapy, when viral suppression is, by definition, not possible due 
to resistance to available drugs, maintenance of CD4+ cell count levels becomes the major goal 
of therapy. Occurrence of immunological failure is, thus, a relevant event in non-suppressive 
therapy. Because the evolution of CD4+ cell count over time is explicitly included in the model, 
this event was not considered per se, and it occurs as a result of the modeled path for CD4+ cell 
count. 
4.5.3.8. Mortality 
Mortality data was available from two distinct sources: the CVEDT dataset and HIV-related 
aggregate mortality data provided by the National Institute of Statistics (INE). While the first 
database accounts for all deaths among HIV-infected individuals (without specifying the cause 
of death), the second refers to deaths attributed to HIV. In spite of this fact, the number of 
deaths per year is significantly higher in the INE database. This difference may either be due to 
non-notification of death among those in the CVEDT database, or it may be that the vital status 
is correctly registered in the CVEDT sample, but not all HIV infected individuals are in the 
database65
Time to death was parameterized with a Weibull distribution stratified by disease stage, using 
the CVEDT database
. 
66. Although 3 disease stages (Asymptomatic, Symptomatic and AIDS) are 
currently the norm, the CVEDT database was constructed on the previous – AIDS/non-AIDS 
classification67
 The Kaplan-Meier estimate of median time to death in the AIDS group is estimated at 9.7 years 
(95% 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼: [8.1; 12.1]), and the model predicts a median time to death, among individuals 
diagnosed with AIDS, of 10.5. Median time to death in the non-AIDS group has not been 
reached and the predicted median is beyond that of the general population life expectancy. All 
  and that was, therefore the strata used in the estimation. For the purpose of 
estimation we have dropped individuals less than 13 years old and those that were diagnosed 
after death (since those individuals did not initiate ART therapy). 
                                                          
65 A detailed comparison is provided in Section CVEDT of Appendix III.  
66 The INE database could not be used to estimate time to death, since it provides only aggregate information on the general 
population, deaths in the general population and deaths due to HIV. Information on the number of infected individuals, date of 
diagnosis or any other characteristics is unavailable. 
67 Only 10% of the observations are classified in the Symptomatic stage. 
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explanatory variables are highly significant and have the expected sign. IDU mode of 
transmission yields shorter time to death, as does age at diagnosis.  
In order to account for the fact that mortality due to age may not yet be correctly reflected in 
the CVEDT database68
Parameterization of the model, regarding death due to other causes, was based on Portuguese 
general population mortality rates in the 2006-2008 period published by the INE [156]. The 
sampling process follows Barton et al. [3] and is described in the Section INE of Appendix III.   
, the model assumes that the estimates provided by the CVEDT refer to 
HIV related deaths, and deaths due to other causes are included as a competing risk. It may be 
argued that death due to other causes is being double counted since CEVDT deaths already 
include deaths due to other causes. Since it is not possible to identify the cause of death, it is 
not possible to correct for double counting. Nonetheless, given the possible sub-notification of 
deaths in the CVEDT database suggested by the comparison with the INE data, we expect the 
double counting not to be of major relevance.    
4.5.4. Quality of Life 
Life expectancy of people with HIV is approaching that of people without the disease [100, 101, 
157] suggesting that HIV infection is a approaching a chronic disease status with more impact 
on quality rather than quantity of life. In this context, quality of life parameters are of special 
relevance in economic evaluation studies of HIV treatment. As such, we start this Section with 
an overview of the methods available, move to a brief literature review of published HIV related 
quality of life estimates and, from there, we present the approach followed in the present 
analysis. 
Due to the interference of “non-health” aspects, such as stigma and discrimination, on HIV 
infected individuals’ quality of life, we use discrete choice experiment (DCE) to gain insight over 
the weight of such non-health related attributes. We do so by constructing and applying a 
questionnaire to a sample of 100 HIV infected individuals in Portugal.  Multiplying the estimated 
utility of each attribute by the level of each attribute69
                                                          
68 A detailed discussion is provided in Section CVEDT of 
, we obtain a quality of life index which is 
used in the model to obtain quality of life adjusted years. 
Appendix III. 
69 As explained in detail in Section 4.5.4.6., the level of each attribute was obtained from published references (using the World 
Health Organization Quality Of Live HIV instrument). Some attributes depend on CD4+ cell count while others, such as 
discrimination, as assumed constant over time. 
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Because, as discussed in detail below, DCE estimates do not generate QALYs, in the model we 
include not only the above mentioned index but also two distinct published utility estimates for 
HIV infected individuals based on the EuroQol quality of life instrument (EQ-5D) instrument 
(one based on a Portuguese sample and another based on an international sample).  
4.5.4.1. The QALY Framework  
The overall aim of economic evaluation is to aid decision makers to make efficient and 
equitable decisions, by comparing costs and benefits of health care interventions [158]. While it 
may seem obvious how to assign a cost to the direct resource consequences of a health 
intervention and even the less direct ones, the health consequences are less tangible and, 
hence, it is less obvious how to assess them [159]. Usually, treatment outcomes are scored 
according to the number of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) that they yield.  
In the QALY framework outcomes are measured in a common unit - a year in full health – 
encompassing both quality and quantity of life in a single score, thus allowing for comparisons 
among different populations, illnesses and interventions. Scores range from 0 (worst) to 1.0 
(best) and are determined by having the respondent value health states against an external 
metric such as risk (usually of death) or time. These scores, thus, reflect society’s, or the 
patients’, willingness to exchange quality of life for survival. The QALYs obtained by each 
individual are calculated as a weighted average of years lived.  The weights used represent the 
utility assigned to the health status, of each lived year. The total number of QALYs resulting 
from an intervention is, in turn, a sum of the QALYs obtained by each individual taking part in 
the intervention. Once estimated QALYs can be compared to costs, in the form of an 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER), and comparisons across interventions can be made, 
thereby informing decisions as to whether an intervention can be considered value-for-money. 
Some criticism has been presented with respect to the QALY [160]. One comment is that the 
model is based on expected utility theory, and there is evidence that expected utility theory is 
not valid as a descriptive theory of Decision making under risk [161, 162]. Another mentioned 
limitation is that QALY techniques focus solely on health outcomes [158, 163], and there is 
often a need to evaluate interventions that seek to improve an individual’s quality of life 
beyond health. For example (complex) public health interventions seek to impact on broader 
aspects of quality of life, not just health, but also non-health outcomes such as discrimination, 
participation, amongst others, and QALYs are likely to underestimate the true benefits [164]. 
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Sen’s capability approach [165, 166] could provide a possible solution to the limitations 
discussed above, in that it expands the evaluation space to consider whether a program 
enhances an individual’s capability [167]. In an attempt to operationalize the approach, Coast 
and colleagues are in the process of developing an index for capability using best-worst scaling 
within a discrete choice framework, specifically for use in the elderly [168, 169].  
4.5.4.2. Available Methodologies 
There are two major families of utility measures: direct and multi-attribute [158]. In the first, 
elicitation techniques are used to ask individuals to evaluate health states. Valuation techniques 
are related to measuring the patient's (or the community’s) value for a specific component or 
attribute, either in absolute terms, or in relation to another attribute. The relative importance is 
identified by choices that inevitably require trading off one or more desirable outcomes 
(including price/co-payment, time, etc.) in a given area (or domain), in order to obtain a more 
desirable composite outcome. The most common elicitation techniques are visual analogue 
scale (VAS), standard gamble (SG) and time trade-off (TTO). 
The indirect, or multi-attribute, approach is comprised of two elements: a questionnaire on self-
assessed health status covering the different dimensions of health related quality of life, and a 
scoring algorithm reflecting general population values for the health states described by the 
instrument. To obtain the scoring, the health state values or utility weights for a sample of 
health states described by the instrument are typically derived from an adult general 
population sample using conventional valuation methods such as SG or TTO. Statistical 
modeling methods or multi attribute utility theory models  [170, 171] are then employed to 
generate a scoring algorithm, which allows the estimation of utility weights for all possible 
health states defined by the instrument [159]. The most commonly used health preference 
measures, in this context, are the Health Utility Index, the Quality of Well-Being, and the 
EuroQol. 
While in the direct method health states are valued by the individuals whose health is being 
assessed, in the second, health states are valued by a distinct sample of individuals. 
Nevertheless, in both cases stated preferences methods are employed to place a utility weight 
on each of the relevant health states being considered.  
Stated preference techniques include the commonly used methods of preference weighting 
(e.g., rating scales, standard gamble, and time trade-off), contingent valuation and multi-
Economic Analysis in Health Care Regulation 
 
140 
 
attribute valuation (conjoint analysis and choice modeling). Merino-Castelló [172] provides a 
detailed description of the main differences between contingent valuation, conjoint analysis 
and choice modeling70; Louviere et al.  [173] discuss the difference between conjoint analysis 
and DCE71
4.5.4.2.1. Indirect Methods 
 and a discussion of the methods of preference weighting, in general, may be found in 
Drummond et al. [158] or Dolan [160].  
In terms of indirect methods, two factors ought to be addressed: instrument selection and 
source of preferences. The first issue relates to the utilization of a generic instrument (SF-6D, 
EQ-5D, HUI3, etc) versus a disease specific instrument (MOS-HIV, MQoL-HIV, WHOQOL-HIV, 
etc.). Generic measures are necessary to compare outcomes across different populations and 
interventions, particularly for economic evaluation. Disease-specific measures assess the special 
states and concerns of diagnostic groups and may thus be more sensitive for the detection and 
quantification of small changes that are important to clinicians or patients [174].  
Regardless of the instrument used, valuation of health states requires the quantification of the 
relative weight of each dimension (and of each level on each dimension) in relation to some 
external metric. In general, these weights result from the application of TTO or SG on a random 
sample of the general population (possibly from another country), thus reflecting community 
preferences, instead of patient preferences.  
The argument in favor of patient preferences is based on the notion that patients understand 
better the impact of the disease, and their valuation of health states includes the human 
being’s ability to adapt. Empirical evidence suggests that patients’ valuations are higher than 
those of the general population [175] and the HIV domain is no exception [176]. Schackman et 
al. [107] report that patient SG utilities (derived from a power transformation of rating scale) 
were higher than community SG utilities by 4% to 9%. Joyce et al. [177] report a weak 
correlation between average values obtained by undirected methods (based on community 
preferences) and those obtained by TTO e SG on a sample HIV infected individuals. In the 
                                                          
70 In short, contingent valuation is a direct survey approach where respondents are asked to express their maximum willingness to 
pay for a hypothetical change in the level of provision of the good. Contingent valuation analyzes one attribute of the product at a 
time while multi-attribute valuation explores more than one attribute simultaneously. Within multi-attribute valuation, conjoint 
analysis requires the individual to rate or rank each alternative, while choice-based approaches ask the consumer to choose one of 
several alternatives. Conjoint data is typically analyzed using ordinary least squares (OLS), while choice-based approaches use the 
random utility function that represents the integrated behavioral theory of decision-making and choice behavior. The latter is 
composed of a deterministic component 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  and of a stochastic one 𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 , and is usually estimated by maximum likelihood.  
71 According to Louviere et al. (2000), the theoretical framework of DCE is the main feature distinguishing DCEs from traditional 
conjoint analysis. “Conjoint analysis is a theory about the behavior of sets of numbers in response to factorial manipulations of 
attributes which eventually may allow studying how holistic preferences for combinations of attribute levels are. DCEs are based on 
a sound, well-tested, integrated behavioral theory of decision-making and choice behavior: the random utility theory (RUT)”. 
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literature review performed by Tengs and Lin [176], the authors report that patients’ 
preferences were used in 65% of the articles. 
As discussed in Gosling [178] “the encounter with the HIV/Aids virus may result in despair, 
hopelessness and ultimately death, or it may offer the opportunity of possible transformation, 
an opportunity to embrace a life lived productively and meaningfully with a chronic but 
manageable disease”. In fact, many patients with HIV/AIDS indicate that life is better post-
diagnosis than it was pre-diagnosis [179-181]. There is evidence to support the idea that 
adaptation of patients with HIV/AIDS is manifested through patients’ responses to both TTO 
and SG measures. Specifically, a substantial portion of patients seem to be unwilling to accept a 
(hypothetical) opportunity to live shorter-but-healthier lives or to take a risk of death in 
exchange for perfect health, a phenomenon that is referred to as ‘‘the will to live phenomenon’’ 
[179, 182].  Results reported by Kudel et al. [182] also indicate a greater disposition to gambling 
than to trading time in some classes of individuals. 
4.5.4.2.2. Direct Methods 
Although there is no uniformly accepted preferred method for eliciting health state values for 
the estimation of QALYs, the most commonly used methods are the choice-based valuation 
methods of SG and TTO [159]. The VAS method has been criticized for its direct and choice-less 
nature [183]  as well as for the fact that data obtained through VAS may be subject to end point 
and context bias [184-186].  
SG, which is founded on expected utility theory of decision making under uncertainty, has been 
argued to have the most rigorous theoretic foundation [160], while TTO is seen as a less 
complex alternative to SG because it overcomes the problems of explaining probabilities to 
respondent [187].  
Some of the limitations of these two most commonly used methods include theoretical 
arguments, the significant cognitive burden and the difficulty to include “non-health” and 
“process” aspects. 
First, with respect to theoretical arguments it has been argued that SG valuations may be 
influenced by factors other than a person’s attitude towards the health state, including 
probability weighting and loss aversion [159, 188-190]. By the same token, there is evidence to 
suggest that duration effects and time preference effects can have an impact on the elicitation 
of TTO values [191-193]. Overall, none of these techniques simply reflect people’s preference 
Economic Analysis in Health Care Regulation 
 
142 
 
for health states,  instead  including attitudes towards risk (in SG) or time preference (in TTO) 
[170]. 
Secondly, concerning the practical implementation of these methods, both methods place a 
considerable cognitive burden on respondents since respondents are asked to successively 
compare full health to a series of health states, until the point of indifference is found. 
Moreover, this cognitive burden usually implies the use of trained professional interviewers and 
may be difficult to apply to specific populations.  
Thirdly, there is evidence to suggest that non-health related aspects of treatment receiving 
process are also important to individuals [194-196]. For the SG and TTO methods to represent 
utility fully, preferences over health and non-health attributes must be assumed independently 
[160] or else a significantly increase in the number of questions, (and in the complexity of each) 
would be required.  
As an attempt to overcome such limitations, there has been an increasing interest in using 
ordinal approaches to estimate cardinal values for health states to calculate quality adjusted life 
years [159]. Such ordinal approaches include discrete choice experiments (DCE), which can be 
used to obtain data to estimate utilities of individual attribute levels (and their interactions, 
given larger designs), or the utility of a profile. 
Several empirical studies have reported similar health state values using ordinal and cardinal 
approaches  [197-199] while recent work by Ratcliffe et al. [200] found evidence that values 
estimated by DCE and ranking do differ from those obtained by TTO. 
4.5.4.2.3. Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) 
DCE is an attribute-based survey method which has its theoretical basis in random utility theory  
[201, 202]. Based on Lancaster’s economic theory of value, DCEs assume that individuals derive 
utility from the attributes of the commodity and that individuals’ preferences are revealed 
through their choices [203]. In accordance with economic theory, it is assumed that the 
individual chooses the alternative with the highest level of utility. In reality, the individuals do 
not always make the optimal choice and/or their choice is based on factors unobservable by the 
researcher. Hence, the problem is inherently stochastic from the observer’s view, which leads 
to the formulation of expressions for the probability of choice.  
The random utility theory can be considered a more realistic representation of preferences; 
however, distributional assumptions about the random component are required in order to 
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make any predictions from the theory. It is usually operationalized in conjunction with a 
valuation function that relates the mean utility for a given health state with a set of explanatory 
variables [203, 204]. This operationalization of DCEs is usually conducted within a conditional 
(multinomial) logistic regression model and its generalizations [202].  
Internal validity and convergent validity has been demonstrated with respect to standard 
gamble and willingness to pay [205]. The technique has been shown to be relatively insensitive 
to both the ordering and levels of attributes [206]. Theoretically, three key axioms underlying 
the technique— completeness, stability, and rationality—have been investigated with 
encouraging results [207-209]. 
DCEs have the advantage of allowing for analysis of preferences for complex multi-attribute 
goods and enable the quantification of the individual trade-offs between the different 
dimensions. DCEs are, thus, an appropriate framework for analyzing the impact of health and 
non-health attributes on health related quality of life.  
Choice experiments not only give welfare consistent estimates [172], but they also provide 
information on the marginal rate of substitution between attributes, a key concept for 
economic analysis and efficient allocation of goods72
The main disadvantage of the DCE approach is that it estimates a latent health state utility 
value, but with arbitrary anchors whereas QALYs require health states to be valued on the full 
health (one) and being dead (zero) scale.  
. Moreover, DCEs may be implemented by 
self-administered questionnaires due to the low level of cognitive burden. 
In recent years, different approaches to the issue of anchoring the utility scale obtained from 
DCE on a full health-dead scale have been published in the literature.  
King et al. [210] include two survival attributes (duration and uncertainty) in the DCE. By using 
survival time as the matrix for measuring the welfare impacts of the change in health state, the 
authors argue that this approach can be used to determine the QALY weights.  Nevertheless, 
because survival has a multiplicative relationship to QoL, its inclusion requires a far larger 
design and consequently longer questionnaires [211, 212]. 
                                                          
72 The efficient allocation in the Pareto sense for two private goods requires (1) to be on the frontier, (2) that MRS in consumption 
is the same for A and B (3) that the MRS equals the marginal rate of transformation. In the case of one public good and one private 
(1) is the same, (2) may differ as both consume equal amounts of the good (3) sum of MRS=MRT. 
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Ratcliffe et al. [200] re-scaled according to the highest and lowest predicted TTO values 
(corresponding to the best and worst SQOL health states, respectively) and found that this 
method yielded biased predictions relatively to TTO values.  
Brazier and Cain [213] include a death state in the pairwise choice set and re-scale by dividing ß 
coefficients on each dimension level by the coefficient for being dead. This option may not be 
suitable for mild conditions, where the worse scenario would not be considered worse than 
death by any responder, as in Ryan et al. [214].  Moreover, as pointed out by Flynn et al. [212], 
the use of a statistical model such as conditional (multinomial) regression to anchor quality of 
life values from ordinal data to death, is inappropriate in the presence of respondents who do 
not conform to the assumptions of conventional random utility theory, namely those who think 
some states are worse than dead. For those individuals, their data tells us nothing about their 
strength of preference for QoL compared to quantity of life 
While research continues on ways to obtain cardinal values from ordinal data, the adequacy of 
DCE methods with its current limitations will be context specific, depending on the aim of the 
research.   
4.5.4.3. Literature Review 
Utility estimates in the HIV research have aimed at a wide variety of themes. Reported utility 
estimates include the valuation of specific aspects, like the impact of HIV diagnosis [180], the 
impact of adverse events [215, 216], the impact of co-infection HIV/hepatitis [217], the impact 
of AIDS-defining events (ADEs) and non-AIDS serious adverse events (SAEs) [218] or the 
potential health gains from Kaposi sarcoma treatment [219]. Reported utility estimates also 
include valuation of health states, usually by means of several instruments simultaneously 
[220]. 
Within this last topic – valuation of health states – several papers have been published recently, 
suggesting that the mean valuation of health states (as measured by TTO and/or SG) 
significantly varies with the health state of the respondents [177, 221, 222], or even with a 
mixture of health state and attitudes of the respondents [179, 182]. This variability in health 
state valuations demonstrates that imposing the QALY model restrictions distorts valuations 
[161]. 
As reported in Tengs and Lin [176], there is a significant variation in published mean preference-
based scores for HIV infected individuals. In the meta-analysis of HIV/AIDS utility estimates 
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performed by those authors to explain the considerable variation in the estimates reported, 
22% of the utilities in the sample were elicited with the TTO method, 14% with the SG method, 
22% with the rating scale method, 18% with the QWB Scale, and 27% using judgment. The 
authors find a positive significant impact of disease stage category (Symptomatic HIV) and a 
negative and statistically significant impact of Rating scale and respondent type (Nonpatients). 
Upper and lower bound scale label did not have a statistically significant impact on estimates 
reported. More recent articles report values ranging from 0.73 to 0.88, depending on the 
sample and instrument used [177, 220, 221]. Joyce et al. [177] compared scores obtained from 
direct and indirect methods in the same sample and found values ranging from 0.59 (HUI3) to 
0.80 (TTO), although direct methods did not always yield the highest values. A strong 
correlation was found between indirect methods, but a weak correlation was found between 
scores obtained from direct and indirect methods. 
The vast majority of the DCE applications in health economics have focused on the relative 
weight of different attributes of health care (including non-health and process attributes), 
rather than on valuing health per se. Some of these papers include price as an attribute in order 
to estimate the willingness to pay for each attribute. In addition, the technique has been 
applied to address a wide range of issues, including estimation of benefits within health 
technology assessments; analysis of patient/consumer and professional decision making; and 
developing prioritization frameworks (see [223-225] for a literature review of applications of 
DCEs in the field of health economics). In the area of HIV, Beusterien et al. [226] analyzed 
preferences with respect to HIV medication, Phillips et al. [227] estimated preferences for 
different attributes of HIV testing and Lee et al. [228] analyzed preferences with respect to 
hypothetical HIV vaccines. 
A few studies have used DCE to estimate the values of different health states. Hakim and 
Pathak [229] compare rating scale and standard gamble with discrete choice modeling 
(including death in each set) for measuring EuroQol health state preferences, McKenzie et al. 
[230] estimated weights for asthma symptoms and Ryan et al. [214] estimate quality weights 
for social care of the elderly. In these studies, a value of zero is assigned to the worse case and a 
value of one to the health state with the highest level on all attributes, thus providing program-
specific weights that do not allow for the comparison between different programs.  
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4.5.4.4. Methodology selection 
In the absence of a gold standard method for valuation of health states, the selection of the 
method to use was based on the specific characteristics of the HIV infected population, on the 
resources available and on the aim of the present work. 
Progresses in treatment of HIV, namely the introduction of ART, has not only reduced the gap 
between HIV infected individuals’ life expectancy and that of the general population [101], but 
it has also prolonged the asymptomatic period of the disease and reduced the incidence of OI in 
the symptomatic period [231]. At present, one pill a day and a medical appointment with 
laboratory tests every 4-months may be all the health care that is required for an HIV infected 
individual in the asymptomatic period of the disease. At least during this period, which usually 
lasts for more than a decade [232], the infected individual is able to maintain the exact same 
life style he/she had prior to the infection and, in this sense, infection by HIV bears a lower 
disease burden than many other diseases. Nevertheless, even at the initial stage, the disease 
bears a significant social burden resulting from discrimination and stigma associated with HIV 
infection. HIV infection may, from the first moment, have an impact on family/love 
relationships, on access to credit and health insurance, on participation in the labor market, etc. 
and, thus, on the quality of life [233]. This is why, as described in the “National Program for 
Prevention and Control of the HIV/AIDS Infection” [89], health policies in HIV/AIDS require a 
coordination effort involving behavioral, social and health aspects. 
In this context, it was considered of major relevance to include in the analysis of the quality of 
life of HIV infected individuals, not only health aspects but also “non-health” issues that affect 
and are affected by the  utility assigned to health states. As discussed in Chapter 4 of Brazier et 
al. [159] “Whether or not social activities are counted as health, health related quality of life or 
quality of life, the impact of social activities should form part of the description of the benefits of 
health care.” 
This, in turn, led to the selection of DCE as the methodology to estimate utility weights for the 
population in analysis. DCEs are implemented with easily understood, self-administered 
questionnaires and by focusing on both health related and non-health related issues relevant to 
quality of life, the DCE estimated index can be used to compare across health and social 
interventions, which are all integrant parts of HIV/AIDS health policies.  
Nevertheless, this possibility comes at a price. Since DCE utility weights are not anchored on the 
full health-death scale necessary for QALY calculations, the quality of life index constructed with 
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such weights may not be used to compare to programs in other areas of health care. While the 
utility weights here developed provide in-depth information about the relative weight assigned 
to each of the factors influencing quality of life among HIV infected individuals, it does not 
provide information on how these individuals would be willing to trade quantity for quality of 
life.  
In order to allow for QALY calculations, we have also included in the model two alternative 
utility weights. The estimates used and the corresponding sources are detailed in Section 
4.5.4.6.  
4.5.4.5. Application of DCE  
DCEs present respondents with samples of hypothetical choice sets drawn from all possible 
choice sets, according to statistical design principles. Each choice set comprises several 
alternatives, which vary in the levels of the attributes, and individuals are asked to choose the 
most (or least) preferred. The data generated is, then, modeled within a random utility 
maximization framework. 
There are four sequential stages in conducting a DCE: (i) Identifying Attributes and Levels; (ii) 
Experimental Design to Determine Choices; (iii) Collecting Data and (iv) Model Estimation. The 
DCE methodology is explained in detail in Chapters 1 and 2 of Ryan et al. [234] and Coast and 
Horrocks [235] provide further guidance on attribute (and their levels) selection. The present 
analysis follows the guidelines therein. Consequently, this section will focus on explaining the 
application of the methodology to estimate the utility weights for quality of life of HIV infected 
individuals. 
4.5.4.5.1. Identifying Attributes and Levels 
Identification of the most relevant attributes was performed by gathering information from HIV 
infected individuals, HIV related associations and physicians who work with HIV infected 
individuals on a daily basis. The last section of the recently translated (to Portuguese) version of 
the WHOQoL-HIV-BREF questionnaire was used to inquire a (convenience) sample of 15 HIV 
infected individuals about the most relevant factors affecting their quality of life. This section 
includs 37 questions, where the respondents are asked to classify the factor in analysis, in terms 
of its degree of importance (on a 5-level scale). All factors assigned “highest importance”, by at 
least one of the individuals, were considered as potential attributes. Physicians and patients’ 
representative associations were asked, on a personal interview basis, about the attributes they 
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considered to be of relevance. The potential attributes identified were then grouped in order to 
attain a manageable number of attributes.  
The number of attributes (and levels) included had an impact on the number of choice sets 
necessary to estimate the coefficients of interest and thus on the length of the questionnaire. 
This trade-off led to the selection of seven attributes: health and ability to perform daily 
activities, impact of treatment on life style, access to health care, discrimination, love/sexual 
relations, employment, and fear of premature death and/or suffering as a consequence of 
serious illnesses. 
Employment was included as a proxy for social integration while the last attribute was included 
in an attempt to measure the value of being HIV infected per se even if the fact that a person is 
infected has absolutely no impact on quality of life at present (in any of the other dimensions), 
knowledge of HIV infection status bears with it a weight which the last attribute is meant to 
capture.  
Each of these attributes has two levels. Since the number of health states increases 
exponentially with the number of levels, the two-level choice was, once again, based on the 
trade-off between length/complexity of the questionnaire and sample size. Although an initial 
version of the questionnaire with three levels for the first 5 attributes and two levels for the last 
two was tested on a small sample, respondents considered levels of attributes to be of minor 
relevance in the choice process. When faced with having to compare alternatives on the basis 
of 7 attributes, respondents confessed taking a two level approach in order to make the 
decision process easier. Consequently, a two level approach was selected even thought it 
implied the assumption of a linear marginal utility function, i.e. that the marginal utility of an 
attribute does not depend on the level that the attribute takes. 
Table 28: Attributes and Levels Included in the Questionnaire 
 
Attributes
Health Healthy, full  of energy.
Sick, depressed and/or unable to self-
care
Impact of Treatment on Lifestyle
Little impact  and/or no severe adverse 
effects 
Highly restricted activities and/or 
severe adverse effects
Access to Healthcare
Easy access to medication, routine 
blood tests and physician
Difficult access to medication, routine 
blood tests and physician
Discrimination Never/rarely feels discriminated Feels constantly discriminated
Impact of HIV Infection on Sexual 
and Love Relationships
Little or none Unable to maintain a relationship
Employment Status Employed Unemployed
Fear About the Future
No worries about premature death and 
severe pain
Worries about premature death and 
severe pain
Coded Level 1 0
Notes: HIV=Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Levels
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In an attempt to capture possible sources of variability within individuals which could lead to 
important valuation differences, as found in the empirical literature [177, 179, 182, 221, 222], 
the questionnaire included an initial characterization section where age, gender, transmission 
category and CD4+ cell count were asked to the respondent. Ideally, we would want to obtain 
DCE estimates by CD4+ stratum not only to allow for a comparison with estimates obtained 
with other methods but also for easier incorporation into the model. 
Each choice set consisted of two alternatives with different values for all or some of the 
attributes. Because the choice between two hypothetical situations was found to be confusing 
to the respondents (who are used to questionnaires where they are asked to describe their own 
situation), the question was phrased by assigning a common Portuguese name to each 
alternative (in all choice sets) and asking whom they considered to be in a worse situation. 
Although it has been argued that using generic (unlabelled) experiments is preferred because it 
will focus the respondent on the attributes [173], the labels chosen were neutral enough to 
avoid attracting any attention from the respondent. As suggested by Miguel et al. [236], a 
clearly explained example was also included to help minimize choice inconsistencies. 
Respondents were asked to choose who, in their opinion, was worse off. Asking the participants 
to choose the least preferred alternative, avoids having to choose “the best” of two undesirable 
options [214].  
4.5.4.5.2. Experimental Design to Determine Choices 
Seven varied attributes with two levels each, implied a total of 128 states. DCEs use only a 
subset of all possible combinations of attribute levels, called fractional factorial designs (FFDs). 
In the present context, a resolution 3 fractional factorial design (OMEP) obtained in Matlab 
R2009a® was used. The OMEP design ensures that estimates of all (2 ×  7 =  14) main effects 
are uncorrelated. Nevertheless, as noted in Ryan et al. [234], these designs have limitations, as 
they do not permit the estimation of interaction effects between any subsets of attributes, and 
main effects will be confounded with the interaction effects73
                                                          
73
A full factorial has the advantage of estimating both main effects of each attribute, as well as all the possible interactions 
between the attributes. But it is not tractable in practice, as it implies (128 ∗ 127)/2 unique binary choice sets. A long version of 
the questionnaire, designed to be able to estimate interactions among attributes, was first considered. This version with 18 choice 
sets was, nonetheless, considered too long by physicians and patients. Although, using two versions of the questionnaire with 10 
choice sets each could, in principle, be a solution, due to practical constraints it was not be possible to recruit enough respondents 
for two versions of the questionnaire and consequently, interactions could not be estimated.  
.  
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The construction of experiment design, that is, the choice sets from the above orthogonal main-
effects plan (OMEP), was performed considering the Huber and Zwerina criteria [234]: 
orthogonality, level balance, minimum overlap and utility balance, although these are neither 
necessary nor sufficient conditions for efficient designs [211]. The efficiency of a design is 
measured by the information it provides on the parameters, and this is measured by the Fisher 
information matrix of the model to be estimated. In order to produce a design with improved 
efficiency, it is desirable to maximize the information matrix. A design that achieves the 
optimum is called a D-optimal design. As discussed in Ryan et al. [234], in the context of the 
multinomial Logit model with two-level attributes and a choice set of size two, the D-optimal 
design is achieved by interchanging all 0s and 1s in the OMEP shown above. This design is 100% 
efficient.  
The questionnaire thus consisted of 8 choice sets with two alternatives each. The size two of 
the choice was considered adequate, in that it facilitates the cognitive burden of the 
questionnaire.  An additional dominant choice set was included for consistency tests. Appendix 
VI provides a blank copy of the questionnaire applied. 
4.5.4.5.3. Collecting Data 
A convenience sample was collected through self-administered questionnaires in two Im-
munodeficiency Treatment Units, while patients waited for a physician’ appointment, and a 
non-governmental organization.  
In the hospital setting patients were approached by a nurse or physician and asked whether 
they would like to participate. The Immunodeficiency Treatment Units are located in two 
hospitals in the Lisbon area (Hospital Santo António dos Capuchos, which is part of the Centro 
Hospitalar Lisboa Central, and Centro Hospitalar de Cascais).  
Consent for application of the questionnaires was granted by the hospitals’ Ethics Committees, 
as required and informed consent was signed by participants. The data from the two Im-
munodeficiency Treatment Units was collected between November 1st and January 31st, 2010, 
resulting in 59 respondents from Centro Hospitalar Lisboa Central, 33 from the Centro 
Hospitalar de Cascais. On randomly selected days during those three months and at the 
convenience of the nurses and doctors, patients waiting for an appointment were approached. 
No individual refused answering the questionnaire. Nevertheless, 10 respondents did not 
complete the questionnaire or failed the consistency question and were, therefore, discarded.  
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In an attempt to reach special subpopulations that may not be receiving appropriate care, such 
as illegal immigrants, individuals with drug addiction problems and/or homeless, data was also 
collected at SER+, a non-governmental organization located in Cascais. SER+ provides 
information, support and guidance in access to Social Security benefits to HIV infected 
individuals. At SER+, a technician approached potential respondents and explained the 
questionnaire to them. 23 individuals responded, 5 were discarded for not completing the 
questionnaire or failing the consistency question. The percentage, in each site, of complete 
questionnaires complying with the consistency question out of all questionnaires returned was 
thus higher in the hospital sample than in the SER+ sample (89% versus 78%). 
Overall, 100 respondents were included in the estimation. Age ranged from 23 to 69 years old, 
with an average of 42.6 (standard deviation= 10.4) and 37% were female. With respect to CD4+ 
cell count, only 53% of respondents answered. Average CD4+ cell count was 571 per mm3, (S.D. 
349.5). The minimum observed value was 66 (maximum 1702) and 9.4% had CD4+ cell count 
per mm3 below 200. With respect to mode of HIV transmission, 52% was sexual transmission 
(25% homosexual, 27% heterosexual), 31% was drug related.  It is noteworthy that, in the 
sample, 13% of the individuals (62% of which are women) in the sample did not know (or 
became infected through other modes) and 4% did not answer.  
Although the sample was never intended to be representative of the HIV population in 
Portugal, it is of interest to compare its composition to the characteristics of the declared HIV 
infected population alive in Portugal (as reported by the CVEDT database). In the sample, there 
is a sub-representation of individuals in the IDU class (31% versus 41%) and in the heterosexual 
class (27% versus 45%), and an over representation of individuals infected through homosexual 
contact (25% versus 12%). The most significant difference occurs, nonetheless, in the 
“Other/Unknown” mode, with 13% in the sample versus 2% in the National database. It is also 
noteworthy that, because the SER+ population is expected to have a higher prevalence of 
current IDUs and other HIV infected individuals living in less favorable socio-economic 
environments, the lower response rate observed in that center introduces a potential bias in 
results and suggests that alternative approaches (such as face-to-face questionnaires) may be 
required if a representative sample is to be obtained. Average age is one year lower in the 
sample and there is an over-representation of women (37% versus 28%).  
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4.5.4.5.4. Model Selection 
The questionnaire consisted of eight choice sets with two alternatives each. Given this structure 
of the data, a binary choice model, accounting for panel structure of the data is appropriate. 
Most commonly, a random effects Probit/Logit model is used to model such type of data. 
Nevertheless, as previously discussed, there is empirical evidence in the HIV area to support the 
idea that health state valuations may depend on individual characteristics of individuals, such as 
health status and attitudes [177, 179, 182, 221, 222]. In such context, the coefficients 
associated with each attribute will vary from individual to individual, suggesting a random 
coefficients approach. Two models were, therefore, estimated: a fixed effects Logit model as a 
basis for comparison and a mixed Logit model74
The mixed Logit model overcomes the limitations associated with the Logit model, namely, it 
allows for random taste variation, unrestricted substitution patterns, and correlation in 
unobserved factors over time. Moreover, unlike Probit, it is not restricted to Normal 
distributions for all unobserved components of Utility, and is computationally simple, although 
the integral has to be (partially) solved by simulation because it does not have a closed-form. 
Train [237] provides an excellent guide for all steps required in such simulation and the analysis 
here performed follow those suggestions. 
.  
4.5.4.5.5. Results 
Prior to model estimation, two transformations in the variables of the database were 
performed. First, the dependent variable was inverted (switching zero for one, and one for 
zero) so that the chosen alternative became the most preferred instead of the least preferred. 
Secondly, since the last attribute had been defined with a value of one for “worries about the 
future” and a value of zero for “no worries about the future”, the variable was multiplied by -1 
to ensure a positive coefficient, in line with the remaining attributes. This is a standard 
procedure in discrete choice models, as described in Train [237]. 
Table 29 and Table 30 present the estimation results for the conditional (fixed effects) Logit 
Model and the Mixed Logit Model. In both specifications, the cluster-robust covariance 
estimator was used to allow for intra-correlation among observations of the same individual. All 
attributes are statistically significant at 5%. As expected (physical and mental) health is the 
attribute with the highest impact on utility, followed concerns about the future, by 
                                                          
74 In Appendix VI the mixed Logit model is discussed in the context of the present application.  
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discrimination, employment and impact of treatment on lifestyle. These results hold for both 
specifications of the model. 
Table 29: Conditional Logit Regression 
 
Table 30: Mixed Logit Model 
 
In the present analysis, convergence of the likelihood function was not achieved when a 
Lognormal distribution was assumed for the attributes expected to have the same sign for all 
individuals, namely, impact of treatment on life style, access to health care, discrimination, 
love/sexual relations; a Normal distribution was, therefore, assumed for all random coefficients. 
As shown in Table 30, even with the assumption of a Normal distribution for all random 
parameters, the coefficients have the expected sign. In fact, 0% of the individuals have a 
Conditional (fixed-effects) logistic regression
Number of obs =  1600
Log l ikelihood = -476.0 Wald chi2(7) = 104.9
Prob > chi2  =  0.000
(Std. Err. adjusted for 100 clusters in id) McFadden R2 0.142
% correct predictions = 68%
Dep. Var: Best alternative Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err.
z P>z
Health 0.70 0.10 6.97 0.000 0.50 0.89
Lifestyle 0.23 0.07 3.23 0.001 0.09 0.36
Healthcare 0.21 0.08 2.63 0.009 0.05 0.36
Discrimination 0.38 0.07 5.08 0.000 0.23 0.52
Love/sexual relationship 0.14 0.06 2.36 0.018 0.02 0.25
Employment 0.30 0.09 3.44 0.001 0.13 0.48
Future 0.38 0.10 3.83 0.000 0.19 0.58
[95% Conf.Interval]
M
ea
n
Mixed logit model Number of obs =  1600
Log l ikelihood = -466.69 Wald chi2(7) = 98.9
Prob > chi2  =  0.000
(Std. Err. adjusted for 100 clusters in id) McFadden R2 = 0.148
% correct predictions = 68%
Dep. Var: Best alternative Coef.
Robust 
Std. Err.
z P>z P(x<0)
Health 0.82 0.12 7.05 0.000 0.59 1.05
Lifestyle 0.27 0.08 3.21 0.001 0.11 0.44 0%
Healthcare 0.24 0.10 2.57 0.010 0.06 0.43 21%
Discrimination 0.44 0.09 5.21 0.000 0.28 0.61 0%
Love/sexual relationship 0.17 0.07 2.51 0.012 0.04 0.30 0%
Employment 0.34 0.11 3.21 0.001 0.13 0.55 25%
Future 0.46 0.13 3.66 0.000 0.21 0.71 28%
Lifestyle 0.05 0.10 0.45 0.651 -0.15 0.25
Healthcare 0.30 0.25 1.24 0.215 -0.18 0.79
Discrimination 0.04 0.46 0.09 0.926 -0.86 0.95
Love/sexual relationship 0.04 0.04 0.89 0.373 -0.05 0.12
Employment 0.51 0.20 2.56 0.011 0.12 0.89
Future 0.77 0.22 3.5 0.000 0.34 1.20
[95% Conf.Interval]
M
ea
n
St
. D
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negative sign on the attributes “impact of treatment on lifestyle”, “impact of HIV infection on 
love/sexual relationships” and “discrimination”. Moreover, the associated standard deviation 
coefficients are not statistically significant.  21% of the individuals are estimated to have a 
negative coefficient on the attribute “Access to healthcare” but the standard deviation 
coefficient is not statistically significant.  Regarding the “Access to Health Care” attribute, it is 
worth mentioning that this attribute was found not to be statistically significant when the 
model was estimated on the sub-sample completing the questionnaires in the hospital context. 
Once individuals interviewed at SER+ were added the coefficient on this attribute becomes 
statistically significant likely reflecting the fact that people tend to value more what they do not 
have. 
In line with prior beliefs, for some individuals, employment has a negative impact on utility 
(25%) and for 28% of the individuals results suggest that uncertainty about the future actually 
increases utility. This last finding is in line with “the will to live” phenomenon described in the 
literature [178]. Employment and concerns about the future where also the only two covariates 
with significant variability among respondents (as shown by the statistically significant standard 
deviations in Table 30) 75
The overall significance of the models was evaluated by comparing the value of the pseudo-R2 
or Likelihood Ratio Index of McFadden and the Wald statistics (shown in 
.  
Table 29 and Table 30). 
The percentage of correctly predicted outcomes was also used as an additional measure of 
goodness of fit. The McFadden R2 is slightly higher in the mixed model specification than in the 
conditional Logit, while in terms of the percentage of correct predictions the two models 
perform equally76
 
. 
4.5.4.6. Quality of Life Parameters for the CE of Therapy Model 
Results of the DCE analysis presented in the previous Section were used to construct a quality 
of life index (QoLIndex), which is used in the cost-effectiveness model to estimate the number 
                                                          
75 While the estimated variances for all attributes, with the exception of employment and concerns about the future, are found not 
to be statistically significant, the model specification assuming fixed the coefficients associated with lifestyle, healthcare, 
discrimination and love/sexual relationships, yielded a lower McFadden R2. 
76 The Mixed Logit Model was also estimated allowing for a correlation among coefficients and in that specification, few 
correlations were found to be statistically different from zero (Employment and relationships were correlated with discrimination 
and healthcare with lifestyle). This model specification yielded a slightly lower percentage of correct predictions. 
Economic Analysis in Health Care Regulation 
 
155 
 
of quality adjusted life years (QAdjLY) using a methodology analogous to that used to estimate 
QALYs (described in Section 4.5.4.1).  
Nonetheless, as previously mentioned, since DCE utility weights are not anchored on the full 
health-death scale necessary for QALY calculations, the QoLIndex constructed with DCE utility 
estimates (and thus the resulting QAdjLY) may not be used to compare to programs in other 
areas of health care. In order to insure that the cost-effectiveness model produces an estimate 
of the number of QALYs for each alternative under consideration, we have also included two 
alternative utility weights.  
Moreover, it is assumed in the model that inpatient care episodes, AIDS events and intolerance 
events are associated with a temporary reduction in quality of life. The remaining events 
(described in Section 4.5.3) are assumed not to have a specific disutility associated to them. 
In this Section, we first present the estimates and corresponding sources of QALY weights used, 
then we describe the method used to obtain the QoLIndex based on the DCE results and at the 
end of the Section,  the disutilities assumed for each modeled event and the corresponding 
source are presented.  
4.5.4.6.1. QALY weights  
In order to insure that the cost-effectiveness model produces an estimate of the number of 
QALYs for each alternative under consideration, we consider utility weights drawn from the 
literature. Both estimates were obtained using the EQ-5D with weights derived from the 
population in the United Kingdom. The first (Catarino 2010) was estimated on a sample of 152 
HIV infected individual followed at Hospitais da Universidade de Coimbra (Portugal) [238] and 
the other (Simpson et al. 2004) was obtained from about 21,000 clinical trial patients [4]. Table 
31 provides a summary of the results presented in these two studies77
Table 31: QALY weights obtained using EQ-5D 
.   
 
                                                          
77 Catarino (2010) does provide estimates for suppressed and unsuppressed individuals. The author does not, however, provide 
those estimates desaggregated by CD4 cell count and we have consequently discarded the impact of viral load in favor of that of 
CD4. 
Catarino (2010)
log10HIV RNA-> <2.6 2.6-4.3 4.3-5 >5 Any
CD4<50
50<CD4<200 0.863 0.865 0.856 0.826
201<CD4<350 0.929 0.931 0.72
351<CD4<500 0.934 0.83
CD4>500 0.954 0.85
0.63
Simpson et al. (2004)
0.781
0.938
0.931
0.933
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4.5.4.6.2. The DCE-based Quality of life Index (QoLIndex) 
For each individual, in each moment of time, the QoLIndex is calculated as a weighted average 
of the levels of each dimension. In our index, seven dimensions are considered: health and 
ability to perform daily activities, impact of treatment on life style, access to health care, 
discrimination, love/sexual relations, employment, and fear of premature death and/or 
suffering as a consequence of serious illnesses. The weights used are the (normalized) DCE 
utility estimates. The levels of each dimension are obtained from published results in the 
literature (Reis et al. [132, 134] and Canavarro et al. [239]). 
 
The DCE model produces predicted valuations on an interval scale, such that meaningful 
comparisons of differences are possible, but the origins and units of the scale are defined 
arbitrarily [197, 240]. This means that the rank order of a set of health states will be the same 
under any positive affine transformation of the latent utilities, the utility from alternative j in 
choice situation t by person n, in its general form 𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡  =  α� βn’xnjt + εnjt � +Φ  and the 
predicted utility, conditional on the parameter values estimated by the model is 𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡  =
 α� βn’xnjt � + Φ. Consequently, in order to obtain the QoLIndex on a scale between zero and 
one, the estimated coefficients were normalized so that the state characterized by a low level 
on all domains yielded a utility of zero and the state characterized by a high level on all domains 
yielded a utility of one. This normalization is presented in Table 32. 
For example, nowadays in Portugal, an HIV infected individual, asymptomatic, healthy, with no 
restrictions on lifestyle due to infection, employed and happily married, will have an estimated 
utility index between 0.63 [1-0.17-0.16] and 1 depending on the extent  to which the individuals 
is affected by worries about the future and a feelings of discrimination. 
Table 32: Quality Weights for Quality of Life Index (QoLIndex) 
 
Coefficient
Low 
level
High 
level
Quality 
weight
Low 
level
High 
level
MRS
Health 0.82 0 1 0.30 0 1 1.00
Lifestyle 0.27 0 1 0.10 0 1 0.33
Healthcare 0.24 0 1 0.09 0 1 0.30
Discrimination 0.44 0 1 0.16 0 1 0.54
Love/sexual relationship 0.17 0 1 0.06 0 1 0.20
Employment 0.34 0 1 0.12 0 1 0.42
Future 0.46 -1 0 0.17 0 1 0.56
Utility -0.461 2.296 1.00 0 1
Affine transformation of utility 0.000 2.757
MRS=Marginal rate of substitution
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The column labeled MRS, which is not affected by the affine transformation of the utility, 
reveals the rate at which an individual is willing to trade health for each of the remaining 
attributes, while maintaining the same level of utility. For example, say health of an HIV 
infected individual is measured on a 0-100 point scale and imagine an individual is on the top of 
the scale – that is, the individual is as healthy as he could be – and that he feels constantly 
discriminated for being HIV positive. This (average) individual would be willing to move down 
on the health scale from 100 to 46 (100-54) in exchange for not feeling discriminated. 
At any point in time, the QoLIndex is calculated as a linear function QoLIndex = 𝒃𝒃′𝑿𝑿, where 𝒃𝒃 
is the vector of coefficients presented in the “Quality Weight” column of Table 32 and 𝑿𝑿 is a 
vector containing level of each of the attributes (on a 0-1 scale) for the simulated individual, in 
that moment in time. 
Quantification of the level of each attribute (𝑀𝑀), on a 0-1 scale, should, ideally, be performed by 
an additional questionnaire to Portuguese HIV infected individuals, where each person would 
classify their current situation on each of the seven attributes included in the QoLIndex, in 
addition to providing information on their CD4+ cell count, viral load and socio-demographic 
characteristics. Although such information is not available, recent published literature on 
quality of life of HIV infected individuals in Portugal may be used as a proxy.  
In 2008, Canavarro et al. published the results of the validation of the WHOQOL-HIV on a 
sample of 200 HIV infected individuals in Portugal [239]. In that that article, the authors provide 
information on the mean score (on a 0-100 scale) for each domain, by HIV stage 
(Asymptomatic, Symptomatic and AIDS). More recently, Reis et at. [132, 134] have collected 
data on a sample of 298 HIV infected individuals attending the Infectology Department of two 
Portuguese hospitals in 2009. The authors used the Portuguese versions of the WHOQOL-BREF 
[241], which also uses a 0-100 scale, plus the Instrumental-Expressive Social-Support Scale [242] 
to collect data on the socio-demographic profile of respondents. Reis et al. did not use the 
WHOQoL-HIV version of the questionnaire; consequently, questions regarding specific HIV 
related issues were not included78
Both Canavarro et al. and Reis et al. present their results discriminated by disease stage 
(Asymptomatic, symptomatic and AIDS - CDC Classification System for HIV-Infected Adults and 
Adolescents [119]). When applying the results of the QoLIndex to estimate QAdjLY in the cost-
. A comparison of the results obtained in the two samples is 
provided in Appendix VI. 
                                                          
78 Domain VI of the WHOQOL-HIV questionnaire includes questions 24 “Spirituality/Religion/ Personal Beliefs”, 52 “Forgiveness and 
blame”, 53 “Concerns about the future” and 54 “Death and dying” 
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effectiveness model, we have made the assumption that patients in lines 1 and 2 are 
asymptomatic, patients in line 3 are symptomatic and patients in non-suppressive therapy have 
a quality of life identical to that of patients diagnosed with AIDS. We have also assumed that, in 
any line, if a patient has been diagnosed with AIDS, his quality of life no longer depends on 
therapy line and it becomes until death equal to that of AIDS stage. 
Table 33 provides a detailed explanation of how the QoLIndex was calculated. It specifies both 
the source and the corresponding facet or domain within each source used to proxy the level of 
each attribute included in our index. Although our QoLIndex (Table 33) is not directly 
comparable to the utility estimates obtained using EQ-5D (Table 31) due to the reasons 
previously discussed, results do suggest that non-health factors may indeed play a significant 
role in the quality of life of HIV infected individuals.  
Table 33: Quality of Life Index (QoLIndex) 
 
4.5.4.6.3. Decrement in utility due to clinical events 
It is assumed in the model that hospitalizations, AIDS events and intolerance events are 
associated with a temporary reduction in quality of life. The remaining events (described in 
Section 4.5.3) are assumed not to have a specific disutility associated to them. The decrement 
in utility estimates where obtained from the Anis et al. [218] who use data from OPTIMA 
(OPTions In Management with Antiretrovirals), a multinational, randomized, open, control, 
clinical management trial to estimate the impact of both AIDS-Defining Events and Non-AIDS 
Serious Adverse Events on quality of life using several instruments among which, the Health 
Utility Index (HUI3)79
                                                          
79 The authors provide also estimates using the EQ-5D instrument. Nonetheless, as per discussion in the article, due to short recall 
period, EQ-5D estimates may have underestimated the impact of AIDS events. We have therefore selected the estimates obtained 
using the HUI3 instrument. 
. Following their results, we assume a serious adverse event to have a 
variation in utility of -0.09 (95% C.I.[-0.14;-0.05]) for 4 weeks, followed by -0.10 (95% C.I.[-0.14;-
Quality 
weight (DCE)
Line 1 
and 2
Line 3
Line 4 or any 
line if AIDS
Source Facet/Domain/Characteristic
Health 0.299 0.600 0.518 0.492 Canavarro et al.  (2008) Phys ica l  and Pscycologica l
Lifestyle 0.099 0.691 0.576 0.508 Canavarro et al.  (2008) Level  of Independence
Healthcare 0.089 0.645 0.540 0.622 Reis et al.  (2010) Heal th and Socia l  Care Access
Discrimination 0.161 0.630 0.630 0.630 Canavarro et al.  (2008) Socia l  Inclus ion
Love/Sexual Relationship 0.061 0.650 0.533 0.579 Canavarro et al.  (2008) Socia l  Relationships
Employment* 0.124 0.660 0.660 0.660 Reis et al.  (2010) & CHC Percentage employed
Future 0.167 0.527 0.526 0.484 Canavarro et al.  (2008) Domain VI
Quality of Life Index (QoLIndex) 0.616 0.564 0.552
Note: AIDS=Acquired immune deficiency syndrome. DCE=Discrete choice experiment. * In the cost-effectiveness model, employment level is a random draw 
from a Bernoulli distribution.
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0.07]) for 8 weeks and a serious AIDS-defining event to cause a variation in utility of -0.09 (95% 
C.I.[-0.14;-0.04]) for 8 weeks followed by -0.7 (95% C.I.[-0.14;-0.01]) for 8 weeks. We assume an 
inpatient care event to generate a variation in utility similar to that of the last 8 weeks of the 
AIDS-defining event.  
4.5.5. Costs 
4.5.5.1. Introduction 
While the relevant costs to be included will depend on the analysis at stake [158], the default 
model includes only direct costs associated with ART therapy, medical costs of follow-up and 
treatment of clinical events. No indirect costs were included in the model due to lack of 
available data.  
Medication costs were valued according to the official table prices for Governmental health 
care products purchases (Catálogo de Aprovisionamento Público da Saúde) [243], when 
available.  If more than one brand of a specific drug was available, the price used was the 
weighted average of available brands, with the weight set by the number of units bought by the 
Ministry of Health in 2008. If the drug was not available at that source, the price published by 
INFARMED [244] was used, and in that case, the unweighted average price was used. All other 
resources, (physician appointments, diagnosis tests and laboratory tests) were valued at the 
prices published in Portaria nº 132/2009 [245].  
Resources were valued at 2009 prices. Given the fact that the database refers to the 2001-2008 
period, these 2009 prices were not those in place when resource consumption occurred. Since 
relative prices may have changed, the prices at stake when resource consumption decisions 
were made should, ideally, be used to reflect the actual marginal rate of technical substitution. 
Because such price tables were not readily available for all resources, and in order to have a 
common criterion, 2009 prices were used for all resources. In the context of the Portuguese 
NHS, with some inelasticity of demand with respect to price (from the physicians’ point of 
view), the error generated may not be too large. Moreover, given the fact that DRG tables do 
not yet reflect the actual production cost, although they have improved over time, 2009 tables 
may better reflect the true cost of the resources used. 
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4.5.5.2. Antiretroviral Therapy Monthly Costs 
Antiretroviral drug prices used were those published in the Catalogue of Health Procurement 
(Catálogo Público de Aprovisionamento da Saúde [243]) in December 2009 and when necessary 
those published at INFARMED IP website. Prices were not available for some formulations 
(mostly, liquid presentation of antiretroviral drugs) and in that case, it was assumed the price of 
the solid equivalent formulation.  
Antiretroviral drugs quantities were obtained directly from the CHC database. In line with the 
rational used to parameterize the model with respect to efficacy results, the CHC sample was 
used to estimate costs in first and second line, while the LVHEM sample was used for third line 
and non-suppressive therapy. 
In the CHC sample, information was available on the exact package and formulation/dosage 
used, therefore the cost assigned to each regimen reflects that information. In the LVHEM 
sample, information was not available on the formulation used and in that case, it was assumed 
the price of the drug sold individually (that, is co-formulations were assumed not to exist). 
Moreover, the most frequent dosage for each drug was assumed. 
Monthly regimen cost was assumed to vary according to individual characteristics. A 
Generalized linear model for panel data with a Gamma distribution with logarithm as the link 
function was used to estimate monthly ART cost per simulated individual. Specification tests 
were used to select the most appropriate link and family function according to the methods 
described in Glick [246]. Age and gender were not found to have an impact on monthly regimen 
cost. As expected, a higher CD4+ and a lower resistance score are associated with lower 
monthly regimen cost and; previous virological failures and year of first ART are associated with 
higher regimen costs.  
Given the initial particular characteristics assigned to the simulated individual, a monthly 
regimen cost is consequently determined. That regimen cost will prevail, until the occurrence of 
a regimen switch event (either with or without virological failure). In the sample, the average 
monthly cost was 823€ (95% 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼 [814€; 832€]) with a median of 804€ 
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Table 34: Regression Model for Monthly Regimen Cost in Suppressive Therapy 
 
In non-suppressive therapy, the daily regimen cost assigned to each simulated individual is a 
random draw from the distribution of daily regimen costs fitted on the group of individuals in 
the LVHEM sample in class 4 of resistance. The fitted distribution was a Lognormal distribution 
with parameters80 Figure 47 𝜇𝜇 = 6.807 and 𝜎𝜎� = 0.276 (𝜒𝜒2 = 23.7,𝑝𝑝 = 0.0142, Appendix IV, ) 
The observed average monthly cost is 939€ (95% 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼: [882€ ;  997€]) with a median of 904€, 
while the average of the fitted distribution is 937€. This value is likely to underestimate the 
current monthly cost in non-suppressive therapies given the availability of recent expensive 
drugs for end of line treatment.   
4.5.5.3. Outpatient Medical Monthly Costs 
According to the “Quality of follow-up Patterns” described in the Portuguese Recommendations 
for the HIV/AIDS infection [102], clinical follow-up should occur every three to four months. This 
follow-up is to include the physician appointment, complete blood tests, viral load and CD4+ 
cell count measurement. According to the prices published Portaria nº 132/2009 [245], such 
follow-up exam has a monthly cost of 53€.  
                                                          
80  TreeAge® parameters for the Lognormal distribution are 𝜇𝜇 = ln(𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀)⁡ and 𝜎𝜎 = �2 ln � mean
median
� 
GEE Population-Averaged model Number of obs= 2684
Group variable: id Number of groups= 1076
Link: log Obs per group: min= 1
Family: gamma avg= 2.5
Correlation: exchangeable max= 11
Estimated within-id correlation: 0.286 Wald χ2(9)= 492.46
Scale parameter: 0.129 Prob> χ2= 0.000
Modified Park Test 0.728
Pearson Test 0.020
Pregibon Link test 0.173
vhc_dist*vhc+c_TAR_cd4_dist*cd4+c_TAR_vl_dist*vl+c_TAR_l2_dist*if(linha=2;1;0)+c_TAR_l3_dist*if(linha=3;1;0)+c_TAR_res_dist*res+c_
Monthly ART Cost Coef. Robust    SE z P>z dy/dx
Gender (Female=1) -0.029 0.018 -1.7 0.098 -0.064 0.005 -23.95 €
Age at 1st ART 0.000 0.001 0.470 0.637 -0.001 0.002 0.35 €
HCV -0.015 0.017 -0.870 0.384 -0.048 0.019 -12.33 €
CD4+ -0.0001 0.000 -2.2 0.030 0.000 0.000 -0.05 €
Log10VL -0.030 0.006 -5.4 0.000 -0.041 -0.019 -24.76 €
VF=1 0.028 0.023 1.2 0.226 -0.017 0.074 23.27 €
VF>1 0.307 0.031 9.8 0.000 0.245 0.369 280.90 €
Resistance Level 0.039 0.007 5.5 0.000 0.025 0.052 31.86 €
Year 1st ART 0.035 0.003 13.4 0.000 0.030 0.040 28.81 €
Constant -63.1 5.2 -12.1 0.000 -73.3 -52.8 Pred Mean= 826€
[95% CI]
Previous Virological Failures (0 is reference)
Notes: ART=Combined Antiretroviral Therapy, CD4+=CD4+ T-Lymphocyte count per µL, CI=Confidence Interval, HCV=Hepatitis C Virus, 
Log10 HIV RNA copies per mL
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In practice, costs may differ significantly from that value, since some individuals will not attend 
the pre-defined follow-up visits and others may need them on a more frequent basis. The CHC 
database contains information on the physician appointments, types of tests performed (blood 
samples, CD4+, viral load, etc); medication prescribed in conjunction with ART, and resources 
used on sporadic episodes (medication, other diagnosis exams and, in some cases, identification 
of the diagnosis) for the period of time that the patient attends the day hospital facility. 
For modeling purposes, medication prescribed in conjunction with ART was used as a proxy for 
the cost of prophylaxis; physician appointments and fluids tests were assumed to be follow-up 
costs and resources associated with sporadic episodes were used as a proxy for the cost of 
light/moderate adverse events and non-severe OI.  
These three sources of costs were added and the average monthly cost modeled as a function 
of individual characteristics. In the simulation, a random draw, conditional on individual 
characteristics at each event occurrence, provides the monthly outpatient follow-up cost. 
Median monthly non-ART costs in the CHC was 108€ (𝑋𝑋� =  124€, 95% 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼: [120€;  128€]). The 
best fit to the generalized linear model for panel data has a Gamma distribution with logarithm 
as the link function81 Table 35. Estimated coefficients are shown in . As expected, monthly non-
ART costs are decreasing in CD4+ cell count and year of ART initiation and increasing in viral 
load, resistance level and disease progression. Interestingly, adherence has a positive marginal 
effect on cost, possibly reflecting the fact that patients who comply with medication will also 
attend physician consultations and perform fluid testing, as recommended by the physician. 
                                                          
81 In estimation we have excluded 52 (1.6%) observations with monthly follow-up costs of more than 1,000€ 
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Table 35: Regression Model for Outpatient Non-ART Cost 
 
4.5.5.4. Cost of events 
Antiretroviral therapy costs and outpatient medical costs are assumed to be incurred 
continuously. These costs accumulate over time, even when no event occurs. Due to the 
discrete events nature of the model, values are updated at event occurrence but the update is 
performed considering the time lag since the last event occurrence (that is, since the last 
update) and the increment is the accumulated value. The cost of events is incurred upon event 
occurrence. Both types of costs are, nonetheless, dependent on individual characteristics and 
past history.  In this section we provide our estimates for the cost of events. 
4.5.5.4.1. Cost of Regimen Switch with and without Virological 
Failure 
Portuguese Guidelines for HIV/AIDS infection [102] recommend a complete patient evaluation 
at ART initiation. The recommended resources, as well as their respective costs [245], are 
presented in Table 36.  
Changing regimens, whether due to intolerance, virological failure or other, requires, in general, 
utilization of resources, such as physician appointments and laboratory tests. Given the fact 
that regimen switch frequency may be an important determinant cost-effectiveness analysis of 
GEE Population-Averaged Model Number of obs= 2472
Group variable: id Number of groups= 1149
Link: log Obs per group: min= 1
Family: gamma avg= 2.2
Correlation: exchangeable max= 8
Estimated within-id correlation: 0.105 Wald χ2(11)= 99.83
Scale parameter: 0.362 Prob> χ2= 0.0000
Modified Park Test 0.255
Pearson Corr Test 0.599 Std. Err. adjusted for clustering on id
Pregibon Link test 0.099
Modified Hosmer Lemeshow Test 0.992
Monthly Non-ART Cost Coef.
Semi-Robust 
SE
z P>z dy/dx x
Gender (Female=1) 0.046 0.032 1.4 0.150 -0.017 0.110 6.06 € 35%
Age at 1st CART 0.000 0.002 -0.130 0.895 -0.003 0.003 -0.03 € 37.5
HCV 0.020 0.031 0.630 0.530 -0.042 0.081 2.56 € 52%
CD4+ -0.0001 0.000 -2.3 0.023 0.000 0.000 -0.02 € 435.3
Log10VL 0.028 0.011 2.5 0.013 0.006 0.050 3.59 € 3.0
Previous Virological 
Failures (0 is reference)
VF=1 0.000 0.033 -0.020 0.988 -0.065 0.064 -0.06 € 54%
VF>1 0.166 0.046 3.6 0.000 0.076 0.256 22.64 € 20%
Resistance Level 0.021 0.009 2.4 0.015 0.004 0.038 2.74 € 0.5
Year 1st CART 0.042 0.006 6.6 0.000 0.030 0.055 5.45 € 2002
Adherence 0.010 0.001 10.4 0.000 0.008 0.011 1.23 € 85.6
Constant -80.2 12.8 -6.3 0.000 -105.3 -55.2 Predicted mean=130€
[95% CI]
Notes: ART=Antiretroviral Therapy, CART=Combined Antiretroviral Therapy, CD4+=CD4+ T-Lymphocyte count per µL, HCV=Hepatitis C 
Virus, Log10 HIV RNA copies per mL, VF=Virological Failure
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different treatment options, costs associated with regimen switch was modeled separately. In 
order to avoid double counting, physician appointment costs and laboratory tests’ costs 
performed at the time of regimen switch were not included in estimation of outpatient medical 
monthly costs and instead accounted as switching costs. 
Table 36: Cost of Antiretroviral Therapy Initiation 
 
According to the Portuguese Guidelines for HIV/AIDS infection, it is assumed in the model that a 
regimen switch requires utilization of the following resources: two physician appointment, a 
viral load test, a CD4+ cell count test and a complete blood test. In case of virological failure, 
confirmation of such failure and a resistance assay should also be performed. As such, the cost 
of regimen switch with and without virological failure was calculated to be 582€ and 495€, 
respectively. 
4.5.5.4.2. Cost of Adverse Events 
Light adverse events costs are accounted for in “Outpatient Medical Monthly Costs”. The cost of 
intolerance (adverse events causing a regimen switch) was obtained in the literature. Llibre-
Codina et al. [247] estimate the annual cost of toxicity associated with NRTIs of 1,268 HIV-1 
infected patients in several centers in Spain (RECOVER study), in the year 2005.  
In their cost estimation Llibre-Codina et al. include both direct and indirect cost of intolerance, 
reporting that direct costs account for 45% of the total cost and events considered are classified 
in three categories: light, moderate and severe. The average (direct) cost of an intolerance 
episode of moderate or severe level, reported by Llibre-Codina et al., is 1,126€ 
Cost of ART Initiation
DRG Cost
Physician Appointment 31.0 €
Laboratory Tests
Confirmation of HIV Status 26029 99.5 €
2x Viral Load Test 26322/26328 174.2 €
2x CD4+ Cell  Count Test 25719 83.8 €
Complete Blood Test See note 1 40.7 €
Resistance Assay 26340 263.1 €
Other Recommended Tests See note 2 79.2 €
Chest X-Ray 10405 10.4 €
Electrocardiogram 40301 7.5 €
Gynecological Exam and Colpocytology (Women only) 48190 36.6 €
Anal Cytology Test for Screening of Pre-Cancerous Lesions 51280 15.7 €
Tuberculosis Skin Test 81365 7.1 €
Dentist Appointment 31.0 €
Total 879.8 €
Source:  Portuguese Guidelines for HIV/AIDS infection (2007) and Ministério da Saúde, Portaria n.º 132/2009 de 30 de Janeiro
Notes:  ART=Antiretroviral Therapy, CD4+=CD4+ T-Lymphocyte count per µL, DRG=Diagnosis-Related Group , HIV=Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Note 1: DRGs:4209+24380+22076+22949+21620+21623+22271+21217+21220+21665+22035+21935+21196+21559+21539+21545+22920+22954+22679+22076. 
Note 2:  RPR/VDRL, serology test for Taxoplasma Gondii, CMV and Hepatites A, B, C.
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(95% CI: [1,124€; 1,129€]) at 2005 prices. 2009 prices were obtained using the inflation rates 
reported by the UNECE Statistical Division Database [70].  
4.5.5.4.3. Cost of Hospitalization and AIDS-Defining Events 
The CHC database contains information on all inpatient care episodes and the corresponding 
Diagnoses Related Group in which the episode was classified. Duration of episodes is 
nonetheless not known.  Due to lack of information on lengths of stay, it was not possible to use 
generalized linear models for panel data link event costs to patient characteristics and past 
history. We neither obtained a reasonable fit nor were model variables found to be statistically 
significant.  This link between individual characteristics and costs was the main advantage of 
using the CHC database. Once the option becomes the average cost, the ACSS database 
becomes a better source of information since it includes duration, DGR code and corresponding 
ICD-9 main diagnosis.  
According to the ACSS database, the average cost of an inpatient care episode classified with 
the 042 ICD9-CM82
Table 37
 code in 2009, was 4,765€ (95% CI: [4,597€ ;  4,933€]) and the average cost 
of the remaining episodes was 4,742€ (95% CI: [4,480€ ;  5,003€]). As shown in , the 
corresponding average duration was 19.3 (95% CI: [18.2 ;  20.5]) and 14.9 
(95% 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼: [13.5;  16.2]), respectively83
In the model we have used assumed the cost of an AIDS event to be identical to that of 
inpatient care episodes classified with ICD-CM code 042 and that the average cost of 
hospitalization to be the average cost of the remaining episodes.  
. Although no difference was found in the average cost of 
the episode, the average duration was lower in the case of non-AIDS defining events.  
Because AIDS-defining episodes may imply inpatient care, our model will be double-counting 
the cost (and utility decrement) of AIDS-defining episodes in the cases where these events 
result in hospitalization. Once data becomes available, these assumptions will need 
improvement. Meanwhile, the overall impact is likely to be minimized by the fact that the CHC 
database contains mainly patients in early treatment lines (this being the reason for using the 
LVHEM database in line 3 and 4). The hospitalization rate observed in the CHC sample is, 
therefore, unlikely to reflect the higher hospitalization frequency observed in patients at an 
advanced stage of the disease.    
                                                          
82 The 042 “Human immunodeficiency virus [HIV] disease” includes AIDS and symptomatic infection. 
83 As discussed in Section ACSS of Appendix III, Pina (2007) performed a similar analysis with a larger sample, over a longer period, 
broken down by hospital, which allowed for a parameterization according to the CHC cost pattern. Nevertheless, that analysis was 
based on previous DRG tables, which are no longer valid. Consequently, the 2009 sample was used. 
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Table 37: Cost of Hospitalization and AIDS Event 
 
Since hospitalization costs include the cost of ART, to avoid double counting in the model, this 
cost is subtracted from the cost of the event, assuming the average duration for the event as 
reported in the DRG table. This ART subtracted cost is the one incurred by the simulated 
individual at the time of event occurrence.  
4.5.6. Summary of sources for model input parameters 
The present framework for cost-effectiveness analysis of HIV treatment would, ideally, be based 
on a single complete national database. The availability of such database would allow for 
nationally representative parameter estimates and also for adequate modeling for the linkage 
between the different clinical parameters.  
While the National Coordination for HIV/AIDS infection has already taken the first step towards 
such database – through the SI. VIDA software (“Sistema Informático do VIH/sida”)  – such 
project is yet at a pilot stage and facing several operational difficulties, mainly due to due to 
lack of resources.  
In the absence of such database, the present model, as discussed in detail in Section 4.5, makes 
use of several databases and published international literature. Table 38 summarizes the 
sources of information used to estimate each required parameter. 
 
Cost Duration (days) Cost Duration (days)
Average 4,765 € 19.3 4,742 € 14.9
Standard Deviation 3,474 € 24.9 3,689 € 18.9
Median 3,353 € 12.0 3,353 € 8
N 1641 1641 763 757
AIDS Episode* Hospitalization
Source: ACSS database 2009.*identified by the ICD9-CM code. Notes: ACSS= Administração 
Central do Sistema de Saúde, AIDS=Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, N=Number of 
Observations/Individuals
Economic Analysis in Health Care Regulation 
 
167 
 
Table 38: Summary of Sources for Model Input Parameters 
 
 
4.6. Model outputs in the context of an application 
The aim of the present section is to introduce the reader to the outputs produced by the model. 
Such outputs will be presented in the context of an example: the cost-effectiveness analysis of 
two NRTIs plus one NNRTI versus two NRTIs plus one PI/r as a first line antiretroviral therapy 
regimen. It should be noted that this analysis has been previously presented at the HIV10 
Glasgow conference, 2010 [248]84
Portuguese Guidelines for treatment of HIV/AIDS infection [102] recommend initiating 
treatment with a regimen composed of 2NRTI+NNRTI or 2NNRTI+PI/r as do most of the 
Guidelines (
.  
Table 39). However, these recommendations do not take into consideration cost-
                                                          
84 The differences in results refer to the fact that in the previous analysis, we did not have inpatient data in the CHC database and 
have, therefore, used values reported in the literature. Moreover, once inpatient data become available, slight corrections were 
performed to the database to correct for inconsistencies. 
Parameters for: Source
Detailed in Table 24
CHC, LVHEM, CVEDT, Reis et al.  (2007)
Evolving State Variables
CD4+ Cell Count and Viral Load CHC, LVHEM
Adherence Level CHC
Resistance Endogenous from resistance event
AIDS Status Endogenous from AIDS event and CD4+
Regimen Characteristics CHC
Clinical Events Detailed in Table 27
Virological Suppression CHC, Clotet et al. (2007) (POWER Clinical trails)
Regimen Switch without Virological Failure CHC, Elzi et al.  (2010) (Swiss cohort)
Line Switch - Virological Failure CHC, LVHEM
Resistance Development CHC, LVHEM
Hospitalization CHC
AIDS Event May et al.  (2004)
Immunological Failure Endogenous
Mortality CVEDT, INE
Quality of Life
DCE Index
Quality Weights DCE questionnaire (CHC, CHLC and SER+)
Dimension scores Reis et al. (2010), Canavarro et al. (2008), CHC
QALY weights Simpson et al.  (2004) , Catarino (2010)
Costs
Antiretroviral Therapy CHC, LVHEM, CPAS, INFARMED
Outpatient non-ART costs CHC, Portaria nº 132/2009 
Regimen Switch Portuguese Guidelines HIV/AIDS infection, Portaria nº 132/2009
Intolerance Llibre-Codina et al.  (2007) (RECOVER Study)
Hospitalization ACSS inpatient data 2009
AIDS-Defining Events ACSS inpatient data 2009
Characteristics at ART Initiation
Notes: CHC=Centro Hospitalar de Cascais, LVHEM=Egas Moniz Hospital Virology Laboratory - Western Lisbon Hospital Center, CVEDT=Communicable Diseases and 
Epidemiological Surveillance Center, INE=National Statistics Institute, CAPS=Catalogue of Health Procurement , ACSS=Healthcare System Central Administration, DCE=Discrete 
choice experiment
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effectiveness analysis. The objective of this study was to analyze the cost-effectiveness of the 
two strategies in a cohort of HIV-1 infected naïve patients.  
While NNRTI and PI/r are considered clinically equivalent, in the sense that elements of both 
classes are considered as first choices in clinical recommendations, the average daily cost of PI/r 
is significantly higher than that of NNRTIs.  Consequently, in a search for a more efficient use of 
resources, especially given the increasing cost containment pressure in Portugal, it is relevant to 
estimate the long term impact of each treatment option and compare the alternatives within a 
cost-effectiveness framework.  
In the present analysis, we consider four therapy lines, a lifetime horizon and a 5% annual 
discount rate. Given the unavailability of reliable data to estimate indirect costs, we have 
assumed the National Health Service perspective considering only direct medical costs. 
Table 39: Third Agent Recommendations for Initial ART treatment  
 
4.6.1. Input data 
In order to perform the analysis, we considered the sub-sample of naïve individuals in the CHC 
database who initiated ART with either 2NRTI+NNRTI or 2NRTI+PI/r. 317 out of the 366 naïve 
individuals who initiated therapy during the period of analysis, met the criterion and were 
included.  
DHHSa IAS-USAb BHIVAc EACSd Rec. PTe GESIDAfy 
2011 July 2010 June 2008
 
 2009
 
Jan11 January 2011 
EFV  EFV EFV EFV EFV EFV
NVP# NVP# NVP* #
ATV/r ATV/r ATV/r ATV/r ATV/r
DRV/r DRV/r DRV/r DRV/r DRV/r
RAL RAL LPV/r LPV/r* 
SQV/r bid RAL* 
NVP NVP
FPV/r FPV/r 
FPV/r LPV/r PI/r SQV/r id LPV/r SQV/r 
LPV/r FPV/r FPV/r SQV/r MVC
MRV RAL RAL
Alternative
Preferred  
/Recommended
Notes: *Not all panel experts agreed with this level of recommendation. # CD4 Restrictions.                                                        
  a Panel on Antiretroviral Guidelines for Adults and Adolescents. Guidelines for the use of antiretroviral agents in HIV-1-
infected adults and adolescents. Department of Health and Human Services. January 10, 2011; 1–166. Available at 
http://www.aidsinfo.nih.gov/ContentFiles/AdultandAdolescentGL.pdf
b Thompson M, et al. JAMA. 2010;304(3): 321-333
c. British HIV Association guidelines for the treatment of HIV-1-infected adults with antiretroviral therapy 2008. HIV Med. 
2008; 9:563–608.
d. European AIDS Clinical Society (EACS) Guidelines for the Clinical Management and Treatment of HIV Infected Adults in 
Europe. November 2009.  Available online at http://www.europeanaidsclinicalsociety.org/guidelinespdf/EACS-
EuroGuidelines2009FullVersion.pdf
e. Recomendações Portuguesas para oTratamento da Infecção VIH/SIDA. Available online at http://www.sida.pt
f. Documento de consenso de Gesida y PNS sobre el tratamiento antirretroviral del adulto (enero 2011)
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Table 40 provides the summary characteristics of the two groups at ART initiation. The only 
statistically significant difference relates to year of ART initiation. It should nonetheless be 
noted that patients were not randomly assigned to each group.  
In the simulation, initial individual values for each of the characteristic are randomly drawn 
from Table distributions generated from the sample in analysis. Obviously, the number of PIs 
was set to two in the 2NRTI+PI/r and to zero in the 2NRTI+NNRTI. The Table distribution of the 
number of PIs in line 2 was redefined to become conditional on the number of PIs in the first 
regimen. 
 
Table 40: Initial Characteristics of the 2NRTI+NNRTI and 2NRTI+PI/r Groups 
 
The two groups were tested for differences in time to event using the log-rank test for equality 
of the survival functions (Figure 21) and CD4+ variation and viral load variation. Figure 22 shows 
the variation in CD4 cell count over time in the two groups. The only statistically significant 
difference was found in time to regimen switch without virological failure.  
First regimen 2NRTI+NNRTI 2NRTI+PI/r p-value*
 N (not randomized) 158 159
Year of ART initiation 2003 2005 <0.001
Female 32.3% 34.0% 0.751
HCV 29.8% 29.6% 0.971
Resistance* >1 2 1 0.79
Median [IQR] p-value*
Age 39 [33 ; 46] 39 [33 ; 50] 0.649
CD4+ cell count/µL 234 [128 ; 349] 219 [108 ; 350] 0.500
Log10 HIV RNA/mL 4.9 [4.3 ; 5.4] 5.1 [4.3 ; 5.5] 0.056
Adherence (%) 89 [71 ; 98] 88 [73 ; 96] 0.327
NRTI Pair
AZT+3TC 55% 52%
TDF+FTC 19% 23%
TDF+3TC 9% 9%
ABC+3TC 3% 11%
Others 15% 5%
3rd Agent
EFV 64%
NVP 36%
LPVr 73%
Other PI/r 27%
Note: Inverted Genotype Sensitivity Score based on REGA 8 Algorithm; HCV= hepatitis C virus; 
Adherence measured by pharmacy refills in first regimen. *P-value of the test for difference in 
means/medians. NRTI=Nucleoside Reverse Transcriptase Inhibitor; NNRTI=Non-nucleoside 
Reverse Transcriptase Inhibitor; PI/r=Boosted Protease Inhibitor.
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Figure 21: Kaplan Meier Time Estimates in the NNRTI and PI/r groups,  (a) Time to Viral Suppression, (b) 
Time to Regimen Switch due to Virological, (c) Time to First Increase in Resistance and (d) Time to 
Regimen Switch without Virological Failure  
 
  
Figure 22: Average CD4+ over time in the 2NRTI+NNRTI and 2NRTI+PI/r Groups 
 
First line time to event regression models85 for time to viral suppression, line switch and 
regimen switch were re-estimated on the sample in analysis. The variable number of PIs 
identifies the group in those regressions. The estimated parameters replaced those used in the 
                                                           
85 And consequently, second line corresponding regressions. 
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default version of the model. Due to reduced number of events observed, time to first 
resistance parameters were maintained at the default values.  
First line non-ART costs in each group were assumed not to depend on individual 
characteristics. Instead the sample values presented in Table 41 were used. The ART cost of the 
first regimen, for each group, was that presented in the same Table.  
Table 41: Observed Monthly Costs in the 2NRTI+NNRTI and 2NRTI+PI/r Groups 
 
With respect to mortality, we estimated time to death among the subsample of individuals 
diagnosed in the HAART era (1996 onwards) and considered it as the relevant data for 
individuals in suppressive therapy. In non-suppressive therapy we considered the full sample to 
capture the decreased benefits of ART at this stage. The remaining parameters of the model 
were kept at the respective default value.  
4.6.2. Microsimulation Results 
In the context of individual microsimulation models, it is important to distinguish between 
variability associated with individual characteristics and second-order variability. The first 
source of variability would exist even if we knew with absolute certainty all parameter values, 
simply because individuals are different, while the second occurs because we are uncertain 
about the exact value of the parameters in the population. Even if individuals were all identical, 
probabilistic analysis accounting for parameter uncertainty would still be pertinent. 
Microsimulation outputs presented in this section were obtained by simulating 1 million 
individuals for each comparator, using the average values of all parameters. Such results are 
equivalent to those obtained in the deterministic analysis of a Markov model. Parameter 
Average [95% C.I.] p-value Median [IQR] p-value
First Regimen Monthly Cost
2INRT+INNRT 705€ [658€ ; 752€] 613€ [525€ ; 797€]
2INRTI+IP/r 994€ [966€ ; 1022€] 1057€ [853€ ; 1057€]
First Line Outpatient Monthly Costs
2INRT+INNRT 82€ [63€ ; 101€] 63€ [24€ ; 106€]
2INRT+IP/r 109€ [89€ ; 129€] 98€ [41€ ; 137€]
First Line Inpatient Monthly Costs
2INRT+INNRT 92€ [51€ ; 134€] 0€ [0€ ; 0€]
2INRT+IP/r 109€ [57€ ; 161€] 0€ [0€ ; 46€]
First Line Inpatient Monthly Rate
2INRT+INNRT 0.0162 [0.0097 ; 0.0227] 0 [0 ; 0]
2INRT+IP/r 0.0159 [0.0094 ; 0.0224] 0 [0 ; 0.0133]
p<0.001 p<0.001
NRTI=Nucleoside Reverse Transcriptase Inhibitor; NNRTI=Non-nucleoside Reverse Transcriptase Inhibitor; PIr=Boosted Protease Inhibitor.
p=0.008p=0.05
p=0.62
p=0.9492
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uncertainty is evaluated in Section 4.6.3 by simulating 50,000 individuals for each set of 133 
different (randomly sampled) combinations of parameter values, for each comparator. 
4.6.2.1. Clinical outcomes  
Relevant clinical outcomes produced by the model include the number of months before viral 
suppression is achieved as well as the percentage of individuals achieving it. This information is 
relevant not only because of the risk of disease progression and resistance development but 
also because infectiousness is highly correlated with viral load [249]. 
CD4+ cell increase is also a common indicator reflecting the recovery of the immune system as a 
result of ARV therapy.  In addition to these two indicators, the average number of each type of 
clinical event modeled is also reported.  
The number of regimen switches (for reasons other than virological failure) reflects regimens’ 
tolerability and safety. 
Time spent in each therapy line provides information on the average time to virological failure. 
Virological failure may occur because viral suppression was not reached or because viral load 
has becomes detectable (in two consecutive tests) after a period of viral suppression. The 
model reports the average number of each event per simulated individual. 
 
As expected, with 1 million simulations, simulated initial characteristics average values are close  
to those observed in the distributions from which those characteristics were sampled (Table 24 
and Table 40). 
With respect to clinical outcomes, little difference is predicted by the model in the two groups. 
These results are expected given the pre-analysis on the Kaplan-Meier estimates of time to 
event. The statistically significant difference in time to regimen switch without virological failure 
is estimated to reduce by 17% the total number of switches over the individuals’ lifetime 
therapy. 
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Table 42: Clinical outcomes 
 
 
The remaining differences reflect the impact of the number of PIs and of the accumulated 
number of regimens on the distribution of time to event. For example, the slightly lower 
number of hospitalizations events in the NNRTI group reflects the negative marginal effect 
(Table 27) of the number of PIs on the median time to such event occurrence. It should be 
noted that, although 1 million individuals simulated should be enough to estimate the average 
value with precision, small differences may remain reflecting nothing but first-order variability.    
The estimated average time in first line (Table 43) is around 9 years and a 5 months difference, 
with longer time for the NNRTI group, is predicted in terms of the average time spent in first 
line. This reflects the negative impact of both the number of PIs and the number of 
accumulated regimens on the median time to virological failure in lines 1 and 2. Overall 
effectiveness differences are small with an estimated overall difference of 2.5 months in 
undiscounted life expectancy. 
With respect to the time of death, it is estimated that 24% of the individuals will die during first 
line, 28% will die during second line and 16% after two virological failures and before reaching 
2NRTI+
NNRTI
2NRTI+
PIr
Absolute 
Difference
Percent 
Difference
Clinical outcomes
Line 1 7.55 7.55 0.00 0.0%
Line 2 7.17 7.25 -0.08 -1.2%
Line 3 17.95 17.66 0.29 1.7%
% attaining viral suppression
Line 1 68% 68% 0.00 -0.1%
Line 2 55% 55% 0.00 -0.4%
Line 3 46% 46% 0.00 0.0%
Variation in CD4 cell count
Line 1 265 264 0.28 0.1%
Line 2 180 181 -0.66 -0.4%
Line 3 101 102 -0.19 -0.2%
Line 4 -49 -50 0.76 -1.5%
% Reaching each line
Line 2 0.76 0.75 0.01 1.8%
Line 3 0.49 0.48 0.00 0.6%
Line 4 0.33 0.32 0.01 4.0%
Life time events
Regimen switch 4.16 5.02 -0.86 -17.2%
Hospitalization 4.55 4.70 -0.15 -3.1%
Virological failure 3.53 3.50 0.03 0.7%
Failure after supression 1.53 1.52 0.01 0.4%
Supression not achieved 2.00 1.98 0.02 1.0%
Note: 1 million individuals simulated. Values undiscounted. CD4+=CD4+ T-
Lymphocyte count per µl. OI=Opportunistic Infections
Months w/o viral suppression (among those who reach it)
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non-suppressive therapy. The remaining 33% will die in non-suppressive therapy.  The 
percentage of individuals reaching non-suppressive therapy is likely to be high when compared 
to that expected from current available treatments86
4.6.2.2. Costs, life years and ICERs 
 but it reflects the fact that the model was 
parameterized with 2000-2008 data. 
As explained in Section 4.5.4.6, effectiveness is evaluated using three different indicators: Life 
years, life years adjusted for quality according to the quality of life index obtained by DCE and 
QALYs (with two different estimates on utility weights).  
Cost, reported in Euros (€), are subdivided in ART costs and other costs (clinical events and 
follow-up) and further discriminated by therapy line. Incremental cost-effectiveness ratios 
(ICER) are also reported. Following the economic evaluation literature, when dominance occurs, 
ICERs are replaced by information on whether the strategy under consideration is dominant or 
dominated. 
The main difference between the two groups relies on the total life time cost (Table 43). The 
model predicts that initiating ART with 2NRTI+NN results in savings of 28,178€ over the lifetime 
of the individual, that is, around 1,200€ per year. This annual difference is 11% of the value paid 
to the hospital per patient in the HIV financing program. These savings occur not only in terms 
of ART costs but also in terms of non-ART costs. The most significant cost differences are, 
obviously, in first line since treatment in subsequent lines is only slightly conditional on first line 
ART in each group (through the number of PIs and the number of accumulated different 
regimens). ART costs account for 79% of all costs reflecting the fact that progress in ART has 
improved overall health, decreasing the frequency and severity of OI/ AIDS-defining episodes 
but such progress is being paid for in ART costs. 
Annual non-ART costs are increasing in therapy line indicating the need for more intense 
utilization of resources as the disease progresses. ART-costs are also increasing in therapy line 
reflecting the need for more complex and expensive drugs as resistance develops. Non-
suppressive therapy is the exception. Annual ART costs in non-suppressive therapy are 
estimated to be lower than those for third line which is an unrealistic result but is a direct 
consequence of the data available. Indeed, the observed average monthly cost of 939€ among 
individuals with high resistance levels (in the LVHEM database) is unlikely to reflect current 
                                                          
86 This observation is based on clinical expert opinion, not on published literature given its unavailability.   
Economic Analysis in Health Care Regulation 
 
175 
 
monthly costs among these individuals, given the new more expensive drugs that have 
meanwhile become available. 
 
Table 43: Costs and Life Years Microsimulation Results 
 
 
The model predicts a life expectancy of around 24 years, which means that the average age of 
death is 65. When accounting for quality of life estimates differ significantly based on the 
instrument (and sample) used to estimate utility weights. Recalling that both Simpson et al. [4] 
and Catarino [238] use the same instrument (EQ-5D) to estimate quality of life among HIV-
infected individuals, it is worth noting that the estimates obtained on a Portuguese sample yield 
a 8% reduction in the total number of QALYs. This result suggests that HIV infected individuals 
have a lower quality of life in Portugal when compared to international standards. As expected, 
the total quality adjusted life years estimated by the model using DCE estimates, is significantly 
2NRTI+NNRTI 2NRTI+PIr
Absolute 
Difference
Percent 
Difference 2NRTI+NNRTI 2NRTI+PIr
Absolute 
Difference
Percent 
Difference
Costs
ART costs 135,406 € 151,158 € -15,753 € -10.4% 273,294 € 295,529 € -22,235 € -7.5%
Line 1 54,229 € 70,450 € -16,221 € -23.0% 84,775 € 107,044 € -22,269 € -20.8%
Line 2 41,752 € 41,880 € -128 € -0.3% 86,810 € 88,450 € -1,640 € -1.9%
Line 3 31,812 € 31,070 € 742 € 2.4% 70,431 € 68,287 € 2,144 € 3.1%
Line 4 7,613 € 7,758 € -145 € -1.9% 31,277 € 31,747 € -470 € -1.5%
Monitoring and 
 
37,336 € 41,157 € -3,821 € -9.3% 73,998 € 79,941 € -5,943 € -7.4%
Line 1 14,166 € 17,991 € -3,825 € -21.3% 20,199 € 25,759 € -5,560 € -21.6%
Line 2 11,422 € 11,515 € -92 € -0.8% 22,567 € 23,191 € -625 € -2.7%
Line 3 8,704 € 8,534 € 170 € 2.0% 18,629 € 18,123 € 506 € 2.8%
Line 4 3,044 € 3,118 € -74 € -2.4% 12,604 € 12,867 € -264 € -2.0%
Total cost 172,742 € 192,315 € -19,573 € -10.2% 347,292 € 375,470 € -28,178 € -7.5%
Effectiveness
DCEAdjLY 7.82 7.76 0.06 0.8% 15.26 15.03 0.23 1.5%
QALYs## 10.21 10.09 0.12 1.2% 20.87 20.50 0.37 1.8%
QALYs* 11.84 11.70 0.14 1.2% 22.84 22.43 0.41 1.8%
Life Years 15.69 15.57 0.12 0.8% 24.35 24.14 0.21 0.9%
Line 1 8.13 8.06 0.07 0.9% 9.41 9.15 0.26 2.8%
Line 2 4.41 4.41 0.00 0.0% 7.62 7.59 0.03 0.4%
Line 3 2.58 2.52 0.06 2.5% 4.55 4.59 -0.04 -0.8%
Line 4 0.57 0.59 -0.01 -2.0% 2.77 2.81 -0.04 -1.4%
Incremental Cost effectiveness Ratio
ICER (€/QALY or DCE AdjLY)
ICER (€/LY)
UndiscountedDiscounted at 5% per year
Note: 1 million individuals simulated. ART=Antiretroviral therapy, CD4+=CD4+ T-Lymphocyte count per µl, LY=Life Years; DCE Adj = quality of life adjusted 
by the DCE estimates, ## based on Catarino (2011), *based on Simpson et al. (2004).
2NRTI+NNRTI is Dominant
2NRTI+NNRTI is Dominant
2NRTI+NNRTI is Dominant
2NRTI+NNRTI is Dominant
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lower that the total number of QALY. Accounting for non-health aspects of HIV infection that 
have an impact on quality of life, such as discrimination, reduces the estimate utility associated 
with a given health status.  
With a lower total cost and a slight increase in life expectancy, ART initiation with 2NRTI+NNRTI 
is, in the present analysis, a dominant strategy when compared to ART initiation with 
2NRTI+PI/r. Given the small differences estimated regarding the total number of QALYs in the 
two strategies, it is of special interest to evaluate the impact of the assumed parameter values 
on the results. Such probabilistic analysis is discussed in the next section.  
4.6.3. Probabilistic Analysis 
Although uncertainty resulting from individual variability is included in the microsimulation 
outputs presented in the previous section, the uncertainty (from the statistician point of view) 
about the parameters’ values assumed in the model is not accounted for. The microsimulation 
outputs in the previous section were obtained with all parameters at their mean values. 
In the present section, we discuss the model outputs designed to evaluate the robustness of the 
results with respect to parameter uncertainty. Such uncertainty, denominated second-order 
uncertainty, is incorporated in the probabilistic analysis. Probabilistic analysis is performed by 
sampling a value for each parameter from its distribution and then running the microsimulation 
for that set of parameter values.  
The model provides two instruments for probabilistic analysis: the cost-effectiveness plane 
(Figure 23) and the acceptability curve (Figure 24). In the cost-effectiveness analysis of 
2NRTI+NNRTI versus 2NRT+PI/r, 50,000 individuals were simulated for each of the 133 possible 
sets of parameters. Each point represented in the cost-effectiveness plan represents the pair 
(difference in average cost, difference in average effectiveness) for a given set of randomly 
sampled parameter values. 
Results presented use the QALY values based on Simpson et. al. [4]. 57% of the simulations 
yielded ART initiation with 2NRTI+NNRTI as dominant strategy while 9% resulted in such 
strategy being dominated. 
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Figure 23: CE Plane of 2NRTI+NNRTI versus 2NRTI+PI/r (Discounted) 
 
The probability of the treatment being cost-effective, obviously, depends on the willingness to 
pay for each unit gained. The acceptability curve summarizes how that probability varies in 
response to changes in willingness to pay. Such curve is represented in Figure 24, where a unit 
of gain equals a QALY. The probability of being cost-effective, when quality of life is taken into 
consideration, is about 80% at a threshold of 20,000€.  It should be noted, that neither indirect 
costs nor new infections averted due to treatment, are included in the analysis. 
 
Figure 24: Probabilistic sensitivity analysis: cost-effectiveness acceptability curve for 2NRTI+NNRTI 
compared with 2NRTI+IPr as initial antiretroviral therapy 
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4.7. Discussion 
Although by definition a simplification of reality, to be of use, a model should be able to 
reproduce the main aspects under consideration. Its validity may then be tested by applying the 
model to different samples and verifying whether it is capable of reproducing those results as 
well.  
While the second step has not yet been performed, in order to evaluate model predictions, it is 
of interest to compare them, when possible, to those observed in the CHC sample and those 
published in the literature. We consider first clinical outcomes then the ICER related main 
variables. Model limitations are discussed next and we conclude with a final overall 
appreciation. 
Sixty eight percent of the individuals are predicted to reach viral suppression in the first line and 
those who do, will attain it, on average, 7.6 months after ART initiation. This percentage (68%)  
is lower than clinical trial results of ARV drugs used by the CHC sample (for example, in Study 
934 [250] 70% reach HIV RNA <50 copies/μL at 48 weeks in the zidovudine arm, while 80% do 
so in the tenofovir arm), but this is likely to reflect the difference between efficacy and 
effectiveness.  
An average of 7.6 months to viral suppression matches the input data. Greenbaum et al. [251] 
estimates a median time to first undetectable HIV-1 RNA level of 5.4 months, but average and 
median are not directly comparable. Moreover, the event modeled is “HIV RNA<50 copies/mL 
test result” which depends not only on ART efficacy but also on testing frequency. The model 
predicts time to viral suppression to be identical in both groups, reflecting the fact that the 
difference was not found to be statistically significant (Figure 22). Results in the literature are 
contradictory with respect to such comparison [251, 252]. 
The percentage of individuals who respond to therapy and reach viral suppression decreases 
with the number of previous therapy failures, as expected, and is in line with clinical trial results 
of naïve and experience patients. After the first virological failure 55% will respond and, after 
two virological failures, 46% will reach viral suppression before switching to non-suppressive 
therapy. These values are similar to those observed in clinical trials [142] (from which third line 
data was drawn).  
With active ARV medication blocking the virus from reproduction, CD4+ cell count tends to 
increase. Such increase is predicted to be 265, 180 and 129 in first, second and third line, 
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respectively87
The total number of regimen switches without virological failure is predicted to be 4.2 in the 
NNRTI group and PI/r group. This is the variable where the highest percent difference between 
groups occurs. Results are in alignment with input parameters (namely, the statistically 
significant difference found in the survival curves of such event) and this difference has also 
been found in clinical trials results [145, 258]. 
. This implies an annual increase (were the rate to be constant) of 28, 24 and 21 
per year respectively. This values are similar to those estimated by Phillips et al. [253] on the 
EuroSIDA cohort. In non-suppressive therapy, CD4+ cell count is predicted to decrease at a rate 
of 17 cells per mm3 per year, which is slightly lower that the rate estimated by Plato 
collaboration [254]. At virological failure the viral load increases above the detection value, 
reflecting the failure of ART. According to the model, at this point the viral load increases to 
about 83% of the level at ART initiation. This value is close to the estimates reported in the 
literature by Sanders et al., who report that rebound viral load levels are less than the original 
levels by about 10% [255-257]. 
The ART Cohort Collaboration [100, 101] estimates that life expectancy of HIV infected 
individuals at the age of 20 is about two-thirds of that in the general population in each country 
and that overall, at the age of 35, life expectancy is 31.7. A recent analysis on mortality among 
all HIV-infected persons receiving care in Denmark [157] indicates a higher life expectancy but 
as noted by the authors, it is likely to be country specific.  In Portugal, according to INE [156] the 
general population life expectancy88
It should, nevertheless, be noted that mortality was estimated with data from both the CVEDT 
database, a national database of all registered HIV infections in Portugal, and the INE HIV 
mortality records. Discrepancies among sources indicate that the national database is either 
incomplete or not fully updated. Moreover, neither of those sources provides a link to clinical 
variables. Changes in the epidemiology of the disease (namely age of infection and transmission 
 at the age of 39 is 39.5, thus two-thirds would be 26.6, 
which is close to the 24.3 predicted by the model. The difference found is reasonable given the 
higher proportion of both IDUs and AIDS diagnosis (two factors associated with higher mortality 
rates) in our sample compared to the sample used in the ART Cohort Collaboration study. 
                                                          
87 If the individual is monitored on a regular basis, routine checkups will detect an increase in viral load above the expected level, 
before it has an impact on CD4+ cell count and, in that case, CD4+ cell count is not expected to decrease at virological failure. Such 
was assumed in the model, although, in practice, because patient do not always comply with the recommended follow-up scheme, 
CD4+ cell count will, in fact, decrease before virological failure is detected. Since such variation in CD4+ cell count was not modeled, 
it is estimated that CD4+ cell count will, on average, increase in all lines except in non-suppressive therapy. 
88 Weighted average according to the observed gender distribution of HIV infected individuals. 
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mode) are also likely to have a significant impact on mortality predictions. Life expectancy 
predicted by the model should, thus, be considered with caution. 
Of these 24 years, the microsimulation model predicts that an average of 9 years will be spent 
in first line. This value is identical to the predicted value obtained using a Markov model 
parameterized with the same CHC database [248], but it should be noted that while matching 
the data, the average time in first line with currently recommended regimens is perceived in 
general, by physicians, to be longer than 9 years. The estimated time in first line is significantly 
lower than that implied from the data published by Beck et al. [8], but their definition of end of 
line differs from ours89
We predict a 5 months difference in the average time spent in first line in the two groups, with 
favoring the 2NRTI+NNRTI option. Once again our results contrast with those of Beck et al. but 
coincide with those of  Geretti et al. [146] who uses a definition of failure identical to ours. The 
predicted average number of years spent in each subsequent line is decreasing in line number. 
This result is in accordance with the available literature [259, 260]. 
 so the results are not comparable.  
The total number of QALYs predicted by the model using estimates on a Portuguese sample is 
lower than the total number of QALYs predicted using Simpson et. al. [4] estimates.  A number 
of reasons could explain this result. In Simpson et al. estimates are presented for pairs of CD4 
and viral load, while only CD4 was considered in Catarino’s [238] estimates. Sample sizes are 
also significantly different, and one study uses clinical trial data while the other uses 
observational data. It may also be that HIV infected individuals in Portugal have a lower quality 
of life, for the same health status, than in other countries. While further research is need, 
namely in terms of obtaining results on a more representative and larger sample, the work 
developed by Catarino raises an important issue, of extreme relevant to cost-effectiveness 
analysis of HIV strategies.  
The total number of quality adjusted life years obtained using DCE estimates is significantly 
lower than QALY estimates obtained by standard methods. Non-health related factors affecting 
quality of life are likely to be the main source of the difference found. In the context of a 
disease, which is as much a “medical” condition as a “social” condition, restricting the economic 
evaluation to health related quality of life may lead to biased conclusions.  
                                                          
89 In Beck et al. failure was defined as  any change made to the ART containing regimen, which included intensification of regimen 
by adding any anti-retroviral drug to the regimen or swapping the NNRTI or a PI to another anti-retroviral drug class. changing. Our 
definition relates to virological failure. 
Economic Analysis in Health Care Regulation 
 
181 
 
Visible (identifiable by others) adverse events of ART, such as lipodystrophy, have an impact 
that goes beyond its clinical consequences, as it may, for example, decrease the probability of 
finding a job. Issues such as regimen simplification take a dimension beyond “convenience” if 
they reduce the probability of discrimination by facilitating adherence to ART without the 
embarrassing question of “why are you always taking pills?”.  
Certainly when considering HIV infection but also in other diseases, there is an urgent need for 
more research on how to account for non-health aspects in a framework that allows for 
comparison of resource allocation in different diseases. Meanwhile, quality adjusted life years 
based on DCE-based utilities may complement the information  provided by QALYs, when 
comparing alternative uses of resources devoted to HIV infection.  
The overall cost of treating an HIV infected individual from time of ART initiation to death is 
estimated to be 375,470€ in the 2NRTI+PI/r group and 7.5% less in the 2NRT+NNRTI group. 79% 
of the costs are ART drug costs. This 79% weight seems reasonable given the increasing weight 
of ART cost in the overall treatment cost of HIV infected individuals reported by Krentz et al. 
[261]. According to Krentz et al., this weight rose from 50% in 1996/97 (at the time HAART was 
introduced) to 70% in 2000/2001 (at the time PIs became available). The sources of direct cost 
of HIV care do, nonetheless, differ significantly by country (and CD4 cell count) as documented 
in the literature review by Levy et al. [262]. 
The predicted average annual cost of ART in first line is 9,010€ in the 2NRTI+NNRTI groups and 
23% higher in the 2NRTI+PI/r suggesting that the 11,040€ established in the HIV financing 
program for ART naïve individuals covers first line ART costs, although not first line total costs. It 
should also be noted that the analysis includes (less expensive) regimens no longer recommend 
as first choice drugs.  
Annual ART treatment cost is, as expected, increasing in therapy line, reflecting resistance 
development and the need for more expensive ART options90
In the present analysis, ART initiation with 2NRTI+NNRTI, when clinical viable, is a dominant or 
at least, equally effective cost-saving strategy compared to ART initiation with 2NRTI+PI/r. Two 
cost-effectiveness analyses have been performed comparing NNRT to PI/r as a third agent in the 
. Monitoring and treatment costs 
also increase in the therapy line, reflecting a need for more health care as the disease 
progresses. 
                                                          
90 As previously discussed, an exception occurs in non-suppressive therapy reflecting the likely underestimation of the current cost. 
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initial treatment of HIV-1 infected individuals91. Both studies, although performed in very 
distinct settings (Beck et al. in the United Kingdom [8] and Walensky et al.  [7] in Africa) find 
that initiation with 2NRTI+NNRTI, when clinically viable, is a dominant92
It should nonetheless be noted that the analysis, as those of Walensky et al. and Beck et al., was 
performed using data from a cohort of individuals whose regimens include antiretroviral drugs 
no longer recommended as a first choice (although, still significant  in clinical practice, 
according to IMS Health data 2011). This is certainly a limitation of our analysis.  
 option when compared 
to 2NRTI+PI/r and are thus in accordance with our results. 
Overall, the model predicts values close to those observed in the CHC sample from which the 
model was (for the most part) parameterized. Individual parameter values predicted by the 
model (such as, CD4+ cell count growth, % reaching viral suppression, first line duration, etc.) 
are also close to those published in the literature, when such comparison is possible to be 
performed. 
Developments in antiretroviral therapy have allowed for an increase in life expectancy among 
HIV infected individuals, as well a reduction of the morbidity associated with the disease. Such 
improvements are happening on a daily basis and it is important to have an instrument that will 
easily incorporate such progress, quantifying the costs and benefits associated to it. The goal of 
the present analysis was to create an instrument able to provide relevant information for an 
efficient use of resources devoted to HIV infection. 
The HIV therapy model is flexible enough to allow for analysis of small details, such as the 
impact of the daily regimen frequency, as well as more comprehensive approaches. In fact, the 
model has already been used or is currently being updated and improved to perform several 
distinct economic evaluation analyses, namely, cost-effectiveness of the initial NRTI pair, cost-
effectiveness of one adherence improving strategy and cost-effectiveness of early treatment. 
 
As with any model, the present model has limitations resulting from both the available data and 
assumptions made. The model may be improved on both dimensions and, in fact, as discussed 
                                                          
91 Ritcher et al. original model back in 2002, actually perform a similar analysis although the authors compare regimen sequences, 
rather that first line regimens. Regimens included in that analysis are obsolete and it assumes a 5 year time horizon.   
92 In the work by Beck et al. 2NRTI+NRTI is a dominant strategy in patients with CD4+ > 200 cell/µL. In patients with CD4+<200 
cell/µL 2NRTI+PI/r yields higher effectiveness but with an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio above that considered acceptable by 
the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE).  Walensky et al. find 2NRTI+NNRTI to be a dominant strategy even in 
areas of high prevalence of NNRTI resistance (up to 76%). 
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below, some of the limitations are already being address in a new version of the model under 
development.   
With respect to the data available, while all efforts have been made to parameterize the model 
with Portuguese data, it remains true that the sample used is not a nationally representative 
sample. Estimated results are based on two main sources of information: the CHC database and 
the LVHEM database. As previously discussed, the CHC database represents one Portuguese 
hospital, while the LVHEM represents an approximate national sample of HIV individuals: those 
who have been tested for resistance.  
Moreover, due to sample size restrictions, the complete observation period was utilized for 
estimation. This means that estimates obtained reflect clinical practice for the 2000-2008 
period. Due to rapid progress in HIV therapy, it is likely that a closer reflection of reality would 
be obtained with a larger sample in a more recent period. The underestimation of ART costs in 
non-suppressive patients is a relevant example; another is the proportion of zidovudine 
containing regimens in the CHC sample.  
When a national database with epidemiological, socio-demographic, therapeutic and clinically 
relevant information becomes available, the model should be re-parameterized. In the 
meanwhile, an approximation was obtained using the available databases and we are currently 
working on updating and improving the existing ones. 
With respect to the assumptions made and methodological approaches followed, there is 
certainly room for improvement. 
We have used a very simple approach to the estimation of CD4+ and viral load variation and we 
have not accounted for the correlation between the two in estimation. Following the literature, 
Johnston et al. [113] applied generalized additive models; an approach that is likely to provide a 
better fit to the data and avoid simplifying assumptions made in our model, such as the 
assumption that CD4+ remains constant while the individual is not suppressed, increasing only 
when viral suppression has been achieved.  
Moreover, the main drivers of the model (CD4+ cell count, viral load, resistance, adherence and 
socio-demographic characteristics) should be jointly modeled. In 2005, Brathwaite et al. [263] 
developed an individual simulation model incorporating adherence and the development of 
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antiretroviral resistance (from a biological approach93). The model was designed to predict the 
duration of effectiveness of treatment, and distinguish deaths attributable to HIV from deaths 
that are not attributable to HIV94
One additional limitation regarding resistance is that we have considered a single resistance 
score and, consequently, a single resistance event. There is evidence in the literature suggesting 
that the likelihood of resistance development (and more recently, the level of adherence 
required to avoid resistance development) is drug specific, or at least, drug class specific [148]. 
Separately modeling resistance to each class has the important advantage of allowing for the 
selection of the future ART regimens to be based on resistance history. Both Braithwaite et al.  
[263] and Johnston et al. [113] (although using different approaches) follow that path and we 
have also moved in that direction in the new version.  
. While not a cost-effectiveness model, this model is unique in 
that the adherence-resistance relationship estimated by the model is an emergent property of 
the underlying biological principles instantiated in the model, rather than resulting from 
particular a priori beliefs about the form of this relationship, or from a statistically modeled 
relationship between adherence and resistance. Viral load and CD4 paths, conditional on 
adherence and resistance level, were then estimated and validated on large clinical cohorts. 
Acknowledging the value of this more structural approach, we are incorporating it in the new 
version of our framework for cost-effectiveness analysis of HIV treatment in Portugal.   
We have assumed that a virological failure is immediately followed by a regimen switch. 
Although in theory such should be the case, in practice a significant lag is often observed in 
clinical practice95
                                                          
93 “At the start of the simulation, patients have “wild-type” HIV virus. With each passing day, combination therapies 
may give rise to HIV mutations by means of selection pressures on viral replication. Each HIV mutation may or may 
not result in resistance to one or more antiretroviral drugs. As resistance accrues, the viral replication rate increases, 
which in turn increases the probability that subsequent mutations will develop. Adherence, viral resistance, and other 
patient characteristics together determine the level of effectiveness of combination therapies, as manifested by 
changes in CD4 count and viral load. Adherence not only affects the extent to which combination therapies reduce 
viral replication, but it also directly affects the selection pressures for new mutations.” 
. If the regimen is switched immediately after virological failure, less resistance 
will development and the impact of a detectable viral load on CD4+ is less likely to occur. In our 
model we have, therefore, assumed CD4 does not decrease upon virological failure, but in 
clinical practice, this assumption may be unrealistic. If so, costs will be underestimated and 
94 The model, programmed in Decision Maker for Windows (Version Beta 0.99.11.12a, New Brunswick, NJ), was 
calibrated and validated using data from large clinical cohorts. A cohort of 10,000 antiretroviral-naive patients was 
simulated in the original article. Initial patients’ characteristics were identical but each patient proceeded through the 
model with a distinct clinical trajectory (determined by individual time-varying characteristics), reflecting the 
heterogeneity in actual patients. 
95 Work in progress by Dr. Ricardo Camacho  
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QALYs overestimated. In the new version of our framework, this issue has been corrected by 
including an event which is “physician appointment” and imposing that a regimen switch may 
only occur upon such event. 
Models such as CEPAC [109] focus on OI and complications, thereby extensively discriminating 
between different OIs and modeling, in detail, the relationship between clinical parameters and 
the probability of each OI. Our model is more in the spirit of that of Ritcher et al.  [110], 
focusing on potential impact of different durations of HIV treatment effectiveness and we, 
therefore, simplify in terms of OIs. Due to lack of data on OI and AIDS events in the CHC and 
LVHEM databases, we model inpatient care episodes (that is the consequence rather than the 
cause) and use data from May et al. [154, 155] to model an generic AIDS event.  An alternative 
approach to modeling AIDS events is to use the EuroSIDA risk score which has the advantage of 
depending on ART duration, socio-demographic characteristics and clinical parameters. 
 Progresses in treatment of HIV, namely the introduction of ART, has prolonged the 
asymptomatic period of the disease and reduced the incidence of OI in the symptomatic period 
[231]. In this context, adverse events of ART become at least as relevant as OIs. Drug toxicity is, 
currently, the most common reason for treatment discontinuation [144], and substitution of 
individual ART components to address adverse events is believed not to be associated with an 
increased risk of virologic failure. Accounting for the cause of regimen switch when performing 
cost-effectiveness analysis of HIV treatment has thus become an essential feature, but it is still 
not considered in several cost-effectiveness analysis recently published [264, 265]. In our 
model, as well as that of Kauf et al.  [111]96
Nonetheless, two limitations regarding adverse event modeling remain in our model. First, we 
did not have information on adverse events of ART. Consequently, it was assumed that, with a 
given probability (taken from the Swiss cohort), a regimen switch without virological failure was 
due to toxicity. We, thus, aggregate adverse events in a single event and link its frequency to 
regimen class through the frequency of regimen switch. When comparing specific drugs, this 
approach will not correctly fully capture differences in drugs’ toxicities.  Secondly, our model (as 
well as all others in the literature) does not explicitly model long-term safety. As infected 
individuals are living longer, the long-term impact of ART therapy is becoming more evident. 
Issues such as renal disease, cardiovascular risk and premature aging have an impact on both 
costs and QALYs, and will certainly require cost-effectiveness models to adapt to these new 
, the cause of regimen switch is accounted for.  
                                                          
96 Kauf et al. ADVANCE model is, in essence, Ritcher et al. model. 
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challenges [266]. While CD4 and viral load continue to be the main markers for disease 
progression, other clinical parameters will need to be modeled (lipid profile, creatinine, bone 
density, etc) and its consequences quantified.  
Our model considers four therapy lines. While it may be argued that after two virological 
failures individuals have similar characteristics with respect to disease progression, allowing for 
more therapy lines (as in Kauf et al. [111]) would permit a clearer evaluation of actions affecting 
the subset of HIV infected individuals.  The consequences of our simplification are thus more 
pronounced when evaluating treatment strategies for experienced patients. 
Individual characteristics considered in our model are in line with those of other currently 
available models. Nonetheless, the application of the model to the cost-effectiveness of 
2NRTI+NNRTI versus 2NRTI+PI/r has raised the question on whether we are accounting for all 
relevant characteristics. In the sample of naïve to ART individuals used for that analysis, 
essentially no difference was found in baseline characteristics of each group. Nonetheless, this 
individuals were not randomized, which suggests that relevant characteristics (behind the 
assignment to one or the other group) are not being considered.  
Our model was developed in TreeAge®. This software is inexpensive and may be considered 
user-friendly. Nonetheless, experience has shown us that for extensive model utilization, it may 
not be the most adequate software. We have faced significant problems with both the random 
number generator (for example, when randomly sampling we often obtain 10 identical values – 
up to Microsof Excel® precision) and unwarned /unexplained crashes (which force program 
shut-down and imply a return to a previous version of the model). The new version of the 
framework for cost-effectiveness analysis of HIV is being developed in AnyLogic®, which seems 
to avoid those problems but is far from being user-friendly, since it requires extensive Java 
coding. 
We finalize this discussion on the limitations of the model by looking at the big picture in terms 
of future research, and in the context of providing an instrument to support Health Policy 
decisions regarding HIV infection. In doing so, we point out to three essential, but for the most 
part, unexplored topics, which are not covered in our model. 
The first concerns the infectious nature of the disease. There is an increasing awareness of HIV 
infection as a public health matter fomented, namely, by the acknowledged preventive role of 
ART among infected individuals [249] and, most recently, when used as pre-exposure 
prophylaxis (PrEP)  prevention [267]. Infectious disease models are commonly used in 
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epidemiology to model the epidemiological impact of interventions. Since these interventions 
consume scarce healthcare resources, decision makers are increasingly interested in combining 
such models with pharmacoeconomic techniques in order to investigate whether or not 
interventions provide good value for the resources invested [268]. Johnston et al. [113] 
provides an excellent example of the need to account for avoided transmission due to ART 
when determining the benefits of access to ART in British Columbia and Aragão et al. [269] 
provide evidence that early ART initiation may be cost saving when the transmission is reduced 
due to earlier suppression of HIV infected individuals. 
The second concern the perspective adopted in cost-effectiveness analysis. While data on 
indirect costs of HIV infection are not readily available and especially difficult to obtain given 
the social implications of the disease, a most recent (May 2011) analysis performed on behalf of 
the National Coordination for HIV/AIDS infection [270] provides evidence of the non-negligible 
impact of HIV infection on labor conditions.  
The third concerns the need for structural models in HIV.  In a recent review of mathematical 
models of HIV/AIDS interventions and their implications for policy, Johnson et al.  [271] list 
numerous areas where such models may be of use to policy makers. Since structural models, 
where behavioral changes associated with each intervention is explicitly considered, are 
required to account for the full impact of health policy interventions, this will certainly be an 
area of prominent research.  
 
 
 
Although the number of new diagnosis reported to the Communicable Diseases and 
Epidemiological Surveillance Center is decreasing97
The goal of the present analysis was to create an instrument able to provide relevant 
information for an efficient use of resources devoted to HIV infection in Portugal. While more 
, the trend on new infections is unknown. 
Overall, a significant and increasing amount of resources is used to prevent, treat and improve 
life expectancy and quality of life of HIV infected individuals in Portugal. In such context, it is 
important to have an instrument able to quantify the tradeoff between costs and benefits 
associated with resource allocation decisions.  
                                                          
97 Both in terms of the number of notifications each year and in terms of new diagnoses notified in the year of diagnose. 
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tasteful ingredients will result in a tastier meal, the recipe has value on its own. The instrument 
developed is able to reproduce the patterns observed in the data available, innovating not only 
in terms of the methodology used but also in terms of being an in depth readily available 
instrument to support resource allocations within the context of the National Program for 
Prevention and Control of the HIV/AIDS Infection.  
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5. Overall conclusion 
 
In this dissertation we reinforce the need for context specific pre-analysis of the impact of 
health care regulation. Through a series of essays applied to distinct areas of health economics, 
we aim at analyzing issues of relevance in the national context. While research has value of its 
own no matter the country at focus, we believe it to be important to contribute to the 
(relatively) less abundant research in, or relevant to, the Portuguese context.  
The first chapter focuses on health insurance in the United States, where private health 
insurance plays a major role financing healthcare, learning from their experience will allow us to 
be better prepared for the already growing weight of private health insurance in Portugal. It is 
estimated that 2 million people had a private health insurance health plan in Portugal in 2009 
[33] and access to private health care services has tripled in the last 30 years98
In Chapter 2 we transpose the ideas developed in the first chapter to a distinct sector which we 
analyze with national data. We believe that this approach is valuable; the ability to apply 
existing concepts to different settings and contexts extents the utility and benefit from the 
already established knowledge. By building on the product survival literature, we provided 
evidence of price regulation as a determinant to product withdrawal thus suggesting that a 
more in-depth analysis should be performed in order to estimate the welfare impact of such 
regulation and possible alternatives to the current price regulation in the pharmaceutical 
market in Portugal. 
. Our analysis 
suggests that there are potential efficiency gains to be obtained by adequate regulation of this 
growing subsector. Namely, we find that adequate pricing and premium payment system 
regulation are likely to draw sounder bases in which the sector may grow. 
Chapter 3 draws attention to the role of economic evaluation as a support instrument for 
regulation in the health sector. By expressing results in a “common unit” (the incremental cost 
per QALY or per life year) economic evaluation is a useful instrument for efficient resource 
allocation. While a theoretical, long lasting and valuable discussion goes on as to whether the 
incremental cost per QALY is the adequate measure, truth is decisions are being made based on 
such an indicator. In such context, cost-effectiveness framework of HIV treatment may not be 
the ultimate instrument but it is certainly a necessary and useful one. Chapter 3 provides a 
                                                          
98 Diário de Notícias, June 13th, 2009. http://dn.sapo.pt/inicio/portugal/interior.aspx?content_id=1306442 
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model, general enough to allow, among others, for comparison of antiretroviral treatment 
options, of different cut-offs for treatment initiation or of different adherence promoting 
strategies. Parameterized with observational data, this framework provides a global picture for 
decision makers, highlighting reality beyond clinical trials. Cohort data is crucial to correct 
factors that are overestimated in clinical trial settings, such as adherence.  
As a whole, we believe that the work developed is able to emphasize relevance of economic 
analysis as an adequate and supportive instrument for health care regulation. Moreover, it 
underlines the broad spectrum of such analysis. We built our evidence on three approaches: a 
theoretical model, a reduced-form econometric analysis and an economic evaluation 
framework. These distinct methodologies, regardless of respective advantages and limitations, 
provide relevant and valuable information for decision makers. 
It contributes to the existing literature in two main aspects. First, in each chapter, we have 
attempted to move one small step forward in terms of methodology either by developing a new 
model, by gathering statistical methods from different research areas within health economics 
or improving on the existing modeling approaches. Secondly, we have focused on relevant 
issues in the Portuguese context with an effort to provide information on country specific data. 
Lack of national data is a long lasting and recognized problem in Portugal which limits the 
country’s ability to understand its reality, act upon evidence and define preventive strategies.  
Nonetheless our efforts, it was not our intention to create an all-embracing and global solution 
to any of the problems analyzed. Health policy decision requires even more in-depth analysis, 
namely, dynamic equilibrium models. This occurs because, as noted by Lucas back in 1976  
[272], regression coefficients are unlikely to remain constant when the policy regime changes 
substantially because agent behavior changes in response. Thus, for policy analysis, it is 
necessary to use structural models, on both the demand and supply side, with "deep" 
parameters and behavioral rules (such as value maximization) that are unlikely to change when 
the policy regime changes.  
That was not our goal either. The purpose of this research work was to highlight the relevance 
of health economics as a support instrument for the regulator role most would agree the 
Government should have in the Health sector. As in any other aspect of life, the ability to 
anticipate the impact of current and future actions helps us make the correct choices or at 
least, helps us make an informed guesses about what the right choices are, given the 
information available. 
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Although imbedded in a common goal, this dissertation is composed of three essays. It is 
therefore of relevance to discuss the main findings, the relation to the existing literature, the 
limitations and pointers to future work within the context of each essay. We dedicate the 
remaining of this section to such chapter specific discussion.  
Death Spirals, Switching Costs, and Health Premium Payment Systems  
The existing insurance market literature has generally modeled equilibrium patterns of adverse 
selection without trying to model the dynamics of health plan entry and exit while in the 
non-health literature, a variety of models examine dynamic pricing strategies with switching 
costs. We develop a model of health plan competition and pricing in order to understand the 
dynamics of health plan entry and exit, in the presence of switching costs and alternative health 
premium payment systems. 
Several empirical published papers support the idea of death spiral, biased selection and 
switching costs in the health insurance market [23-29, 31]. Pauly et al. [30], on the other hand, 
argue that the phenomenon interpreted as death spiral may instead be an adjustment towards 
more preferred products which would have occurred even in the absence of adverse selection. 
Our model provides a rational for death spirals even in the presence of identical plans. 
We use the model to simulate how premium cost sharing schemes, risk-adjustment policies and 
the imposition of price floors, affects entry and exit, as well as health plan pricing and enrollee 
choice patterns. These simulations allow for several insights. First, plan deaths impose much 
higher switching costs than those generated by voluntary switches, since higher prices induce 
the lowest switching cost enrollees to switch plans, while plan deaths force those with the 
highest switching costs to involuntarily change plans. Second, in the presence of switching 
costs, cost sharing is potentially harmful because it increases plans' market power. Third, by 
contradicting the forces driving prices up (i.e., the increase in costs due a deterioration of the 
mix of enrollees), risk adjustment creates the right incentives for plans not to follow a death 
spiral pattern. This result is in line with the recently published analysis on the determinants of 
plan switching by Cutler et al. [25]. By slowing down death spirals, risk adjustment also 
decreases switching costs, thus increasing consumers’ welfare with no impact on profits.  
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Among our most interesting findings is the possibility that, a first period price floor strategy, can 
potentially be welfare improving. In our simulations, price floors were found to be extremely 
effective at reducing switching costs.  
We are perfectly aware of the fact that our simple model may not capture many relevant 
aspects and certainly the model we built is limited in a number of ways that could be relaxed 
and studied in future research. The first, is that it assumes the same (uniform) distribution of 
switching costs for healthy and sick enrollees. Second, we focus on the simple case in which 
there are only two types of consumers, healthy and sick, whereas in the real world there are a 
continuum of types, with different demand responsiveness and treatment costs. Third, we 
focus on the case in which plans are all identical, and the only switching cost is a fixed cost for 
changing plans.  An alternative framework, that might be interesting to contemplate, is one that 
is closer to a matching model, in which consumers derive utility each period that depends on 
the quality of their match with a health plan. Finally, there is no moral hazard problem in our 
paper, and plans do not explicitly adopt strategies to affect health plan choices other than 
through pricing. If service distortion and/or explicit dumping are permitted, it would clearly 
change the optimal pricing, entry, and exit decisions. 
Price Regulation and Product Survival in the Portuguese Pharmaceutical 
Market 
The aim of the analysis in Chapter 2 was to understand whether price control measures have an 
impact on product life-cycle. While novel product introductions are expected to have a positive 
welfare impact due to therapeutic improvements, replacement of existing products carries 
costs to society (switching costs, marketing costs and licensing costs) with little or no benefit to 
consumers.  
In 2000, Danzon and Chao [54] find evidence of lack of competition among manufactures of the 
same compound found in more regulated markets. In interpreting the results, the authors 
suggest that price regulation, by driving down real prices over time and consequently creating 
an incentive for manufacturers to introduce me-too products, may be an explanation for 
observed lack of competition. Our analysis supports that interpretation by finding evidence that 
indeed price control measures influence the decision of product withdrawal and consequently 
may have an impact on turnover rates in the pharmaceutical market. Moreover, we do not find 
evidence of such effect in the non-prescription drug market where price control rules are not 
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present. This result may partially explain the increased hazard rate of prescription drugs versus 
over-the-counter drugs estimated by Cardoso [49]. 
In our analysis of the determinants of product withdrawal, we account for unobservable 
characteristics which influence perceived quality. By including preferences for observable and 
unobservable characteristics when constructing indexes of quality, regulation and competition 
we not only improve on the existing product survival literature but also provide further 
evidence of the impact of price regulation on product withdrawal. 
While only a dynamic structural model of entry would allow for a full understanding of the 
impact of price regulation measure or any given health policy, the analysis here performed 
provides empirical evidence on the fact that indeed price control measures have an impact on 
product withdrawal and may thus lead to higher turnover rates. We also find quality to be a 
major determinant of higher survival rates, reinforcing the value of controlling for (observed 
and unobserved) quality when analyzing determinants of survival. 
Given the fact that Cardoso [49] performs an analysis of the determinants of product exit in the 
Portuguese pharmaceutical market and that part of their analysis is performed in the 1996-
2003 period which almost coincides with ours (1997-2003), it is of special interest to compare 
results obtained. In doing so, it should be noted that not only the focus of the analysis but also 
the methodology and the datasets used diverge. A major difference is that price and quantity 
information in which most of our explanatory variables were constructed were not available in 
their analysis. Even so, it is worth noting that comparable results obtained in the two analyses 
do not contradict each other. 
We find that the number of similar99
We do not find a statistically significant effect of the number of own firm products in the 
market segment (ATC3) on the exiting probability but we do find that quality differentiation 
among those products has, as expected, a protective effect on the probability of withdrawal 
while a broadening of quality spectrum covered by the firm increases the hazard rate. If similar 
products were synonymous to identical quality, these results would be in contrast with those of 
 products (owned by the firm or competitors) reduces the 
probability of exit while the number of competitors (similar or close substitutes) in the same 
market segment (ATC3) does not have a statistically significant impact on the hazard rate. These 
results are in line with those obtained by Cardoso [49].  
                                                          
99 Defined as having the same ICD, dosage and pharmaceutical form. These are named “identical” in Cardoso analysis. 
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Cardoso, who estimates that (own firm) similar products have a hazard ratio lower than one 
while (own firm) close substitutes have a hazard ratio higher than one.  
Our analysis and that of Cardoso estimate a protective effect of firm size on product exit and an 
increased hazard in the 2001-2002 period of major regulatory changes. 
The analysis in Chapter 2 has several limitations. First, in terms of data, we have a short span 
with data on an annual basis. Such structure limits the ability to evaluate product replacement, 
since gaps between exit and entry may exist due to licensing (and reimbursement) timings. Félix 
et al. [85] report a median of 10 months for reimbursement requests processes in Portugal in 
2007 after the licensing process has been completed, which itself will take months. The period 
of analysis (1997-2003) is also not ideal for the analysis of the phenomenon under study since 
several confounding factors occurred simultaneously, namely, new regulation on generic 
products which led to a substantial increase in the number of entries unrelated to the 
phenomenon at stake [36, 37, 49]. 
Second, in the pharmaceutical market, physicians act as patients’ agents and, for the most part, 
select the products to be consumed by patients. Demand for pharmaceutical is thus a mixture 
of physicians’ and patients’ preferences. While estimating demand parameters it would be of 
interest to recover both sets of preferences but with the data available only the mixed bundle 
was estimated. Moreover, the fact that physicians’ act as patient agents aggravates the issue of 
unit demand usually assumed in the demand for differentiated products literature, since the 
same bundles are more likely to be repeated [75]. Furthermore, demand for pharmaceuticals in 
inherently dynamic in the sense that a consumer who buys (a physician who prescribes) 
product j today is more likely to buy (to prescribe) product j tomorrow. 
Third, dynamic effects are also present on the supply side and products’ entry and exit decisions 
are based on multiproduct firms, who optimize their portfolio over time. None of these issues 
were accounted for in the present analysis. Only a dynamic structural model would allow for a 
full understanding of the impact of any given health policy and that is beyond the scope of the 
present paper. Further research is thus necessary not only to estimate the welfare impact of 
such turnover (when switching costs, licensing costs and marketing costs are taken into 
consideration) but also to develop a model where alternative price regulation policies may be 
compared. While not explicitly accounting for switching costs, within a behavioral dynamic 
equilibrium model, Filson [86] estimates the welfare impact of price controls in the 
pharmaceutical industry arguing that removing price controls increases firm value, research and 
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development, the flow of new drugs, and consumer welfare globally, but reduces consumer 
welfare in the countries changing their policies. 
A Framework for Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of HIV Treatment in 
Portugal 
Although the number of new diagnosis reported to the Communicable Diseases and 
Epidemiological Surveillance Center is on a decreasing trend, the trend on new infections is 
unknown. Overall, a significant and increasing amount of resources is used to prevent, treat and 
improve life expectancy and quality of life of HIV infected individuals in Portugal. In such 
context, it is important to have an instrument able to quantify the tradeoff between costs and 
benefits associated with resource allocation decisions. The goal of the analysis in Chapter 3 was 
thus to create an instrument able to provide relevant information for an efficient use of 
resources devoted to HIV infection in Portugal.  
We are confident that microsimulation model is the most adequate approach for cost-
effectiveness analysis of HIV treatment and likely the one to prevail in the future research in 
HIV infection. Three most recent articles published on broad cost-effectiveness issues relating 
to HIV such as routine screening [273], expanding access to HAART [113] or HIV testing referral 
strategies [274] make use of microsimulation models. Moreover, Lamontagne et al. [275] point 
out the availability of microsimulation models as a promising path towards the current 
evaluation of the macroeconomic impact of HIV. 
The instrument developed is able to reproduce the patterns observed in the data available, 
innovating not only in terms of the methodology used but also in terms of being an in depth 
readily available instrument to support resource allocations within the context of the National 
Program for Prevention and Control of the HIV/AIDS Infection.  
Moreover, the results obtained in the model application example – the cost-effectiveness 
analysis of 2NRTI+NNRTI versus 2NRTI+PI/r as a first line antiretroviral therapy regimen are in 
line with those obtained by Walensky et al.  [7] in Africa and Beck et al. [8] in the United 
Kingdom. All three analysis reinforce the British HIV Association 2008 [9] recommendations, 
NNRTIs are explicitly recommended as third agent of choice for treatment naïve patients unless 
clinical factors (such as resistance) prevent such option. 
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In developing the framework for cost-effectiveness analysis of HIV treatment, it was our goal 
that the model could effectively be used to support regulatory decisions, namely 
complementing the clinical evaluation of the options available provided by guidelines. As such, 
we hope the framework will, in the future, be available to both the medical community and the 
National Coordination for HIV/AIDS Infection for any analysis of national relevance.  
The optimal timing for therapy initiation, in terms of CD4 cell count, is an issue under debate 
[276-278] and given the limitation of the Markov model approach followed in our previous 
work [248], we are currently working on applying the microsimulation discrete events model 
here developed to a cost-effectiveness analysis of early treatment initiation.  
We are also using it to estimate the cost-effectiveness of adherence improvement. The four 
papers published on the cost-effectiveness of adherence or adherence interventions [279-282] 
indicate that strategies to improve adherence in developed countries are cost-effective 
(although not cost saving). Nonetheless, results depend highly on the effectiveness of the 
interventions effectiveness and associated costs, the epidemiology parameters and surely, on 
country specific clinical practice and costs.  Moreover, there is an ongoing debate on the 
required level of adherence to obtain maximal benefits from currently available drugs which 
has not been included in previous studies. The debate is based on the fact that clinical trials’ 
levels of adherence are not observed in real life and yet viral suppression is maintained thereby 
suggesting that the assumed 95% threshold may no longer be required given the developments 
in antiretroviral therapy [147]. 
As with any model, the framework developed in Chapter 3 has several limitations. The first 
limitation refers to the data available, namely, the need for make use of several unlinked 
databases, the non-representativeness of the CHC dataset and an analysis period from 2000 to 
2008 which, due to rapid progress in HIV therapy, may no longer reflect current practice.  The 
second limitation concerns simplifying assumptions made, such as a single (non-class specific) 
resistance event and the abstraction from long-term safety issues. The third limitation relates to 
its unaccountability for the infectious nature of the disease, which may only be fully captured 
by an epidemiological module. The last, but certainly not least limitation, of the model concerns 
the fact the present model is, by no means, a sufficient instrument for health policy analysis, 
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because evaluating the impact of most health policy interventions requires a structural model 
where behavioral changes associated with each intervention are accounted for100
Given these limitations, pointers to further research include (i) obtaining nationally 
representative cohort data for model validation or, at the least, updating the existing 
databases, (ii) explicitly modeling the selection of the components of next regimen based on 
the reason for switching and the development of resistance based on viral replication and 
adherence and (iii) accounting for antiretroviral therapy long-term safety issues, (iv) developing 
an epidemiological model to be merged to the present framework, and (v) reprogramming it in 
a more adequate software. These small steps forward are already under way. The ultimate goal 
is to move from a regression-based approach to a structural one where the welfare impact of 
HIV related health policies may indeed be evaluated.  
. 
 
 
The research work here developed aimed at highlighting the relevance of health economics as a 
support instrument for Governmental regulation in the Health sector. It drew attention to 
potential and future problems that may be averted through proper regulation; it identified 
potential problems with current regulatory options, and generated a usable instrument to 
support management decisions within one disease area.  While certainly a small step in a long 
path, this dissertation will have served its purpose if it inspires others to perform, produce or 
make use of more and better economic analysis aiming towards more efficient health 
regulation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
100 For example, it may happen that less discrimination changes the mixing pattern, in terms of sexual activity, between infected and 
non-infected individuals, which in turn will have an effect on the number of new infections and thus on costs and effectiveness of a 
given “anti-discrimination policy”. 
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Appendix I 
Proof on the Expressions for Healthy and Sick 
Claim: 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 ≡ �
𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡
𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
� = �
𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝑁𝑁₁
𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1{𝑀𝑀₁ + [1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1]𝑁𝑁₁}
� 
Remark: 𝑓𝑓₁ ≡ 𝐹𝐹₁ ≡ 1;𝑓𝑓𝑇𝑇+1 ≡ 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇+1 ≡ 0  
Proof: 
�𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
� = �
𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1
𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−1)
� <=> 
�𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
� =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡ 𝑊𝑊 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀
�
𝑊𝑊 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�
𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 �
𝑊𝑊 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�
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𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−2�
𝑊𝑊 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�
𝑊𝑊 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�
𝑘𝑘 �
𝑊𝑊 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�
𝑊𝑊 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�
𝑘𝑘(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−2) + 𝑠𝑠 �
𝑊𝑊 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�
𝑊𝑊 −𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�
𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−2��⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
<=> 
�𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
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⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡ 𝑊𝑊 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀
�
𝑊𝑊 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�
𝑘𝑘2𝑘𝑘2𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−2
𝑊𝑊− 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�
𝑊𝑊 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�
𝑘𝑘2(𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−2)⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
<=> 
�𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
� =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡ 𝑊𝑊 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀
�
𝑊𝑊 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−3 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�
𝑘𝑘3𝑘𝑘3𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−3
𝑊𝑊− 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�
𝑊𝑊 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−3 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�
𝑘𝑘3{𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−3 + 𝑠𝑠(𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−3 + 𝑘𝑘𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−3 + 𝑘𝑘2𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡−3)}⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
<=> 
Recursively substituting up to period 1 results in: 
�𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
� =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎡ 𝑊𝑊 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀
�
𝑊𝑊
𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝑁𝑁1
𝑊𝑊− 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�
𝑊𝑊
𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1{𝑀𝑀1 + 𝑠𝑠(1 + 𝑘𝑘 + 𝑘𝑘2 + ⋯+ 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−2)𝑁𝑁1}⎦
⎥
⎥
⎤
<=> 
�𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
� = � 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘
𝑡𝑡−1𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝑁𝑁1
𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1{𝑀𝑀1 + [1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1]𝑁𝑁1}
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Proof on the Cumulative Probability of Not Switching 
Claim:   𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 ≡ ∏ 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖=1 =
𝑊𝑊−𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�
𝑊𝑊
 
Switching costs 𝑤𝑤 ∼ 𝑈𝑈[0,1] and consumers will switch if 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 > 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀� + 𝑤𝑤 
 
Thus, the probability of not switching in period 𝑡𝑡, considering that they did not switch in the 
previous period is:  
𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�����|𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖−1��������) = 𝑃𝑃�𝑤𝑤 > 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�|𝑤𝑤 > 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�� =
𝑊𝑊 − �𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀��
𝑊𝑊 − �𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀��
 
So,  
𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 = �𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�����|𝑆𝑆𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖−1��������)
𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖=2
=
𝑊𝑊 −𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�
𝑊𝑊−𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�
𝑊𝑊−𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�
𝑊𝑊−𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�
…
𝑊𝑊 −𝑃𝑃2 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�
𝑊𝑊
=
𝑊𝑊 −𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�
𝑊𝑊
 
 
Proof of the Average Cost Expression 
Claim:    𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 =
𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝑁𝑁1+𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 �𝑀𝑀1+�1−𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1�𝑁𝑁1�
𝑁𝑁1+𝑀𝑀1
,∀𝑡𝑡=2,…,𝑇𝑇  
Proof: 
𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 =
𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁t + 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀Mt
𝑁𝑁t + 𝑀𝑀t
=
𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁(𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝑁𝑁1) + 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀(𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1{𝑀𝑀1 + [1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1]𝑁𝑁1})
𝑁𝑁t + 𝑀𝑀t
 
<=> 𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 =
𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1[𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝑁𝑁1 + 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀1 + [1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1]𝑁𝑁1)]
𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1[𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝑁𝑁1 + (𝑀𝑀1 + [1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1]𝑁𝑁1)]
 
<=> 𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 =
[𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝑁𝑁1 + 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀1 + [1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1]𝑁𝑁1)]
[𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝑁𝑁1 + (𝑀𝑀1 + [1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1]𝑁𝑁1)]
 
<=> 𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 =
[𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝑁𝑁1 + 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀1 + [1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1]𝑁𝑁1)]
𝑁𝑁1 + 𝑀𝑀1
 
 
Economic Analysis in Health Care Regulation 
 
217 
 
 
Proof of 𝑵𝑵𝟏𝟏∗  
Claim:  𝑁𝑁1∗ =
1
(1−𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘)∑ 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∗𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1
  
Proof:  
𝑁𝑁1 = 𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸 + 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆 + 𝑉𝑉𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆 
<=> N1 = 1 + klNt + �𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡Ft(1− ft+1)N1 <=>
𝑇𝑇−1
𝑡𝑡=1
1 + kTlTFTN1
+ �𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡Ft(1− ft+1)N1 <=>
𝑇𝑇−1
𝑡𝑡=1
 
<=> N1 = 1 + �𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡Ft(1− ft+1)N1 <=>
𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡=1
1 + kTlTFTN1 + �𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡Ft(1− ft+1)N1 <=>
𝑇𝑇−1
𝑡𝑡=1
 
<=> N1∗ =
1
1 − ∑ 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡(Ft∗ − Ft+1∗ )𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1
<=> N1∗ =
1
1 − {k0l0F1∗ + ∑ (𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 − 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1)Ft∗𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1 }
 
<=> N1∗ =
1
∑ (𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 − 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1)Ft∗𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1
 
Note that:   𝑁𝑁1∗ =
1
(1−𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘)∑ 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∗𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1
⇒ 𝑁𝑁∗ = 1(1−𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘) 
Proof of 𝑴𝑴𝟏𝟏∗  
Claim:  𝑀𝑀1∗ =
𝑁𝑁1∗ ∑ �𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡�1−𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡�−𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1�1−𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1��𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∗𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1
(1−𝑘𝑘)∑ 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∗𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1
 
 
Proof: 
𝑀𝑀1 = 𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘 + 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇 + �(𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 + 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖)(1 − 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖+1)
𝑇𝑇−1
𝑖𝑖=1
 
<=> 𝑀𝑀1 = 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇{𝑀𝑀1 + [1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇−1]𝑁𝑁1} + 𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇−1𝑁𝑁1
+ �(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡{𝑀𝑀1 + [1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇−1]𝑁𝑁1} + 𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝑁𝑁1)(1− 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1)
𝑇𝑇−1
𝑡𝑡=1
 
Economic Analysis in Health Care Regulation 
 
218 
 
<=> 𝑀𝑀1 = 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇{𝑀𝑀1 + [1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇−1 + 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇−1]𝑁𝑁1}
+ �𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡(𝑀𝑀1 + [1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1]𝑁𝑁1 + 𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝑁𝑁1)(𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 − 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1)
𝑇𝑇−1
𝑡𝑡=1
 
<=> 𝑀𝑀1 = 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇{𝑀𝑀1 + [1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇]𝑁𝑁1} + �𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡(𝑀𝑀1 + [1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡]𝑁𝑁1)(𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 − 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1)
𝑇𝑇−1
𝑖𝑖=1
 
<=> 𝑀𝑀1 = 𝑁𝑁1 �𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇(1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇−1) + �𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡(1− 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡)(𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 − 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1)
𝑇𝑇−1
𝑖𝑖=1
� + 𝑀𝑀1 �𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇 + �𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡(𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 − 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1)
𝑇𝑇−1
𝑖𝑖=1
� 
𝑀𝑀1∗ =
𝑁𝑁1∗�𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇∗𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇(1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇−1) + ∑ 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡(1− 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡)(𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∗ − 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1∗ )𝑇𝑇−1𝑖𝑖=1 �
�1− 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇∗𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇 − ∑ 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡(𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∗ − 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1∗ )𝑇𝑇−1𝑖𝑖=1 �
 
<=> 𝑀𝑀1∗
=
𝑁𝑁1∗�𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇∗𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇(1− 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇) + �−𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇−1(1− 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇−1)𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇∗ +∑ [𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡(1− 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡)− 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1(1− 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1)]𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∗𝑇𝑇−1𝑖𝑖=1 ��
�1− 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇∗𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇 − �1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇−1𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇∗ +∑ (𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 − 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1)𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∗𝑇𝑇−1𝑖𝑖=1 ��
 
<=> 𝑀𝑀1∗
=
𝑁𝑁1∗�𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇∗𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇(1− 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇) + �−𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇−1(1− 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇−1)𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇∗ +∑ [𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡(1− 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡)− 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1(1− 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1)]𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∗𝑇𝑇−1𝑖𝑖=1 ��
�1− 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇∗𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇 − �1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇−1𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇∗ +∑ (𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 − 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1)𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∗𝑇𝑇−1𝑖𝑖=1 ��
 
<=> 𝑀𝑀1∗ =
𝑁𝑁1∗�𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇∗[𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇(1− 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇) − 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇−1(1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇−1)] + ∑ [𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡(1− 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡)− 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1(1− 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1)]𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∗𝑇𝑇−1𝑖𝑖=1 �
�−𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇∗𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇 + 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇−1𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇∗ + ∑ (𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡)𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∗𝑇𝑇−1𝑖𝑖=1 �
 
 
<=> 𝑀𝑀1∗ =
𝑁𝑁1∗�𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇∗[𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇(1− 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇) − 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇−1(1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇−1)] + ∑ [𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡(1− 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡)− 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1(1− 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1)]𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∗𝑇𝑇−1𝑖𝑖=1 �
�𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇∗(𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇−1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇) + ∑ (𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡)𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∗𝑇𝑇−1𝑖𝑖=1 �
 
<=> 𝑀𝑀1∗ =
𝑁𝑁1∗ ∑ [𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡(1− 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡)− 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1(1− 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1)]𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∗𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖=1
∑ (𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡)𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∗𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖=1
 
Note that:   𝑀𝑀1∗ =
𝑁𝑁1∗ ∑ �𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡�1−𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡�−𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1�1−𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1��𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∗𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1
(1−𝑘𝑘)∑ 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡∗𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1
⇒ 𝑀𝑀∗ = 𝑘𝑘
1−𝑘𝑘
− 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘(1−𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘) 
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Proof of Optimal 𝑷𝑷𝒕𝒕 
Claim: 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 =
(𝑊𝑊+𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀� )
2
+ 𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
2
 
Proof: Because of the simplification made to the model, profit in any period 𝑡𝑡 = 2, . . . ,𝑇𝑇 does 
not depend on any past period prices. Therefore, maximizing Πt  yields the same result as 
maximizing  ∑ Πi𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖=𝑡𝑡  , so the problem resumes to static maximization. For 𝑡𝑡 = 2, . . . ,𝑇𝑇 
Πt = (𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁)𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 + (𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀)𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 − 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 
<=> Πt = (𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁)
𝑊𝑊 −𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�
𝑊𝑊
𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝑁𝑁1
+ (𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀)
𝑊𝑊 −𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�
𝑊𝑊
𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1(𝑀𝑀1 + (1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1)𝑁𝑁1) − 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 
<=> Πt = �−𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡2 + 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡�𝑊𝑊 − 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀� + 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁� − 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁�𝑊𝑊 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀���
𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝑁𝑁1
𝑊𝑊
+ �−𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡2 + 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡�𝑊𝑊 − 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀� + 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀� − 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀�𝑊𝑊 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀���
𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊𝑊
(𝑀𝑀1 + (1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1)𝑁𝑁1)
− 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 
<=> Πt =
𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊𝑊 �
−𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡2[𝑁𝑁1 + 𝑀𝑀1]
+ 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡��𝑊𝑊 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀��(𝑁𝑁1 + 𝑀𝑀1) + 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝑁𝑁1 + 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀1 + (1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1)𝑁𝑁1)�
− �𝑊𝑊 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀��[𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1𝑁𝑁1 + 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀(𝑀𝑀1 + (1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1)𝑁𝑁1)]�  − 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 
<=> Πt =
𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊𝑊 �
−𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡2[𝑁𝑁1 +𝑀𝑀1] + 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ��𝑊𝑊 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀��(𝑁𝑁1 + 𝑀𝑀1) +
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡�
𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1
� − �𝑊𝑊 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀��
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡�
𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1�
 
− 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 
<=> Πt =
𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊𝑊
(𝑁𝑁1 + 𝑀𝑀1)�−𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡2 + 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡�𝑊𝑊 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�� + 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 − �𝑊𝑊 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀��𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡� − 𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶 
ϑΠt
ϑPt
= 0 <=>
𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡−1
𝑊𝑊
(𝑁𝑁1 + 𝑀𝑀1)�−2𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡2 + �𝑊𝑊 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀�� + 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡� = 0 
<=> 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 =
�𝑊𝑊 + 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀��
2
+
𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
2
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Proof of Optimal Profit Expression 
 Claim:   ∏ =

	

 + + − 

−  
Proof: 
 
Proof of the Optimal Entry Price 
Claim: =  +
∑  !"
#$%
− 
&
∑ '()( + − 
*
+  
Proof:  Bertrand competition prior to entry forces ∑ '(∏*+ = 0 so: 
 
Πt =
lt−1M1 + N1
W
P t P1 + W + AC t − P1 + W AC t − P t
2 − FC
⇔ Πt =
lt−1M1 + N1
W
W + P1
2
+
AC t
2
P1 + W + AC t − P1 + W AC t −
P1 + W
2
+
AC t
2
2
− FC
⇔ Πt =
lt−1M1 + N1 
W
1
2
P1 + W + AC t
2
− P1 + W AC t − 14
P1 + W + AC t
2
− FC
⇔ Πt =
lt−1M1 + N1 
W
1
4λ
P1 + W + AC t
2
− P1 + W AC t − FC
⇔ Πt =
lt−1M1 + N1
4W
P1 + W − AC t
2
− FC
Π1 +
T
t=2
∑ ρt−1Πt = 0
⇔ P1 − CNN1 + P1 − CM M1 − FC +
T
t=2
∑ ρt−1 N1 + M14W l
t−1 W + P1 − AC t
2
− FC = 0 = 0
⇔ P1N1 − CNN1 + M1P1 − M1CM − FC´ +
N1 + M1
4W
T
t=2
∑ ρt−1lt−1 W + P1 − AC t
2
−
T
t=2
∑ ρt−1FC = 0
⇔ P1N1 + M1  − CNN1 + M1CM  +
N1 + M1
4W
T
t=2
∑ ρt−1lt−1 W + P1 − AC t
2
−
T
t=1
∑ ρt−1FC = 0
⇔ P1 = AC1 − 14W
T
t=2
∑ ρt−1lt−1 W + P1 − AC t
2
+
T
t=1
∑ ρt−1FC
N1 + M1
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Determination of the Optimal Steady-State Live Span 
Our model is a free terminal time discrete optimal control problem101. Unlike its continuous 
counterpart, there is no terminal condition uniquely defining T, the optimal time period 102
In the presence of switching costs, plan owners know they will have market power over 
consumers once these are "captured". This implies that plans are willing to incur losses to 
attract potential consumers because they will be able to recover those losses in future years. If 
no restriction is imposed on first period profits (as it occurs in our price floor scenario), it is 
fairly intuitive to expect a pattern of profits beginning with negative profits in the first year, in 
order to establish market share, and positive profits in all subsequent years (recall that, by 
assumption, any plan unable to reach expected positive profits in the forthcoming year, exits at 
the begging of that year). Moreover, the longer plans live, the more profitable their market 
share will become. Thus, we expect 𝑃𝑃1∗  to be decreasing in 𝑇𝑇. Section 
. 
2.6, confirms this result. 
Claim:  𝑇𝑇 is optimal life span in steady-state equilibrium if the 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 is not satisfied at 𝑇𝑇 + 1, 
given the optimal price sequence for a life span of 𝑇𝑇 and if the optimal sequence of profits for 
any life span 𝑇𝑇� > 𝑇𝑇 yields a negative profit for some 𝑡𝑡 > 1. 
First note that, if given the optimal price sequence for a 𝑇𝑇 life span, ∃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇+1 : ∏𝑇𝑇+1 > 0, there 
would be an incentive to offer the plan one more year and 𝑇𝑇 would not be optimal to begin 
with. This is, thus, a necessary, although no sufficient, condition for equilibrium.  
Now, suppose 𝑇𝑇 was the optimal life span in the steady-state but the optimal sequence of 
prices and profits for plans living 𝑇𝑇�  yielded positive profits in all periods beyond the first. Each 
year, the employer selects one plan from among the potentially many entrants. This "pre-
entrance" competition implies that, if a plan announces a first period premium yielding zero 
intertemporal profits for a life span of 𝑇𝑇, some other plan could announce a (lower) first period 
price, equally generating zero intertemporal profits and satisfying the 𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 but over a longer 
life span. And this last plan would be selected. Thus 𝑇𝑇 could not be the optimal life span. 
 
  
                                                          
101 We chose a discrete time model to capture the fact that health plan pricing decisions and commercial plan enrollment decisions 
are each made only once a year. 
102 For a discussion on terminal conditions in discrete optimal problems, we refer the reader to Ried, W. Health Economics, 1996. 
5: p. 447-468, Grossman, M., The Human Capital Model, in Handbook of Health Economics, J.A. Culyer and J.P. Newhouse, Editors. 
2000, Elsevier: Amsterdam  and Eisenring, C., Health Economics, 2000. 9(8): p. 669-680. 
. 
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Appendix II 
 
Figure 25: Graphic Analysis of Proportional Hazard Assumption 
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Test of PH Assumption - Rival quality differentiation
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Test of PH Assumption - Within firm quality differentiation
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Test of PH Assumption - # of products of the firm
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Figure 26: Functional Form Graphic Evaluation using Martingale Residuals 
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Figure 27: Graphical Analysis of Outliers Using Score Residuals 
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Table 44: Discrete time Proportional Hazard Model Estimation Results  
 
  
Discrete Time Proportional Hazard Regression
Residual df= 26,434 No. of obs= 26,973
Pearson X2= 24,342 Deviance= 8,648.93
Dispersion= 0.92 Dispersion= 0.327189
Haz. Ratio Std. Err. z P>z
Price Control 1.059 0.012 5.02 0.000 1.036 1.083
Quality 0.801 0.033 -5.450 0.000 0.739 0.867
Competion
Cannibalization 0.974 0.058 -0.450 0.652 0.867 1.093
Rival's competition 0.992 0.058 -0.140 0.890 0.885 1.112
# of similar products 1.002 0.000 5.030 0.000 1.001 1.003
Rival quality differentiation 0.782 0.114 -1.68 0.092 0.588 1.041
Within firm quality differentiation 0.591 0.096 -3.230 0.001 0.429 0.813
Own firm proliferation 1.002 0.001 3.610 0.000 1.001 1.004
Firm Characteristics
# of products 0.913 0.007 -11.95 0.000 0.899 0.926
# of ATC3 0.986 0.009 -1.510 0.131 0.968 1.004
Average quality 0.908 0.068 -1.280 0.201 0.784 1.052
Prescription drug (Yes=1) 1.391 0.073 6.280 0.000 1.255 1.542
Log likelihood (-0.5*Deviance) = -4324.1311. Cf. log likelihood for intercept-only model (Model 0) = -5460.6541
Chi-squared statistic for Model (1) vs. Model (0) = 2273.0459. Prob. > chi2(538) = 2.91e-211 Note: Interaction terms omitted
[95% Conf. Interval]
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Appendix III 
The databases  
CHC - Centro Hospitalar de Cascais 
The CHC database is used by physicians at the CHC to assist medical care during physician 
appointments. It is, therefore, extremely complete. It provides information on socio-
demographic characteristics, clinical relevant variables over time, medication prescribed and 
delivered (both ART and non-ART), other diagnosis, and clinical events.  
Inpatient information is not included in the database. It was obtained by requesting the hospital 
Board for all inpatient episodes of the individuals included in the database. The information 
provided by the Board includes the attributed DRG code and date of discharge, but information 
on admission date is missing so episode duration could not be calculated. 
This database contains information on 3,085 individuals followed at the CHC immunodeficiency 
treatment unit. The vast majority of the individuals began the follow-up between 2001-2008, 
but 804 started before 2001. The average follow-up time of the total sample is 3.4 years.  Of the 
3,085 individuals, 1,744 were not HIV infected, had not started antiretroviral therapy, or such 
information was missing. For those whose ART information was available, 7 were under 13 
years old and 28 were HIV-2. The remaining 1,306 individuals were included in the analysis, 
from the first prescription date to the censoring date (December 31st, 2008) or death. Table 45 
presents the main descriptive statistics on the most relevant variables while Table 46 provided 
the un-weighted proportions of each antiretroviral drug prescribed. 
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Table 45: Descriptive Statistics of CHC Sample 
 
Table 46: Antiretroviral Drugs Used in the CHC Sample. 
 
Since individuals may have been transferred from other hospitals where they had already 
started ART, they were not necessarily naive at the first prescription date in the CHC database. 
Dr. Inês Vaz Pinto identified naïve, on a case by case basis. 366 naive individuals were identified 
as having initiated therapy at the CHC between 2001 and 2008 and this sub-sample was the 
Descriptive Statistics of CHC Sample
N Average/Freq. Stand.Dev./ % Median Minimum Maximum
HIV-1 infected individuals on ART 1,306
Year of entry in cohort 1,306 2002 2.7 2002 1994 2008
Year First (in cohort) ART 1,306 2003 2.9 2003 1994 2008
Follow-up Period (Years) 1301* 4.1 3.0 3.3 0 13.5
Annual Mortality Rates 96
2002 5 1%
2003 7 1%
2004 15 2%
2005 21 3%
2006 21 2%
2007 13 1%
2008 14 1%
Socio-Demographic Characteristics
Age at cohort entry 1,303 36.3 10.3 35 14 75
Age at ART initiation 1,303 37.8 10.0 36 14 76
Gender (F) 1,306 35%
Race 1,167
Caucasian 79%
Black 19%
Clinical Information
% of HCV Co-Infection 1,306 43%
% of HBV Co-Infection 1,306 5%
Initial Distribution 1,053 355 295 286 2 1983
Initial Log10 Viral Load 961 4.0 1.5 4.4 1.7 6.9
Resistance Score 124 3.8 4.2 0.8 0.8 18.0
* 5 are single observations
Notes: Only  HIV-1 is included;   ART=Antiretroviral Therapy, CD4+=CD4+ T-Lymphocyte count per µL, HBV=Hepatitis B Virus, 
HCV=Hepatitis C Virus, log10 Viral Load=log10 HIV RNA copies per mL, N=Number of Observations/Individuals; Resistance score= 
inverted Genotypic Sensitivity Score, where 1 out of 1 means full resistance for the drug and is based on the REGA algorithm.
Nucleoside Reverse Transcriptase Inhibitors (NRTIs)
Lamivudina 61.32%
Zidovudina 38.52%
Tenofovir 37.62%
Emtricitabina 22.39%
Abacavir 15.66%
Estavudina 14.73%
Didanosina 13.39%
Zalcitabina 0.53%
Non-Nucleoside Reverse Transcriptase Inhibitors (NNRTIs)
Efavirenze 23.70%
Nevirapina 17.84%
Protease Inhibitors
Ritonavir 43.44%
Lopinavir 26.41%
Indinavir 9.59%
Atazanavir 6.63%
Nelfinavir 4.36%
Saquinavir 3.15%
Fosamprenavir 2.80%
Darunavir 0.65%
Tipranavir 0.22%
Amprenavir 0.06%
Integrase Inhibitors
Raltegravir 0.06%
Entry Inhibitors
Aplaviroc 0.12%
Enfuvirtida 0.62%
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main source of information used to parameterize the model with respect to initial 
characteristics. Table 47 shows the main descriptive statistics on the most relevant variables. 
Table 47: Descriptive Statistics of Naive Sample in the CHC Database 
 
CD4 and Viral load Over Time – graphical analysis. 
Weighted least squares regression was used to estimate CD4+ and log10VL trajectories, 
conditional on therapy line. Figure 28 and Figure 29 provide a graphical comparison of the 
observed and estimated average values over time. 
 
N Average/Freq. Stand.Dev./ % Median Minimum Maximum
Socio-Demographic Characteristics
Initial Age 366 40.2 11.2 38.1 19 75
Gender (F=1) 366 36%
Race 359
Caucasian 71%
Black 28%
Other/unknown 1%
Transmission 365
Homosexual 8%
Heterosexual 65%
IDU 24%
Other/unknown 3%
Late Diagnosis** 365 40%
Clinical Information
Year of First ART 366 2004 2.09 2005 2000 2008
% of HCV Co-Infection 366 30%
Initial CD4+ Distribution 366 269 198 239.5 2 1334
Classe CD4+ Inicial
0– 50 366 38 10%
51– 100 33 9%
101– 200 72 20%
201– 350 128 35%
351– 500 53 14%
>500 42 11%
Log10 Viral Load 366 4.7 0.895 4.8 1.7 6.9
Notes: ART=Antiretroviral Therapy, CD4+=CD4+ T-Lymphocyte count per µL, HCV=Hepatitis-C Virus, Log10 Viral Load=Log10 HIV RNA copies per mL, 
N=Number of Observations/Individuals,  IDU=Injection Drug User.**defined as either having a CD4+ cell count at the time of diagnosis of less 
than 200 cells/mm³ or having AIDS diagnosed concomitantly with HIV infection or in the 12 months thereafter.
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Figure 28: Variation of CD4+ over Time, per Line. 
 
Figure 29: Average Monthly Variation in Log10VL, by Line. 
Regimen switches in the CHC sample versus the Swiss cohort. 
A recent analysis of “time to the first treatment modification” in the first year of ART, as the 
primary end point, was performed on 1,318 naive individuals from the Swiss HIV Cohort Study, 
in the period 2005-2008 [144]. The included regimens were, for the most part, those 
recommended by Portuguese current guidelines. In that analysis individuals starting ART, 391 
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(29.7%) modified their treatment103
Comparing the results in Elzi et al. with those of the CHC sample, out of the 1,306 (not 
necessarily naive individual in the database), 339 (26%) switched regimen during the first year 
of follow-up and 117 switched in the first three months. This switching rate is, thus, close to the 
one found in the Swiss HIV Cohort. During the first year, virological failure accounted for 20% 
(68 out of 339) regimen switches, which is significantly higher than the 6% found in the Swiss 
cohort, but it should be noted that the CHC sample does not contain only naive patients.  
 during the first year, half of them within the first 3 months. 
The most frequent reasons for treatment modification were toxic effects (46.6%), followed by a 
physician’s decision (22.8%), the patient’s choice (16.9%), and treatment failure (5.9%). During 
the first year of ART, 208 individuals (15.8%) modified their treatment because of drug 
intolerance and/or drug toxicity, mostly (64.2%) during the first 3 months.  
If we consider only those 366 naive individuals, 98 (26%) switched regimen in the first year and 
of these 18 switched due to virological failure. Virological failure thus accounted for 18% of 
regimen switches in the first year which is a percentage significantly above that reported by Elzi 
et al. The reason for this fact may be related to the fact that, as noted by Elzi et al., combined 
zidovudine and lamivudine was associated with higher rates of treatment modification104
 
  and 
in the Swiss cohort 23.4% were on such NRTI pair, while the corresponding percentage is 54.1 in 
the CHC sample. 
LVHEM - Laboratório de Virologia do Hospital Egas Moniz 
Since January 2001, European guidelines recommend resistance testing in case of treatment 
failure [283] and such recommendation has been routinely implemented in Portugal. The vast 
majority of samples were tested at Hospital Egas Moniz, which is the laboratory of reference 
[284].  
The LVHEM database provides information on 5,456 individuals older than 12 years old, from 22 
hospitals located in the Portuguese mainland and the Madeira Archipelago, who were tested 
                                                          
103 Treatment modification was defined as a switch or discontinuation of ART within the first year. A switch to another regimen was 
defined as changing 1 or more drugs within 4 weeks after stopping ART. Discontinuation was defined as stopping any antiretroviral 
drug for at least 4 weeks. 
104 Results are not provided for modification due to virological failure. 
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for resistance from March 2001 to March 2009105
Each time a resistance test is performed, the physician in charge of the database – Dr. Ricardo 
Camacho – requests information on the complete ART. Such information includes drugs used, 
starting date, ending date and reason for termination. This data is, thus, retrospectively 
collected. Complete information regarding ART history is available for 2,136 individuals, 
incomplete information is available for 1,216 individuals, and no information of ART regimens is 
available for 2,104 individuals. 
. This database includes around 80% of all 
resistance tests performed by HIV infected individuals in continental Portugal.  
Since 2001 it is recommended to perform resistance tests at ART initiation. In the LVHEM 
sample, of the 2,104 individuals without any information on ART regimens, 1,960 performed a 
resistance test. These are most likely naive patients tested prior to ART initiation and such was 
assumed in the analysis.  
At the time of the test, which for most cases coincides with therapy failure, information on viral 
load is registered. In some cases, CD4+ cell count is also registered. Table 48 provides a 
summary of the main characteristics of the LVHEM sample. 
Resistance levels recorded in the database use the new REGA 8.0 algorithm [285] and the 
following drugs are tested: enfuvirtide, raltegravir, atazanavir, nelfinavir, etravirine efavirenz, 
nevirapine, tenofovir DF, emtricitabine, abacavir, stavudine, lamivudine, didanosine, 
zidovudine, darunavir/r, tipranavir/r, atazanavir/r, lopinavir/r, fosamprenavir/r, indinavir/r, 
saquinavir/r. Results of the REGA 8.0 algorithm should be interpreted as: 0= high resistance 
level, 0.5/0.75= some resistance level (0.75 is for booster PIs) and 1/1.5= susceptible to the drug 
(1.5 is for boosted PIs). This classification was inversed to generate an indicator that increases 
with resistance. The current resistance level, as calculated from REGA 8.0, was subtracted from 
the maximum level attainable by that drug. After such transformation 0= susceptible and 
1/1.5=high resistance. This yields a resistance score between 0 and 24.5.   
                                                          
105 Resistance level information is not available for 201 individuals, therefore, other criteria may apply for inclusion in 
the database. 
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Table 48: Descriptive Statistics of the LVHEM Sample 
 
In order to estimate time to event models (conditional on therapy line and regimen number, 
among others) it is necessary to have complete ART history; consequently the sub-sample of 
2,123106
Figure 30
 individuals was considered in the parameterization of the model with respect to time 
to event. No information is provided on the alive/dead status, so all individuals are assumed 
censored at the date of the last record.  
 provides the Kaplan-Meier estimate of time to development of first resistance107
 
 to at 
least one drug, and the difference between the LVHEM database and the CHC one is clear. 
Figure 30: K-M Estimate of Time to First Resistance Development in the CHC and LVHEM Samples 
                                                          
106 In the 13 cases where the first and last observations coincide, the individuals were discarded from the analysis. 
107 It should be noted that information is not available for those individuals who have not been tested. Given that resistance 
development reflects itself though detectable levels of viral load without response to treatment, it was assumed that those who 
were not tested had not yet developed resistance.  
N Average/Freq. Stand.Dev./ % Median MinimumMaximum
Complete ARV Information 2,136
First Resistance Level 2,057 5.2 4.3 4.8 0.750 21.5
Incomplete ARV Information 1,216
First Resistance Level 1,156 6.3 5.5 4.8 0.750 22.8
No ARV Information 2,104
First Resistance Level 1,960 1.1 1.7 0.8 0.750 22.8
Whole LVHEM Sample
   Socio-Demographic Characteristics
Gender (F) 5,103 0.343
Geographic Origin 2,729
Africa 540
Asia 15
Estern Europe 2
Europe 2,119
South America 53
   Mode of Transmission 721
   IDU 298
Heterossexual 260
Homossexual/Bissexual 92
Other 71
   Clinical Information
CD4+ 3,277 310.4 250.4 265.0 1.0 2,953.0
% with CD4+<200 3,277 0.382
Log10 Viral Load 5,374 4.3 0.818 4.2 1.3 7.0
Number of Regimens 3,352 2.2 1.3 2.0 1.0 13.0
Notes: ART=Antiretroviral Therapy, ARV=Antiretroviral,  CD4+=CD4+ T-Lymphocyte count per µL, IDU=Injection Drug User, Log10 Viral 
Load=log10 HIV RNA copies per mL, LVHEM=Laboratório de Virologia do Hospital de Egas Moniz, N= Number of Observations/Individuals
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CVEDT - Centro de Vigilância Epidemiológica de Doenças Transmissíveis 
The CVEDT database is the official national list of HIV infected individuals. Detailed official 
statistics referring to that database are published by the Communicable Diseases and 
Epidemiological Surveillance Center on a regular basis, consequently, only a short summary is 
described in Table 49. 
Information obtained from this database consists of a “picture” taken in August, 28th, 2009. It 
characterizes infection at that moment in time and, thus, unlike the above mentioned 
databases, it is not in a panel form. Some past information is included, such as probable year of 
infection, the date of diagnosis, date of notification, date of death (if it has occurred), and date 
and type of first symptoms. It provides information on the current stage of infection 
(asymptomatic, symptomatic or AIDS), but not on the dates of transition between stages. Socio-
demographic variables provided include: place of birth, nationality, age and gender. HIV related 
variables provided include: type of infection (HIV-1 or HIV-2) and mode of transmission. 
Given that, in the CVEDT database, only 0.8% of the notified HIV cases in Portugal are due to 
mother/child transmission and that only 124 out of 26,066 cases alive in 2009 with known age, 
were children under 13 years-old, the present model focuses on the adolescent/adult 
population. 
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Table 49: Descriptive Statistics of the CVEDT Database 
 
The median age at diagnosis in this sample is 33 years-old (average 35.4, 95% 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼 [35.3;  35.5]. 
This median is, nonetheless, increasing over time, as shown in Figure 31. 
 
Figure 31: Median Age at Diagnosis in the CVEDT Sample 
This pattern is related to the change in the distribution of transmission mode, presented in 
Figure 32. 
N Average/Freq. N Average/Freq.
Number of Cases 34718* 26,200
Age at Diagnosis 34,431 35.4 25,933 34.99
Final Age* 34,431 42.3 25,933 43.57
Gender (F=1) 34,703 25.4% 26,186 28.4%
HIV-1 34,431 96.4% 25,965 96.6%
Mode of Transmission 34,070 25,829
Heterosexual 41% 45%
Homosexual/Bisexual 13% 12%
IDU** 44% 41%
Other 2% 2%
Year of Infection (most likely) 4,502 4,212
1968-1989 3% 3%
1990-1999 34% 32%
2000-2008 63% 65%
Year of Diagnosis 34,718 26,200
1983-1989 3% 2%
1990-1999 46% 40%
2000-2008 52% 58%
Year of Death 8,513
1983-1989 3%
1990-1999 52%
2000-2008 45%
Number of Years Between Diagnosis and Symptoms 
(Year of Symptoms-Year of Diagnosis)
9,383 -0.781 5,521 -0.725
HIV Stage*** 34,718 26,200
Assymptomatic 47% 60%
Symptomatic 10% 11%
AIDS 43% 29%
** Includes the "Homosexual/IDU" Cases; 
*** At Death or in 2009 if Alive
Total Alive in August 2009
Notes: AIDS=Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, HIV=Human Immunodeficiency Virus, HIV-1=Human Immunodeficiency Virus - Type 1, 
IDU=Injection Drug User, N=Number of Observations/Individuals
*Only 13 years old or older at death or in 2009 if alive are included; 
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Figure 32: Proportion of Diagnosis by Transmission Group 
This change in the in the epidemiology of the disease have an impact on mortality since a 
statistically significant difference is found in the survival curves by transmission group as shown 
in Figure 33 
 
Figure 33: Kaplan Meier Estimates of Time to Death by Mode of Transmission 
Progresses in ART, efforts to take infected individuals into therapy and changes in the 
distribution of individuals by transmission group are among the reasons for the reduction the 
mortality observed in Figure 34. 
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Figure 34: Kaplan Meier Estimate of Time to Death By Year of Diagnosis 
Mortality data was available from two distinct sources: the CVEDT dataset and HIV-related 
aggregate mortality data provided by the National Institute of Statistics (INE). While the first 
database accounts for all deaths among HIV-infected individuals (without specifying the cause 
of death), the second refers to deaths attributed to HIV. In spite of this fact, as shown in Figure 
35, the number of deaths per year is significantly higher in the INE database. This difference 
may either be due to non-notification of death among those in the CVEDT database, or it may 
be that the vital status is correctly registered in the CVEDT sample, but not all HIV infected 
individuals are in the database. In fact, in the CVEDT database, 59% of those who died were 
diagnosed no sooner than one year before death, which suggests that there may be a severe 
problem of late diagnosis of infections. Moreover, the median time between diagnosis and 
notification (inclusion in the database) is 2.7 months but 21% of notifications occurred more 
than one year after diagnosis.  
 
Figure 35: Deaths over Time, by Source of Information 
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The distribution of the age of death among HIV infected individuals has itself evolved 
significantly overtime, as shown by the solid lines in Figure 36. Even if we ignore the 2007 curve, 
which is clearly out of pattern and most likely reflects an incomplete update, we observe that 
the most frequent age of death interval has changed from 35-39 in 2002 to 40-44 in 2006, 
reflecting a change in the epidemiology of the disease and the progress in ART therapy. 
Nevertheless, comparing the distribution by age of death among HIV infected individuals and 
that of the general population (the dotted line), the two remain significantly different. 
 
Figure 36: Distribution of Age of Death due to HIV and all Causes. Source:  INE Data 
In spite of this fact, the Kaplan-Meier estimate on the CVEDT sample (Figure 37), indicates a 
survival probability of 75% 25 years after diagnosis (that is, roughly at a median age of 58 since 
the median age at diagnosis is 33 years). In the general population, the proportion of survivors 
at the age of 58 is 91% (Figure 38). There is, thus, an increased mortality risk due to infection, 
but possibly not as high as it would be expected from distributions in Figure 36. 
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Figure 37: Kaplan-Meier Survival Curve among HIV Infected Individuals 
 
 
Figure 38: Survival in the General Population. Source: INE 2009. 
This increased risk of death due to age is not, at its full length, yet captured in the CVEDT 
sample. In fact, about 90% of the diagnosis in the CVEDT sample occurred after 1992 and 51% 
occurred after 1999, when the median age of diagnosis was 32. The median age of HIV infected 
individuals alive in 2009 is 42 years old. Consequently, even if the alive/dead variable in the 
CVEDT database is correctly updated, the individuals in the database have not reached an age 
where the risk of death is significantly increased due to age. 
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ACSS - Administração Central do Sistema de Saúde 
The ACSS database is a national database, at the patient level, of inpatient care related to HIV-
infection in all hospitals within the National Healthcare Service in 2009. All records with HIV 
related codes, either as the primary diagnosis or subsequent ones, are included. 
This database contains information on date of birth, data of admission, date of discharge, 
destination at discharge, DRG code, all diagnosis codes (ICD9-CM classification) and other 
causes for inpatient care. 
In 2009, the average age for HIV-related inpatient care was 43 years-old (median 41, range 14-
87). The majority of cases were associated with AIDS diagnosis (68.9%) and 14% resulted in the 
patients’ death (Table 50).  
Table 50: Descriptive Statistics of the ACSS Database 
 
As shown in Table 51, no statistically significant difference was found in the cost per episode 
between AIDS and non-AIDS diagnosis (𝑝𝑝 = 0.442), but a statistically significant difference was 
found in the average duration (𝑝𝑝 < 0.001).  
N Average (SD)/Freq. SD/ % Median Minimum Maximum
Age 2,404 43.2 (11.6) 11.6 41 14 87
Duration (Days) 2,404 17.9 (23.3) 23.3 11 0 339
Main Diagnosis 2,381
ICD9 Description
42 AIDS 68.9%
486 Pneumonia, Organism Unspecified 1.8%
4829 Bacterial Pneumonia Unspecified 1.2%
1363 Pneumocystis carinii 1.0%
1300 Meningoencephalitis due to Toxoplasmosis 0.8%
1175 Cryptococcosis 0.7%
4660 Acute Bronchitis 0.6%
64761 Other Viral Diseases 0.6%
481 Pneumococcal Pneumonia 0.5%
5712 Alcoholic Cirrhosis of Liver 0.5%
Discharge Destination 2,404
Home 76%
Other Healthcare Facil ity with Inpatient Care 5%
Home Based Healthcare 1%
Against Physicians Recommendation 5%
Death 14%
Notes: AIDS=Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, ICD9=International Classification of Diseases-9th Revision, SD=Standard Deviation
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Table 51: Cost of Inpatient Care in the ACSS Database 
 
It is of interest to compare the results obtained from the 2009 ACSS database with those 
reported in the literature, using the same (although more complete) database in different 
years.  Dias et al. [80] analyze the predictors of mortality in HIV-associated hospitalizations in 
Portugal, on a sample of 12,078 adult discharges, from patients with HIV infection diagnosis 
assisted at Portuguese hospitals from 2005–2007 and registered on the diagnosis-related 
groups' database. The authors find gender, age, urgent/programmed inpatient care, 
surgical/medical diagnosis and co-morbidities to be associated with hospital mortality of HIV-
infected individuals. The most common HIV-related complications were: Pneumonia (27%), 
Tuberculosis (25%), PCP (10%), Hepatitis B (5%) and Hepatitis C (32%)108
Pina [286] performs a statistical analysis of HIV related hospitalizations in the period 2000-2006 
by year and hospital. The average length of stay reported by Pina for the CHC hospital is 18 days 
(the national average is not directly provided) which is close to the average in the 2009 sample. 
A total of 794 hospital admissions were registered. At the time the analysis was performed, only 
three HIV-related DRG codes existed. Consequently, results on the average cost are not directly 
comparable. Moreover, all data is disaggregated by hospital or region.  Nevertheless, the 
average cost reported by Pina for the CHC hospital was 5,326€ 
. The authors report a 
median length of hospital stay of 19.2 days, while the median duration observed in the 2009 
sample is 11 days. 
                                                          
108 PCP is an AIDS-defining illness, while pneumonia and tuberculosis may or may not be an AIDS-defining event, 
depending on the severity (recurrent pneumonia and disseminated tuberculosis). 
Main Diagnosis
Most Frequent DRG
DRG Codes Frequency (>5%) DRG Codes Frequency (>5%)
714 30.1% 714 17.0%
710 18.8% 710 6.9%
716 8.8% 712 5.8%
709 7.7% 557 5.1%
715 6.0%
712 6.0%
Cost of Episode p-value
Average 0.442
Standard Deviation
Duration
Average <0.001
Standard Deviation
4,741.6 €
3,688.7 €
ICD9=042 (AIDS) ICD9 not 042
4,764.8 €
3,474.5 €
19.3
24.9
14.9
18.9
Notes: AIDS=Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, DRG=Diagnosis-Related Group, ICD9=International Classification of 
Diseases-9th Revision
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INE - Instituto Nacional de Estatística 
The National Institute of Statistics (INE) kindly provided data, on the number of deaths due to 
HIV and in the general population, over the period 1988 – 2006, and by gender and age group. 
 
Figure 39: Age of Death According to HIV Status and Gender 
Figure 39 summarize the information provided by INE. Although international studies indicate 
that the gap between life expectancy among HIV infected and the general population is 
narrowing down [101], the average age of death among HIV individuals is still far from the 
average observed in the general Portuguese population, as shown in Figure 40. 
 
Figure 40: Average Age of Death among HIV Infected Individuals versus General Population 
The Sampling Process for Age of Death 
At model entrance, individual characteristics are sampled from the distributions described in 
Section 4.5.1. Following that process, the age of death, conditional on having lived up to the age 
of ART initiation is sampled from the gender specific general population mortality tables 
provided by INE [156]. The sampling process, conditional on age, is as follows: assume that the 
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general population probability, for a female, of surviving to at least the age of 33 is 0.98961 and 
to the age of 58 is 0.58778. Then, the conditional probability that a woman drawn from the 
general population who has reached the age of 33 will survive for at least another 25 years 
is 0.58778
0.98961 
=  0.59395. If that woman is HIV-infected and the increased risk of death due to the 
condition is 1.5, then from standard risk analysis [3] the conditional probability is taken to the 
power of the hazard ratio  yielding �0.58778
0.98961 
�
1.5
=  0.4577. As such, if α is the probability of 
death at current age, the age of death may be obtained by first calculating β = α p
1
HR , where 𝑝𝑝 
is a random draw from a Uniform distribution and HR is the hazard ratio, and then using the 
mortality tables to convert the probability β, back to age of death.  
A hazard ratio of 1 was assumed since the random draw is meant to reflect death due to age. 
Although set at 1 in the base case, this parameter is useful for model calibration. 
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Appendix IV 
Baseline Individual Characteristics Distributions 
The histogram of age at ART initiation is shown in Figure 41. 
 
 Figure 41: Age at ART Initiation  
The initial distribution of CD4+ cell count is taken from the CHC database, as it is the only one 
which included this particular data.  For each individual, the last observed CD4+ value recorded 
prior to the date of the first ART prescription is assumed as the initial CD4+ count. A Table 
distribution was fit to the observed frequencies (Figure 42). In the CHC naive sample, 74% are 
below 350, 15% are between 351 and 500 and 11% are above 500. 
 
 
Figure 42: Distribution of CD4+ and Log10VL at ART Initiation  
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individual refilled the prescription. Considering that the individual may get a refill while still 
having some left, the number of days that the individual may not have taken medication (unless 
it was obtained from somewhere else) is added over the course of the regimen. The proportion 
of non-missing days out of the total number of days between the first and last refill the 
adherence indicator used in the model. We have ignored the last refill since we do not have 
information on last month’s adherence. Two adherence indicators were constructed for each 
individual: an overall adherence level and a regimen specific adherence level.  
Employment status was found to be a significant variable in determining quality of life (QoL) 
among HIV infected individuals (See Section 4.5.4.5.1) and was consequently included in the 
model in spite of no direct effect being expected on disease progression. The amount of 
information available on this regard is scarce, as it is only available for 42% of the CHC database 
and most likely not updated. In the CHC sample 31% of the individuals are inactive (not 
employed or retired) while Reis et al. [132, 134] report 48% of inactive individuals in their 
sample. The employment status is sampled from a Bernoulli distribution with p =  703  
1065
 (66%), 
reflecting the joint results of CHC and Reis et al.   
In the model, the number of PIs in each regimen was sampled from the Table distribution of the 
corresponding therapy line. Table distributions for lines 1 and 2 were obtained from the 
observed frequencies in the CHC sample, while those of lines 3 and non-suppressive came from 
the LVHEM data. Figure 43 describes the observed frequencies of the number of PIs.  
 
Figure 43: Number of PIs, per Therapy Line 
159 out of 1,306 individuals in the CHC sample where tested for resistance and 64 of these tests 
occurred in naive patients. In the LVHEM sample, 1,960 naive109
                                                          
109 Assuming naive patients are those for whom no information on ART regimens is available (i.e. tested before ART initiation) 
 individuals were tested for 
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resistance. Table 52 shows the frequency in each resistance level among naive patients in both 
cases. Given the relative sample sizes, the LVHEM information was used to parameterize the 
model with respect to initial resistance level. A Table distribution was assumed using the values 
summarized in the last column of Table 52.  
Table 52: First Line Resistance Level in the CHC and LVHEM Samples 
 
 
 
The CVEDT database does not provide information on the date of ART initiation, so it is not 
possible to know how many were classified as having AIDS at that time. The database does not 
provide information on AIDS status at diagnosis, it only informs on such status as of August 
2008. However, considering the sub-sample of individuals diagnosed in 2008 and assuming the 
AIDS/not-AIDS status did not change until August 2009, we obtain a proxy of the proportion of 
individuals who are diagnosed with AIDS at ART initiation. This value is obviously a proxy, since 
it is not possible to know the percentage of diagnosed cases that started ART on the year of 
diagnosis. This value will be close to 100 in the AIDS and Clinically Symptomatic cases, but will 
be lower for asymptomatic cases. Moreover, there is a significant lag in notification, so these 
values are likely to change in the near future. Considering all limitations, it was assumed a 
Bernoulli distribution with 𝑝𝑝 = 387
1,201
  (32%). This value is in accordance with the 31.6% of late 
presenters (that is, individuals who reach medical care at AIDS stage) in the CHC sample 
between 2001 and 2007, reported by Vaz Pinto [125] although significantly lower than the 42% 
reported by Alfaiate et al. [126]. 
Class of Resistance 
Level
CHC    
Naive 
LVHEM 
Naive
<1 81.3% 91.2%
1<=R<5 10.9% 6.7%
5<=R<10 7.8% 1.6%
R>10 0.0% 0.5%
N 64 1,960
Notes: CHC=Centro Hospitalar de Cascais, 
LVHEM=Laboratório de Virologia do Hospital de Egas 
Moniz – Centro Hospitalar de Lisboa Ocidental, E.P.E., 
N=Number of Observations/Individuals
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Fitted distributions 
 
Figure 44: Fit Comparison for Log10HIV RNA at rebound 
 
 
 Figure 45: Fit Comparison for log10HIV RNA at rebound in non-suppressive therapy  
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Figure 46: Fit Comparison of Resistance level in Non-suppressive Therapy 
 
 
Figure 47: Fit comparison for monthly antiretroviral costs in non-suppressive therapy  
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Appendix V 
Regression Models for Time to Event 
Table 53: Regression Model for Time to Viral Suppression 
 
Table 54: Regression Model for Time to Virological Failure in Line 1 and 2 
 
Weibull Regression -- Log Relative-Hazard Form
No. of subjects = 1,276 Number of obs= 1,562
No. of failures = 831 Wald χ2(9)= 75.1
Time at risk    = 19,730 Prob > χ2= 0.000
Log pseudolikelihood =   -1,965
AIC= 3,957
BIC= 4,026
Time to Viral Suppression            
Line 1 & Line 2
Coef.
Robust 
SE
z P>z dy/dx
Gender (Female=1) 0.090 0.086 1.1 0.294 -0.078 0.257 -0.554
Age 0.018 0.004 4.2 0.000 0.010 0.026 -0.111
Log10VL -0.152 0.032 -4.7 0.000 -0.215 -0.089 0.951
CD4+ 0.000 0.000 0.5 0.655 0.000 0.000 0.000
HCV 0.273 0.089 3.1 0.002 0.098 0.447 -1.680
Adherence 0.010 0.003 3.7 0.000 0.005 0.015 -0.062
Year 1st ART -0.004 0.017 -0.2 0.836 -0.037 0.030 0.022
Number of PIs -0.048 0.047 -1.0 0.313 -0.140 0.045 0.297
Resistance Level 0.136 0.059 2.3 0.021 0.020 0.251 -0.847
Line (1 is reference)
2 -0.077 0.093 -0.8 0.407 -0.260 0.105 0.485
Constant 3.8 34.4 0.1 0.912 -63.6 71.2
/ln_p 0.030 0.026 1.1 0.255 -0.021 0.080
p 1.030 0.027 0.979 1.084
[95% CI]
Notes: ART=Antiretroviral Therapy,HVC=Hepatitis C-Virus, Log10VL=log10 HIV RNA copies per mL, PI=Protease 
Inhibitor
7 [6;8]         
Pred. median=6
(Std. Err. adjusted for 1,276 
clusters in id)
Weibull Regression -- Log Relative-Hazard Form
No. of subjects = 1,302 Number of obs= 3,205
No. of failures = 575 Wald χ2(11)= 129.95
Time at risk    = 63,356 Prob > χ2= 0
Log l ikelihood= -1,170
AIC= 2,366
BIC= 2,445
Time to Virological 
Failure
Coef.
Robust   
SE
z P>z dy/dx
Gender (Female=1) -0.137 0.056 -2.5 0.014 -0.246 -0.028 7.65
Age -0.010 0.006 -1.6 0.121 -0.023 0.003 0.56
Log10VL 0.362 0.100 3.6 0.000 0.166 0.559 -19.56
CD4+ 0.000 0.000 -2.6 0.010 -0.001 0.000 0.03
HCV -0.182 0.111 -1.6 0.102 -0.400 0.036 10.09
Adherence -0.003 0.002 -1.7 0.093 -0.007 0.001 0.18
Year 1st ART -0.044 0.024 -1.9 0.063 -0.090 0.002 2.45
Number of PIs 0.110 0.049 2.2 0.027 0.013 0.206 -6.12
Resistance Level 0.034 0.028 1.2 0.228 -0.021 0.089 -1.89
Regimen Number 0.160 0.036 4.4 0.000 0.089 0.232 -8.96
Line (1 is reference)
Line 2 0.191 0.102 1.9 0.062 -0.010 0.392 -10.7
Constant 81.5 47.1 1.7 0.084 -10.9 173.8
/ln_p 0.370 0.032 11.7 0.000 0.308 0.432
p 1.447 0.046 1.4 1.540
Notes: ART=Antiretroviral Therapy, HVC=Hepatitis C Virus, Log10VL=log10 HIV RNA copies per mL, PI=Protease Inhibitor
[95% CI]
(Std. Err. adjusted for 1,302 
clusters in id)
72 [67;80]       
Pred. median=80
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Table 55: Regression Model for Time to Virological Failure in Line 3 
 
 
Table 56: Regression Model for Time to Regimen Switch without Virological Failure 
 
Weibull Regression -- Log Relative-Hazard Form
No. of subjects = 1,864 Number of obs= 2,184
No. of failures = 1,932 Wald χ2(12)= 1,017
Time at risk    = 62,290 Prob > χ2= 0.000
Log l ikelihood= -961
AIC= 1,944
Time to Virological 
Failure
Coef.
Robust 
SE
z P>z dy/dx
Gender (Female=1) -0.033 0.045 -0.720 0.470 -0.122 0.056 0.643
Age 0.004 0.002 2.1 0.039 0.000 0.008 -0.080
Log10VL 0.079 0.027 2.9 0.004 0.026 0.133 -1.550
Year 1st ART 0.266 0.009 29.7 0.000 0.249 0.284 -5.188
Regimen Number -0.012 0.030 -0.410 0.680 -0.070 0.046 0.239
Number of PIs 0.032 0.026 1.220 0.221 -0.019 0.083 -0.618
Resistance Class (1 is reference)
1<=R<5 0.330 0.064 5.2 0.000 0.205 0.455 -6.225
5<=R<10 0.393 0.065 6.0 0.000 0.266 0.521 -7.348
R>=10 0.385 0.065 5.9 0.000 0.257 0.513 -7.021
Constant -540.2 18.0 -30.0 0.000 -575.6 -504.9
/ln_p 0.627 0.023 27.2 0.000 0.582 0.673
p 1.873 0.043 1.8 2.0
[95% CI]
(Std. Err. adjusted for 1,864 clusters in id)
31 [29;34]         
Pred. median= 36.5
Notes: ART= Antiretroviral Therapy,Log10VL=log10 HIV RNA copies per mL,PI=Protease Inhibitor, R=Genotypic Sensitivity 
Score (inverted).
Weibull Regression -- Log Relative-Hazard Form
No. of subjects = 1,302 Number of obs= 3,205
No. of failures = 1,328 Wald χ2(12)= 208
Time at risk    = 63,356 Prob > χ2= 0.000
Log l ikelihood= -2,259 (Std. Err. adjusted for 1,302 clusters in id)
AIC= 4,547
BIC= 4,632
Time to Switch 
Without VF
Coef.
Robust 
SE
z P>z dy/dx
Gender (Female=1) 0.073 0.083 0.880 0.379 -0.090 0.236 -2.7
Age 0.006 0.004 1.5 0.148 -0.002 0.014 -0.079
Log10VL -0.100 0.034 -2.9 0.003 -0.167 -0.033 1.3
CD4+ 0.000 0.000 0.230 0.815 0.000 0.000 0.003
HCV 0.246 0.083 3.0 0.003 0.083 0.408 -5.2
Adherence 0.030 0.003 8.9 0.000 0.023 0.037 -0.940
Year 1st ART 0.034 0.019 1.8 0.072 -0.003 0.070 -1.2
Number of PIs 0.199 0.041 4.9 0.000 0.119 0.279 -5.7
Resistance Level -0.055 0.035 -1.6 0.119 -0.124 0.014 0.269
Regimen Number -0.097 0.034 -2.9 0.004 -0.164 -0.030 1.1
Line (1 is reference)
Line 2 0.096 0.092 1.0 0.299 -0.085 0.276 -2.8
Line 3 -0.072 0.124 -0.580 0.561 -0.314 0.170 -1.4
Constant -76.2 37.4 -2.0 0.041 -149.5 -3.0
/ln_p 0.405 0.040 10.2 0.000 0.327 0.483
p 1.5 0.060 1.4 1.6
[95% CI]
Note: ART=Antiretroviral Therapy, CD4+=CD4+ T-Lymphocyte count per µL, HVC=Hepatitis C-Virus, Log10VL=log10 HIV 
RNA copies per mL, PI=Protease Inhibitor, VF=Virological Failure
35 [32;39]        
Pred. median=41
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Table 57: Regression Model for Time to First Resistance 
 
 
Table 58: Regression Model for Time to Resistance Class Switch 
 
Weibull Regression -- Log Relative-Hazard Form
No. of subjects = 1,298 Number of obs= 3,094
No. of failures = 60 Wald χ2(8)= 40.7
Time at risk    = 61,754 Prob > χ2= 0.000
Log Pseudolikelihood= -248.3
AIC= 98.0
BIC= 144.3
Time to First Resistance Coef. Robust z P>z dy/dx
Gender (Female=1) -0.04 0.290 -0.13 0.896 -0.606 0.530 8.59
Age 0.02 0.012 1.98 0.048 0.000 0.046 -5.18
Log10VL 0.37 0.093 4.05 0.000 0.193 0.556 -84.45
HCV 0.12 0.289 0.40 0.690 -0.451 0.682 -26.00
Adherence -0.01 0.006 -2.21 0.027 -0.024 -0.001 2.91
Year 1st ART 0.10 0.056 1.76 0.078 -0.011 0.209 -22.29
Number of PIs 0.15 0.108 1.39 0.165 -0.062 0.362 -33.89
Regimen Number -0.02 0.154 -0.12 0.908 -0.319 0.284 3.99
Constant -208.48 112.970 -1.85 0.065 -429.891 12.941
/ln_p 0.41 0.186 2.18 0.029 0.041 0.772
p 1.50 0.280 1.04 2.164
(Std. Err. adjusted for 1,298 
clusters in id)
[95% CI]
Pred. 
Median=338
Notes: ART=Antiretroviral Therapy, HVC=Hepatitis C Virus, Log10VL=log10 HIV RNA copies per mL, PI=Protease Inhibitor
Weibull Regression -- Log Relative-Hazard Form
No. of subjects = 2,323 Number of obs= 2,713
No. of failures = 1,236 Wald χ2(6)= 186
Time at risk    = 74,712 Prob > χ2= 0.000
Log l ikelihood= -1,238
AIC= 1,145
Time to Resistance Class 
Switch
Coef.
Robust 
SE
z P>z dy/dx
Gender (Female=1) 0.013 0.065 0.2 0.838 -0.114 0.141 -0.486
Age 0.015 0.003 5.3 0.000 0.010 0.021 -0.555
Log10VL 0.089 0.036 2.4 0.015 0.018 0.160 -3.249
Year 1st ART -0.001 0.000 -7.0 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.020
Regimen Number 0.172 0.037 4.7 0.000 0.100 0.245 -6.310
Number of PIs -0.187 0.034 -5.5 0.000 -0.254 -0.120 6.850
Constant -6.7 0.289 -23.1 0.000 -7.3 -6.1
/ln_p 0.421 0.029 14.4 0.000 0.364 0.479
p 1.524 0.045 1.4 1.6
[95% CI]
(Std. Err. adjusted for 
2,323 clusters in id)
87 [85;89]     
Pred. 
median=86
Note: ART=Antiretroviral Therapy, CI=Confidence Interval, Log10VL=Log10 HIV RNA copies per mL, PI=Protease 
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Table 59: Regression Model for Time to Hospitalization  
 
Table 60: Time to Death among HIV Infected Individuals 
  
Weibull Regression -- Log Relative-Hazard Form
No. of subjects = 1,301 Number of obs 41,721
No. of failures = 600 Wald χ2(10)= 98.4
Time at risk    = 63,282 Prob > χ2= 0.000
Log pseudolikelihood= -1,621
AIC= 3,267
BIC= 3,379
Time to hospitalization 
Event
Coef.
Robust   
SE
z P>z dy/dx
Gender (Female=1) -0.088 0.162 -0.5 0.587 -0.405 0.229 11.149
Age 0.020 0.008 2.5 0.011 0.005 0.036 -2.502
Log10VL 0.146 0.053 2.8 0.006 0.042 0.251 -18.216
CD4+ -0.001 0.000 -3.6 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.146
HCV 0.255 0.136 1.9 0.061 -0.012 0.523 -32.008
Adherence -0.003 0.003 -1.1 0.278 -0.010 0.003 0.424
Year of 1st ART -0.010 0.021 -0.5 0.617 -0.051 0.030 1.295
Number of PIs 0.028 0.074 0.4 0.709 -0.118 0.173 -3.453
Resistance Level 0.064 0.035 1.8 0.070 -0.005 0.133 -7.927
Line (1 is reference)
2 0.289 0.132 2.2 0.029 0.030 0.548 -34.500
3 0.711 0.242 2.9 0.003 0.236 1.186 -64.061
Constant 16.3 41.5 0.4 0.694 -65.1 97.7
/ln_p -0.311 0.057 -5.4 0.000 -0.423 -0.199
p 0.733 0.042 0.655 0.820
[95% CI]
(Std. Err. adjusted for 
1,301 clusters in id)
72 [64;82]         
Pred. median=90
Note: ART=Antiretroviral Therapy,HVC=Hepatitis C-Virus, Log10VL=log10 HIV RNA copies per 
mL, PI=Protease Inhibitor
Weibull Regression -- Log Relative-Hazard Form
No. of subjects = 34,185 Number of obs= 34,185
No. of failures = 8,278 Wald χ2(7)= 3,807
Time at risk    = 2,875,986 Prob > χ2= 0.000
Log l ikelihood= -30,183
AIC= 60,387
BIC= 60,471
Time Death Coef.
Robust         
SE
z P>z dy/dx
Time
Gender (Female=1) -0.189 0.033 -5.8 0.000 -0.253 -0.125 1,523
Age at Diagnosis 0.021 0.001 17.3 0.000 0.019 0.024 -153
Transmission Group
Heterosexual (reference)
IDU 0.523 0.031 16.8 0.000 0.462 0.584 -3,692
Homosexual 0.140 0.039 3.6 0.000 0.063 0.217 -900
Other 0.516 0.059 8.7 0.000 0.399 0.632 -2,300
Year of Diagnosis -0.092 0.003 -34.1 0.000 -0.097 -0.086 660
HIV Stage
Non-AIDS  (reference)
AIDS 2.7 0.066 41.1 0.000 2.597 2.9 -18,143
Constant 176.9 5.4 33.0 0.000 166.4 187.5
ln_p
HIV Stage
Non-AIDS  (reference)
AIDS -0.205 0.026 -7.9 0.000 -0.255 -0.154
Constant -0.726 0.025 -29.5 0.000 -0.774 -0.678
[95% CI]
Notes: AIDS=Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, HIV=Human Immunodeficiency Virus, IDU=Injection Drug User
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Appendix VI  
The Mixed Logit Model 
A Mixed Logit Model is any model whose choice probabilities can be expressed in the form 
𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = �𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 (𝜷𝜷)𝑓𝑓(𝜷𝜷)𝑑𝑑𝛽𝛽 
where, 
𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 (𝜷𝜷) =
𝐻𝐻𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 (𝜷𝜷)
∑ 𝐻𝐻𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗 (𝜷𝜷)𝐽𝐽𝑗𝑗=1
 
There are, hence, two sets of parameters to be estimated in a mixed Logit model: the 
parameters β and the parameters that describe the density of β, 𝑓𝑓(𝜷𝜷).  
In our analysis, the coefficient associated with physical and mental health was assumed fixed as 
the common main attribute associated with quality of life among HIV infected individuals, while 
the remaining factors were assumed random, since their weight in quality of life may vary 
significantly among individuals. This allows us to quantify the dispersion in the relative weight 
of the remaining factors with respect to health.  
A Normal distribution was assumed for the distribution of the random parameters. Employment 
was assumed to follow a Normal distribution, to allow for the possibility that employment may 
be regarded as undesirable by some individuals. Fear of future consequences of the disease 
and/or premature death was also assumed to follow a Normal distribution to allow for the 
possibility of the “will to live” phenomenon described in the literature [178]. The coefficients 
associated with the remaining attributes are expected to be positive for every individual and to 
ensure estimation results which are in line with that assumption, a Lognormal distribution is 
often used.  
In the present analysis, utility was assumed linear in β, consequently: 
𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = ��
𝐻𝐻𝜷𝜷′𝒙𝒙𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝐻𝐻𝜷𝜷′𝒙𝒙𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
� 𝑓𝑓(𝜷𝜷)𝑑𝑑𝜷𝜷 
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In this case, the mixed Logit Probability is a weighted average of the Logit formula evaluated at 
different values of β, with the weights given by the density f (β)110
In the questionnaire, respondents were asked to make repeated choices. Each individual was 
asked to choose the worse alternative in each of the 9 choice sets presented. Consequently, the 
data obtained has a panel structure. Given that all choices were performed in a single moment 
in time, it was assumed that the β parameters, although varying among people, were constant 
over choices of the same individual
.  
111
Conditional on β, the probability that the person makes this sequence of choices i =
 (i1, . . . , iT) is: 
𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 (𝜷𝜷) = ��
𝐻𝐻𝜷𝜷𝑀𝑀 ′𝒙𝒙𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡
∑ 𝐻𝐻𝜷𝜷𝑀𝑀 ′𝒙𝒙𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗
�
𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡=1
 
. In this context, utility from alternative 𝑗𝑗 in choice 
situation 𝑡𝑡 by person 𝑀𝑀 is 𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡  =  βnxnjt  +  εnjt  , with 𝜀𝜀𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡  being independent and identically 
distributed (i.i.d.) extreme value over time, people, and alternatives.  
since the  ε𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗 𝑡𝑡  ’s are independent over time. The uncondicional probability is, thus, the integral 
of this product over all possible values of β:  
𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 = �𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 (𝜷𝜷)𝑓𝑓(𝜷𝜷)𝑑𝑑𝜷𝜷 
It should be noted that the i.i.d. assumption on ε𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡  does not imply the independence from 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption, since the ratio of mixed Logit probabilities, Pni  
𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗
, 
depends on all the data, including attributes of alternatives other than 𝑖𝑖 or 𝑗𝑗 (since the 
denominators of the Logit formula are inside the integrals, they do not cancel one another) 
In fact, in the random coefficient specification, utility is always correlated among alternatives. 
To observe this fact, the coefficients 𝛃𝛃n  can be decomposed into their mean α and deviations 
µn , so that Unj =  𝛂𝛂𝐱𝐱nj +  𝛍𝛍n’𝐱𝐱nj + εnj  , where  𝛍𝛍n’𝐱𝐱nj + εnj  ,  represents the unobservable part 
of utility. The covariance between alternative 𝑖𝑖 and alternative 𝑗𝑗 is, therefore: E(𝛍𝛍n𝐱𝐱ni +
 εni  )(𝛍𝛍n𝐱𝐱nj +  εnj  )  =  𝐱𝐱ni W𝐱𝐱nj  , where 𝑊𝑊 is the covariance of  µn . Utility is correlated over 
alternatives even when, as in most specifications, the error components are independent, such 
as when 𝑊𝑊 is diagonal.  
                                                          
110 In the statistics literature, the weighted average of several functions is called a mixed function, and the density that provides the 
weights is called the mixing distribution. 
111 Identification issues arise with regard to socio-demographic variables, as these do not vary among alternatives and in choice 
models only differences in utility matter. 
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Along with the percentage of correct predictions, the overall significance of the model  is 
evaluated by comparing the value of the log likelihood function with the base model, where the 
base case coefficients were all set to zero [234]. Two test statistics were used, both based on 
comparison of the likelihood function:  
The pseudo-R2 or Likelihood Ratio Index of McFadden: 
𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅2 = 1 −
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝐻𝐻
 
And the Wald statistics 
𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑 𝜒𝜒2 = −2(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝐻𝐻 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑 )~𝜒𝜒𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑 −𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝐻𝐻2  
 
The WHOQoLHIV and WHOQoL-BREF – a comparison  
Table 61 provides a summary of the average scores on each domain of the questionnaires used 
by Canavarro et al. [239] and Reis et al. [132, 134]. Average scores are not directly comparable, 
since the instrument used is not the same. In Canavarro et al. the WHOQoL-HIV is used while in 
Reis et al. the WHOQoL-BREF was selected. Table 62 provides a comparison between the facets 
included in each. 
Table 61: Average WHOQOL-HIV and WHOQOL-BREF Scores in Portugal 
 
 
With respect to sample variability, the Canavarro et al. sample has a higher proportion of 
women (40% versus 31%) and more educated individuals (18% with college degree versus 8%). 
Age, which is an important factor in HIV infection characterization, namely due to its link to the 
Source
Instrument
HIV Stage
N 15 190
Average SD Average SD Average SD p-value Average SD Average SD Average SD Average SD
Physical 0.557 0.193 0.453 0.155 0.428 0.180 0.000 0.587 0.027 0.443 0.003 0.488 0.016 0.574 0.026
Pscycological 0.643 0.195 0.583 0.151 0.555 0.176 0.020 0.588 0.026 0.411 0.015 0.449 0.044 0.570 0.029
Level of Independence 0.691 0.190 0.576 0.155 0.508 0.150 0.000
Social Relationships 0.650 0.177 0.533 0.151 0.579 0.178 0.002 0.540 0.043 0.393 0.015 0.405 0.030 0.524 0.043
Environment 0.598 0.150 0.543 0.111 0.526 0.135 0.010 0.543 0.025 0.393 0.020 0.445 0.054 0.530 0.028
Spirituality 0.527 0.192 0.526 0.152 0.484 0.188 0.440
Overall 0.597 0.211 0.492 0.171 0.474 0.174 0.001 0.541 0.201 0.306 0.189 0.394 0.258 0.521 0.213
Notes: In Canavarro et al.  (2008)  of the 200 individuals, 36 did not known their HIV-stage. HIV=Human Immunodeficiency Virus, N=Number of Observations/Individuals, SD=Standard 
Deviation, WHOQOL-HIV=World Health Organization Quality of Life Questionary for HIV Patients, WHOQOL-BREF=World Health Organization Quality of Life Questionary for HIV 
Symptomatic
7
Asymptomatic AIDS Al lSymptomatic AIDS
Reis et al.  (2007)
WHOQOL-BREF
87 37 39 168
Canavarro et al.  (2008)
WHOQOL-HIV
Asymptomatic
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mode of transmission, is not reported in the Canavarro et al. sample and is 40 years-old in the 
Reis et al. sample. The Canavarro sample does not provide information on where the 
questionnaires took place.    
Table 62: Correspondence between the WHOQOL-HIV / WHOQOL-BREF Facets and the DCE Attributes 
 
  
Model Domains
WHOQOL-BREF 
FACET
WHOQOL-HIV 
FACET Description
3 1 Pain and Disconfort
10 2 Energy and Fatigue
16 3 Sleep and Rest
50 Symptoms of PLWHA
5 4 Positive Feelings / Enjoy Life
7 5 Thinking, Learning, Memory and Concentration
19 6 Self-Esteem
11 7 Bodily Image and Appearance
26 8 Negative Feelings
15 9 Mobility
17 10 Activities of Daily Living
4 11 Dependence on Medication or Treatments
18 12 Work Capacity
20 13 Personal Relationships
22 14 Social Support
21 15 Sexual Activity
Discrimination 51 Social Inclusion
22 16 Physical Safety and Security
21 17 Home Environment
19 18 Financial Resources
Healthcare 24 19 Health and Social Care: Accessibil ity and Quality
13 20 Access to Relevant Information
14 21 Participation in Recreation / Leisure Activities
23 22 Physical Environment
25 23 Transport
6 24 Spirituality / Religion / Personal Beliefs
52 Forgiveness and Blame*
53 Concerns about the Future*
54 Death and Dying*
HIV=Human Immunodeficiency Virus, WHOQOL-BREF: World Health Organization Quality of Life Questionary for HIV 
Patients, Brief Version, WHOQOL-HIV: World Health Organization Quality of Life Questionary for HIV Patients, 
PLWHA=People Living With HIV/AIDS
Health
Lifestyle
Notes: * HIV Specific Questions
Love / Sexual 
Relationship
Future
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The Discrete Choice Questionnaire 
 
VIH+
Que qualidade de vida?
A melhoria da qualidade de vida das pessoas infectadas pelo VIH implica 
conhecer os factores que determinam essa mesma qualidade de vida.
Preencher este questionário é um passo nesse sentido. 
Este questionário é anónimo. Muito obrigada pela sua colaboração.
Filipa Aragão, Escola Nacional de Saúde Pública.
Os dados recolhidos serão utilizados exclusivamente no âmbito da tese de Doutoramento.
Os resultados agregados da análise serão apresentados publicamente.  
Esta participação será voluntária, pelo que poderá interrompê-la a 
qualquer momento.
Consentimento informado 
 
Gostaríamos de saber se aceita colaborar neste estudo respondendo a 
algumas questões. 
As suas informações são estritamente confidenciais pois os resultados serão 
codificados e utilizadas apenas neste estudo. Esta participação será 
voluntária , pelo que poderá interrompê-la a qualquer momento. 
 
 
Data ........../........../..........   Data ....../ ........./........... 
Assinatura do Investigador   Assinatura do participante 
______________________   _____________________ 
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(Aproximadamente)
Imagine 
que a 
Isabel: 
Está doente
Tem uma péssima 
relação 
amorosa/sexual
Está 
desempregada
Na sua opinião, quem está em
pior situação?
Imagine 
que a 
Maria: 
Está bem de 
saúde
Tem uma 
excelente relação 
amorosa/ sexual
Tem um bom 
ordenado
As respostas a este questionário consistem em escolher , para cada 
par de situações hipotéticas, quem, na sua opinião, está em pior 
situação . Por exemplo:
Como a Isabel está pior que a Maria, deverá ser colocada uma 
cruz no quadrado em frente à situação da Isabel.
Sexo: Masculino
Feminino
Heterossexual
Homossexual
Toxicodependência
Outra/desconhecida
Idade:
Categoria de 
transmissão:
CD4+:
Caracterização
Instruções
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1.
2.
3.
Na sua opinião, 
quem está em
pior situação?
Imagine 
que o Zé: 
Não se preocupa 
com  o facto  de 
poder morrer 
precocemente ou de 
sofrer com doenças 
graves
Sente-se 
doente,  
deprimido ou 
incapaz de 
cuidar de si 
próprio
Está impedido de 
fazer o  que gosta por 
causa do tratamento 
e/ou a medicação 
provoca-lhe efeitos 
adversos graves
Tem dificuldade em 
levantar a medicação, 
em fazer análises, em 
falar com seu o médico 
assistente quando 
necessita.
Nunca se sente 
discriminado, a 
infecção por VIH 
não tem 
qualquer estigma 
social
A infecção pelo  
VIH pouco ou 
nada afecta a 
sua relação 
amorosa/sexual
Tem emprego
Imagine 
que o 
Manuel: 
Vive preocupado 
com com o facto  de 
poder morrer 
precocemente ou 
sofrer com doenças 
graves
Sentre-se 
saudável, com 
energia.
Tem o tratamento 
perfeitamente 
integrado no seu 
estilo  de vida  e/ou a 
medicação não lhe 
provoca efeitos 
adversos graves
Tem acesso fácil à 
medicação, às análises 
de ro tina e ao médico 
assistente sempre que 
necessita
No dia-a-dia 
sente-se 
constantemente 
discriminado
Não consegue 
ter ou manter 
uma relação 
amorosa/sexual 
pelo facto  de 
ser VIH+.
Está 
desempregado
Na sua opinião, 
quem está em
pior situação?
Imagine 
que o Zé: 
Não se preocupa 
com  o facto  de 
poder morrer 
precocemente ou de 
sofrer com doenças 
graves
Sente-se 
doente,  
deprimido ou 
incapaz de 
cuidar de si 
próprio
Tem o tratamento 
perfeitamente 
integrado no seu 
estilo  de vida  e/ou a 
medicação não lhe 
provoca efeitos 
adversos graves
Tem acesso fácil à 
medicação, às análises 
de ro tina e ao médico 
assistente sempre que 
necessita.
No dia-a-dia 
sente-se 
constantemente 
discriminado
Não consegue 
ter ou manter 
uma relação 
amorosa/sexual 
pelo facto  de 
ser VIH+.
Tem emprego
Imagine 
que o 
Manuel: 
Vive preocupado 
com com o facto  de 
poder morrer 
precocemente ou 
sofrer com doenças 
graves
Sentre-se 
saudável, com 
energia.
Está impedido de 
fazer o  que gosta por 
causa do tratamento 
e/ou a medicação 
provoca-lhe efeitos 
adversos graves
Tem dificuldade em 
levantar a medicação, 
em fazer análises, em 
falar com seu o médico 
assistente quando 
necessita.
Nunca se sente 
discriminado, a 
infecção por VIH 
não tem 
qualquer estigma 
social
A infecção pelo  
VIH pouco ou 
nada afecta a 
sua relação 
amorosa/sexual
Está 
desempregado
Na sua opinião, 
quem está em
pior situação?
Imagine 
que o Zé: 
Não se preocupa 
com  o facto  de 
poder morrer 
precocemente ou de 
sofrer com doenças 
graves
Sentre-se 
saudável, com 
energia.
Está impedido de 
fazer o  que gosta por 
causa do tratamento 
e/ou a medicação 
provoca-lhe efeitos 
adversos graves
Tem acesso fácil à 
medicação, às análises 
de ro tina e ao médico 
assistente sempre que 
necessita.
No dia-a-dia 
sente-se 
constantemente 
discriminado
A infecção pelo  
VIH pouco ou 
nada afecta a 
sua relação 
amorosa/sexual
Está 
desempregado
Imagine 
que o 
Manuel: 
Vive preocupado 
com com o facto  de 
poder morrer 
precocemente ou 
sofrer com doenças 
graves
Sente-se 
doente,  
deprimido ou 
incapaz de 
cuidar de si 
próprio
Tem o tratamento 
perfeitamente 
integrado no seu 
estilo  de vida  e/ou a 
medicação não lhe 
provoca efeitos 
adversos graves
Tem dificuldade em 
levantar a medicação, 
em fazer análises, em 
falar com seu o médico 
assistente quando 
necessita.
Nunca se sente 
discriminado, a 
infecção por VIH 
não tem 
qualquer estigma 
social
Não consegue 
ter ou manter 
uma relação 
amorosa/sexual 
pelo facto  de 
ser VIH+.
Tem emprego
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4.
5.
6.
Na sua opinião, 
quem está em
pior situação?
Imagine 
que o Zé: 
Não se preocupa 
com  o facto  de 
poder morrer 
precocemente ou de 
sofrer com doenças 
graves
Sentre-se 
saudável, com 
energia.
Tem o tratamento 
perfeitamente 
integrado no seu 
estilo  de vida  e/ou a 
medicação não lhe 
provoca efeitos 
adversos graves
Tem dificuldade em 
levantar a medicação, 
em fazer análises, em 
falar com seu o médico 
assistente quando 
necessita.
Nunca se sente 
discriminado, a 
infecção por VIH 
não tem 
qualquer estigma 
social
Não consegue 
ter ou manter 
uma relação 
amorosa/sexual 
pelo facto  de 
ser VIH+.
Está 
desempregado
Imagine 
que o 
Manuel: 
Vive preocupado 
com com o facto  de 
poder morrer 
precocemente ou 
sofrer com doenças 
graves
Sente-se 
doente,  
deprimido ou 
incapaz de 
cuidar de si 
próprio
Está impedido de 
fazer o  que gosta por 
causa do tratamento 
e/ou a medicação 
provoca-lhe efeitos 
adversos graves
Tem acesso fácil à 
medicação, às análises 
de ro tina e ao médico 
assistente sempre que 
necessita.
No dia-a-dia 
sente-se 
constantemente 
discriminado
A infecção pelo  
VIH pouco ou 
nada afecta a 
sua relação 
amorosa/sexual
Tem emprego
Na sua opinião, 
quem está em
pior situação?
Imagine 
que o Zé: 
Não se preocupa 
com  o facto  de 
poder morrer 
precocemente ou de 
sofrer com doenças 
graves
Sentre-se 
saudável, com 
energia.
Tem o tratamento 
perfeitamente 
integrado no seu 
estilo  de vida  e/ou a 
medicação não lhe 
provoca efeitos 
adversos graves
Tem acesso fácil à 
medicação, às análises 
de ro tina e ao médico 
assistente sempre que 
necessita.
Nunca se sente 
discriminado, a 
infecção por VIH 
não tem 
qualquer estigma 
social
Tem emprego
Imagine 
que o 
Manuel: 
Vive preocupado 
com com o facto  de 
poder morrer 
precocemente ou 
sofrer com doenças 
graves
Sente-se 
doente,  
deprimido ou 
incapaz de 
cuidar de si 
próprio
Está impedido de 
fazer o  que gosta por 
causa do tratamento 
e/ou a medicação 
provoca-lhe efeitos 
adversos graves
Tem dificuldade em 
levantar a medicação, 
em fazer análises, em 
falar com seu o médico 
assistente quando 
necessita.
No dia-a-dia 
sente-se 
constantemente 
discriminado
A infecção pelo  
VIH pouco ou 
nada afecta a 
sua relação 
amorosa/sexual
Está 
desempregado
Imagine 
que o 
Manuel: 
Não se preocupa 
com  o facto  de 
poder morrer 
precocemente ou de 
sofrer com doenças 
graves
Sentre-se 
saudável, com 
energia.
Tem o tratamento 
perfeitamente 
integrado no seu 
estilo  de vida  e/ou a 
medicação não lhe 
provoca efeitos 
adversos graves
Tem dificuldade em 
levantar a medicação, 
em fazer análises, em 
falar com seu o médico 
assistente quando 
necessita.
No dia-a-dia 
sente-se 
constantemente 
discriminado
A infecção pelo  
VIH pouco ou 
nada afecta a 
sua relação 
amorosa/sexual
Tem emprego
Imagine 
que o Zé: 
Vive preocupado 
com com o facto  de 
poder morrer 
precocemente ou 
sofrer com doenças 
graves
Sente-se 
doente,  
deprimido ou 
incapaz de 
cuidar de si 
próprio
Está impedido de 
fazer o  que gosta por 
causa do tratamento 
e/ou a medicação 
provoca-lhe efeitos 
adversos graves
Tem acesso fácil à 
medicação, às análises 
de ro tina e ao médico 
assistente sempre que 
necessita.
Nunca se sente 
discriminado, a 
infecção por VIH 
não tem 
qualquer estigma 
social
Não consegue 
ter ou manter 
uma relação 
amorosa/sexual 
pelo facto  de 
ser VIH+.
Está 
desempregado
Na sua opinião, 
quem está em
pior situação?
Não consegue 
ter ou manter 
uma relação 
amorosa/sexual 
pelo facto  de 
ser VIH+.
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7.
8.
9.
Muito obrigada pela sua colaboração!!
Na sua opinião, 
quem está em
pior situação?
Imagine 
que o Zé: 
Vive preocupado 
com com o facto  de 
poder morrer 
precocemente ou 
sofrer com doenças 
graves
Sente-se 
doente,  
deprimido ou 
incapaz de 
cuidar de si 
próprio
Tem o tratamento 
perfeitamente 
integrado no seu 
estilo  de vida  e/ou a 
medicação não lhe 
provoca efeitos 
adversos graves
Tem dificuldade em 
levantar a medicação, 
em fazer análises, em 
falar com seu o médico 
assistente quando 
necessita.
No dia-a-dia 
sente-se 
constantemente 
discriminado
A infecção pelo  
VIH pouco ou 
nada afecta a 
sua relação 
amorosa/sexual
Está 
desempregado
Imagine 
que o 
Manuel: 
Não se preocupa 
com  o facto  de 
poder morrer 
precocemente ou de 
sofrer com doenças 
graves
Sentre-se 
saudável, com 
energia.
Está impedido de 
fazer o  que gosta por 
causa do tratamento 
e/ou a medicação 
provoca-lhe efeitos 
adversos graves
Tem acesso fácil à 
medicação, às análises 
de ro tina e ao médico 
assistente sempre que 
necessita.
Nunca se sente 
discriminado, a 
infecção por VIH 
não tem 
qualquer estigma 
social
Não consegue 
ter ou manter 
uma relação 
amorosa/sexual 
pelo facto  de 
ser VIH+.
Tem emprego
Na sua opinião, 
quem está em
pior situação?
Imagine 
que o Zé: 
Vive preocupado 
com com o facto  de 
poder morrer 
precocemente ou 
sofrer com doenças 
graves
Sentre-se 
saudável, com 
energia.
Está impedido de 
fazer o  que gosta por 
causa do tratamento 
e/ou a medicação 
provoca-lhe efeitos 
adversos graves
Tem dificuldade em 
levantar a medicação, 
em fazer análises, em 
falar com seu o médico 
assistente quando 
necessita.
No dia-a-dia 
sente-se 
constantemente 
discriminado
Não consegue 
ter ou manter 
uma relação 
amorosa/sexual 
pelo facto  de 
ser VIH+.
Tem emprego
Imagine 
que o 
Manuel: 
Não se preocupa 
com  o facto  de 
poder morrer 
precocemente ou de 
sofrer com doenças 
graves
Sente-se 
doente,  
deprimido ou 
incapaz de 
cuidar de si 
próprio
Tem o tratamento 
perfeitamente 
integrado no seu 
estilo  de vida  e/ou a 
medicação não lhe 
provoca efeitos 
adversos graves
Tem acesso fácil à 
medicação, às análises 
de ro tina e ao médico 
assistente sempre que 
necessita.
Nunca se sente 
discriminado, a 
infecção por VIH 
não tem 
qualquer estigma 
social
A infecção pelo  
VIH pouco ou 
nada afecta a 
sua relação 
amorosa/sexual
Está 
desempregado
Imagine 
que o 
Manuel: 
Não se preocupa 
com  o facto  de 
poder morrer 
precocemente ou de 
sofrer com doenças 
graves
Sente-se 
doente,  
deprimido ou 
incapaz de 
cuidar de si 
próprio
Está impedido de 
fazer o  que gosta por 
causa do tratamento 
e/ou a medicação 
provoca-lhe efeitos 
adversos graves
Tem dificuldade em 
levantar a medicação, 
em fazer análises, em 
falar com seu o médico 
assistente quando 
necessita.
No dia-a-dia 
sente-se 
constantemente 
discriminado
Não consegue 
ter ou manter 
uma relação 
amorosa/sexual 
pelo facto  de 
ser VIH+.
Está 
desempregado
Na sua opinião, 
quem está em
pior situação?
Imagine 
que o Zé: 
Vive preocupado 
com com o facto  de 
poder morrer 
precocemente ou 
sofrer com doenças 
graves
Sentre-se 
saudável, com 
energia.
Tem o tratamento 
perfeitamente 
integrado no seu 
estilo  de vida  e/ou a 
medicação não lhe 
provoca efeitos 
adversos graves
Tem acesso fácil à 
medicação, às análises 
de ro tina e ao médico 
assistente sempre que 
necessita.
Nunca se sente 
discriminado, a 
infecção por VIH 
não tem 
qualquer estigma 
social
A infecção pelo  
VIH pouco ou 
nada afecta a 
sua relação 
amorosa/sexual
Tem emprego
